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The ongoing transition of the energy system are altering the way energy is produced, 
distributed and consumed. It has the promise of increased energy democracy and more 
distributed decentralised developments and benefits. Yet, not everyone or every place has 
equal access to these transition opportunities. Access to energy is already precarious for 
some households leading to what is conceptualised in literature as energy vulnerabilities 
and energy injustice. However, little explored remains how the nature of place – in its 
interplays with social, economic and political factors – impacts upon energy 
vulnerabilities and energy transition.  
This thesis fills this gap by exploring energy transition experiences in sub-regional 
peripheries of South Wales, illuminating the interplay between vulnerability, 
peripherality and transition. It does so by adopting an energy justice and spatial justice 
framework, a qualitative case study methodology and mixed research methods including 
interviews, personal observations, document and secondary data analysis. The research 
demonstrates how drivers of energy vulnerabilities (such as difficulty in affording and 
accessing energy) are place-specific and defined by factors associated with 
peripheralization: lack of agglomerative advantage, political peripheralization, sparse and 
shrinking population, poor energy infrastructure, high energy costs, high costs of living, 
dependence on external investment, limited employment opportunities and low incomes. 
Peripheralization is a self-reinforcing circular process, driven by disadvantageous 
political, symbolic, economic processes manifest spatially. The mutually reinforcing 
circles of peripheralization and energy vulnerabilities limit economic, political and social 
capacity to transition and restrain transition benefits.  
Research findings overall elucidate the production of spatially contingent energy 
vulnerabilities, thus also making contribution to the advancement of energy vulnerability 
and transition literature. It is also shown that geographic processes influence transition 
mode, trajectory and outcomes. Policy implications are identified, including the 
importance of recognising that energy vulnerability is influenced by place-specific factors 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Energy justice calls for the fair and equitable distribution of costs and benefits for all 
throughout the energy system. Yet energy systems all over the world are misaligned with 
this concept leaving many people deprived of the energy they need, unable to take 
advantage of opportunities for benefits, and/or more likely to incur other costs. In the UK 
it is estimated that there are approximately 3.65 million households that are currently fuel 
poor (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy [BEIS] 2018a), living 
without the energy they need to access fundamental services such as heat, light, cooked 
food and transportation. Consequently, they are at higher risk of poor physical and mental 
health, poor educational attainment, and social exclusion.  
Fuel poverty is now a political concern (Hills et al. 2013; Boardman 2015). However, 
despite illuminating the risks associated with energy deprivation and enabling formal 
assistance to many households in fuel poverty, the concept is narrow, focusing on causes 
of deprivation at the point of energy consumption, or ‘end-use’. In this way, policy 
interventions have enjoyed limited success and unfortunately while recognising many 
people at risk, still overlook many others. Similarly, the concept of ‘energy poverty’ used 
mostly to conceptualise energy deprivation in the global south due to mainly 
infrastructural limitations has been critiqued for its narrowness (Bouzarovski 2013). 
Energy vulnerability is a more comprehensive concept, combining elements of fuel 
poverty and energy poverty (Day & Walker 2013; Bouzarovski et al. 2014). It is 
conceptualized as “the propensity of an individual to become incapable of securing a 
materially and socially needed level of energy service in the home” (Bouzarovski et al. 
2014, p.10). In this way it differs from fuel poverty and energy poverty, which are 
outcomes of precarious energy contexts, instead, exploring and highlighting the multiple 
factors that create such precarious contexts. Energy vulnerability comprises six drivers; 
access, affordability, flexibility, energy efficiency, needs and practices (Simcock & 
Petrova 2017). As such, energy vulnerability expands fuel poverty considerations to be 
able to include more nuanced factors such as climate, energy networks and socio-cultural 
practices while still including factors accounted for in fuel poverty, such as building 
structures and energy price. 
However, while energy vulnerability accounts for multiple socio-economic structures that 
make accessing energy precarious, it does not necessarily address the differential 
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influence of place and space – in other words, the geography of vulnerability. It is 
important that this aspect of energy vulnerability is understood as people, communities 
or places may be more or less energy vulnerable depending on their spatial position. For 
example, places spatially differentiated by hierarchical socio-spatial structures such as 
core or periphery, where the periphery is economically, culturally and politically 
disadvantaged relative to the core. Spatial hierarchies work at multiple scales, evident 
between countries, between regions within countries and also inter-regionally between 
differently defined areas, such as urban and rural. Hierarchies are formed and 
continuously reinforced by the agglomeration of social, political and economic power 
within cores but reduced within peripheries. In weaker social, economic and political 
positions peripheries are likely to experience social, economic and political 
marginalization. Thus, peripheralization is considered “a spatially organized inequity of 
power relations and access to material and symbolic goods that constructs and perpetuates 
the precedents of the centre over the marginalized” (Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013, p. 
18). Peripheralization in this way can be considered a spatial injustice. 
The development and sustainment of core and periphery are theorised as influenced by 
virtuous or vicious circles (Myrdal 1957; Krugman 1991; Fujita et al. 1999; Copus 2001) 
whereby once a process of growth or decline commences it becomes self-perpetuating 
and difficult to intercede. Energy is implicated within these processes of spatial 
development and differentiation in several ways. In requiring natural resource extraction 
for its production, then during its distribution and consumption, energy is physical (or 
material) and consequently is bound to space in different ways at different points within 
the “whole system” (Healy et al. 2019, p. 219). Furthermore, existing spatial hierarchies 
influence how and where the costs and benefits within each stage of the whole energy 
system are distributed across space. This can, for example, influence locations of intrusive 
energy development, who can access the energy produced, at what cost, or where energy 
waste is disposed of. Peripheries more likely to experience social, economic and political 
marginalization, hold less power to influence decisions over energy resource access and 
allocation, this includes over natural resources, produced goods and public spending, 
including that on essential energy services. It also limits peripheral ability to utilize 
indigenous resources, including those required for energy, in ways that maximize the 
benefit to the periphery instead of or in addition to the core. In this way, the spatial 
injustice experienced by peripheries can lead to energy injustice, but energy injustice also 
feeds into processes of spatial injustice. 
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Within this existing landscape of core and periphery with already embedded energy 
injustices and vulnerabilities, the energy system is transitioning from high-carbon to low-
carbon. This transition is driven by recognition at multiple scales that global energy 
demand is predicted to increase (Chalvatzis & Ioannidis 2017), and if met using current 
energy sources where fossil fuel remain dominant, hold direct implications for climate 
change (United Nations Development Programme 2000; Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [IPCC] 2014: United Nations General Assembly 2015). In addition, 
many countries are dependent on imported energy to meet their populations energy needs 
(Chalvatzis & Ioannidis 2017), raising concerns for security of supply and control over 
energy costs (Everet & Rampage 2012; Hawkey et al. 2013). In response to these issues 
of energy security, affordability and environmental sustainability otherwise referred to as 
the “energy trilemma” (Pye et al. 2015 p. 673), many countries are taking steps to reduce 
their carbon consumption and emissions, increasing and diversifying indigenous low 
carbon energy supplies, thus reducing reliance on carbon-heavy fossil fuel imports  
(Poudineh & Jamasb 2012). The UK has announced a ‘climate change emergency’ laying 
legislation to “eradicate its net contribution to climate change by 2050” (Gov.UK 2019, 
para 1). In addition, the UK has previously agreed to a 15% proportion of the EU carbon 
reduction target (Hammond & Pearson 2013; Hannon et al. 2013) and has set binding 
national and international targets (Climate Change Act 2008; European Commission 
2019). Within the UK, devolved nations, including Wales, had already declared climate 
change emergencies (Scottish Government 2019; Welsh Government 2019a) and have 
also set carbon emission reduction and renewable energy production targets (Welsh 
Government 2017b). Such targets have initiated many strategies towards their 
achievement, encouraging renewable energy production and increased energy efficiency 
at multiple scales.  
Transition necessitates added urgency in gaining understandings of spatial aspects of 
energy vulnerability. Low-carbon transition offers many opportunities to ensure that the 
energy regime going forward is more ‘just’ than previously. Transition can increase 
“energy democracy” (Szulecki 2018, p.21) by liberating ‘lock-in’ to traditional carbon 
heavy energy and de-monopolise and de-centralise what has been traditionally a centrally 
governed and largely centrally owned system (Foxon 2013). Additionally, local 
ownership of energy production is recognised as a means of retaining economic benefit 
within a local economy (Jones 2015; Benedek et al. 2019). Transition within this framing 
appears to reduce carbon emissions and climate change, in addition to challenging 
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existing capitalist structures that gravitate towards agglomeration, centralisation and 
maximum profit.  
However, transition holds costs as well as benefits and as is being evidenced in multiple 
places at varying scales, the distribution of these costs and benefits is not evenly 
distributed. It is increasingly recognised that low-carbon transition may increase energy 
vulnerability of social groups already in fuel poverty (Bouzarovski et al. 2017). This is 
because low-carbon transition, without concerns for justice can “lock-in patterns of 
exploitation and dispossession” (Healy & Barry 2017, p. 451) through restricting 
immediate and longer-term benefits of participation in the transition process to those with 
the most economic and socio-political capacity. Thus, “the challenge of low-carbon 
energy transition is not just one of shifting to a new and less carbon intensive socio-
technical regime. It is also a challenge in terms of making sure societal costs, risks and 
benefits of that shift are distributed in a way that can be considered ‘just’” (Sareen & 
Haarstad 2018, p. 624).  
Disadvantages associated with peripheralization such as poor infrastructures (including 
energy), lower incomes and weak governance influence (Copus 2001) link with many 
aspects of energy vulnerability and also ability to transition. Thus, energy vulnerability, 
spatialization and transition processes appear highly interlinked, however, academic 
research has tended to focus on each process individually or as a combination of only 
two. For example, spatial dimensions of energy justice (Bridge et al. 2013; Balta-Ozkan 
et al. 2015; Yenneti et al. 2016; Bouzarovski & Simcock 2017) and energy vulnerability 
(Bouzarovski 2013; Bouzarovski & Triado Herrero 2017; Simcock & Petrova 2017) have 
begun to be conceptualized, and transition literature has incorporated energy justice 
(Bouzarovski & Simcock 2017; Healy & Barry 2017; Monyei et al. 2018; Jenkins et al. 
2018). Within this emerging field of research there remains a gap in understanding the 
interplay between geographical processes of spatialization, energy vulnerabilities and 
low-carbon transition. Understanding such interplay is essential as it illuminates how and 
where energy vulnerabilities currently exist and how this may or may not change over 
space and time during transition; how and where transition will progress and to what 
effect on energy vulnerability and spatialization; and finally how existing spatial 
structures and hierarchies may influence energy vulnerabilities and modes, locations and 
outcomes of transition. Such insights will illuminate the spatial distribution of the costs 
and benefits of transition, thus how just transition currently is across space.  
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This research seeks to address this research gap, adopting a spatial justice and energy 
justice framework to illuminate the tripartite interplay between peripheralization and the 
economic, social and political disadvantages it holds, with energy vulnerability and 
energy transition. The research is part-funded by the Brecon Beacons National Park 
Authority (BBNPA) Sustainable Development Fund (SDF) which along with theoretical 
and pragmatic considerations has meant part of the research activity is within the Park 
boundary. Theoretical considerations include an understanding of peripheries as socially 
constructed places of relative low value, experiencing socio-cultural, economic and 
political disadvantage. These disadvantages perpetuate circular processes of social, 
economic and political marginalization, realised spatially. They also create and 
continuously reinforce a dependence on the core. As a relative place, periphery 
development is symbiotic with core development, peripheries are often spatially distal 
from cores, on the edge or fringe of core spaces. As a socio-spatial construct, peripheries 
are subject to scale, thus peripheries can be different places within a neighbourhood, sub-
region, region, country or the globe; core places can hold within them lower scale 
peripheries and peripheries can hold within them lower-scale cores. For the purpose of 
this research, this theoretic was simplified using Copus (2001) peripheralization model to 
select places of relative peripherality in Wales.  
Thus, the case study is located in and around the Brecon Beacons National Park (BBNP), 
Mid-South Wales. As observed by Fischer-Tahir & Nauman (2013), often peripherality 
coincides with rurality (although not exclusively), this is the case here where the study 
area is made up of predominantly rural areas but also some exurban and post-industrial 
areas. Within the case study energy has and continues to play a unique role in determining 
spatial orderings, offering an excellent vantage point to explore variegated reasons for 
and experiences of energy vulnerability and energy transition within the periphery. To 
formulate specific research aims, consideration was given to a number of key areas; 
• First, the heterogeneity of peripheralization processes and resulting 
disadvantages, and the multiple ways in which energy vulnerability can be 
experienced.  
• Second, understanding energy transitions as multi-scalar processes influenced in 
different ways, at different scales by the social, economic, and political position 
of its actors.  
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• Finally, within the three key foci of this research: peripheralization; energy 
vulnerability; and energy transition, how policy has played a key role.  
The position of policy making institutions in urban centres, uneven distributions across 
devolved nations and their regions of policy powers, public funding and political 
autonomy can interplay with economic and social peripheralization processes. Transition 
literature has pointed to the strong influence of policy in driving transition towards certain 
goals, crediting policy targets and incentives for the progress made in the UK in reducing 
Green House Gas (GHG) and carbon dioxide emissions and increasing renewable energy 
production. Fuel poverty literature has highlighted the mix of both alleviation of and 
worsening of fuel poverty due to misaligned policy objectives. Thus, a key area of 
research interest centred on the role of policy and political governance in processes of 
peripheralization, energy vulnerability and energy transition. Therefore, the following 
research questions were posed: 
a) How is peripherality experienced within and around the Brecon Beacons National 
Park, Wales? 
- How do political, economic and social factors interplay at multiple scales to 
influence peripherality at regional scales within Wales? 
- How does the production of peripheries at multiple scales influence 
experiences of periphery at a sub-regional/local scale? 
- How is peripherality experienced at a sub-regional scale? 
- How and to what effect does peripherality impact and interplay with energy 
vulnerabilities? 
 
b) How does energy vulnerability manifest within and around the Brecon Beacons 
National Park, Wales? 
- How is energy vulnerability experienced within a periphery? 
- What are the key conditions affecting energy vulnerabilities in a periphery?  
- How are key energy vulnerability conditions affecting peripheries produced? 
- How are peripheral communities counteracting energy vulnerabilities?  
 
c) How is low-carbon energy transition experienced within and around the Brecon 
Beacons National Park, Wales? 
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-  How do energy vulnerability and peripherality interplay with social, economic 
and political contexts to influence involvement in low-carbon practices and 
innovations? 
-  How do low-carbon energy practices and innovation impact upon vulnerability 
and peripherality? 
-  How do low-carbon energy practices and innovations interplay with the socio-
economic evolution of peripheral places? 
To answer these questions a qualitative case study methodology was used providing scope 
to include a range of different scale energy actors, from energy producers, energy 
consumers and overall energy governance that included interviews with households, 
community groups, third, public and private sectors. The case area was bound an area that 
included rural, exurban and post-industrial peripheries of Mid-South Wales. In this way 
the research exemplifies a multitude of perspectives that may be spatially influenced and 
thus illuminates via multiple perspectives the interplay between processes of 
peripheralization, energy vulnerability and energy transition in Wales.    
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explores the evolution of the concept 
‘energy vulnerability’. To do so, concepts of energy justice and fuel poverty are 
unpacked, highlighting their development from theories of social and environmental 
justice and their political and public use and impact. A critique of fuel poverty is outlined, 
due to its narrow definition that focuses on energy efficiency, income and energy prices. 
This limits scope of including differences between household energy access, needs, 
autonomy and flexibility and energy practices all of which are influenced by geographical 
contexts and wider socio-economic and socio-political structures.  Thus, while fuel 
poverty is an important means of raising awareness, understanding and addressing energy 
deprivation, energy vulnerability reveals that there are potentially a greater number of 
people on the verge of fuel poverty who are currently unrecognized.   
Chapter 3 offers a review of current transition literature, outlining that current 
understandings of transition are largely understood via a multi-level perspective, and that 
the dominance of this framework may have limited understandings of how transitions 
have been and continue to be carried out. In particular, the chapter is supportive of other 
literature in outlining the benefits of viewing transitions through a geographic lens. This 
then allows for concepts such as place and scale to be used for analysis, thereby taking 
into account the uneven distribution of a wide range of local endowments and local 
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contexts. Within this, reference is made to low-carbon transition in the UK, and how 
spatial factors are important influencers on how, where and by who low-carbon energy 
transitions are taken forward, and therefore how the transition may progress.   
Chapter 4 draws on Wales, as a devolved nation of the UK to highlight the connections 
between processes of spatialization, spatial justice and energy vulnerability. Such 
processes affect the relative spatial positioning of Wales within the UK but are also in 
play within Wales affecting spatial differentiation intra-Wales. It starts by unpacking 
core-periphery development, after which connections are made between such spatial 
processes and spatial justice, most notably how the resources required for energy 
production and the siting of the production itself, energy network distribution and energy 
prices are beyond the ability of periphery influence. Finally, the chapter focuses on the 
interplay between multiple and multi-scalar spatial processes with energy vulnerability at 
a domestic scale. It outlines how energy vulnerability while manifest at domestic scale, 
is a product of higher scale, socio-spatial, political and economic structures. 
Chapter 5 explains the research aims and questions followed by an explanation of the 
logic of enquiry including the overall ontological and epistemological perspective. It 
outlines the research design as one of qualitative case study and explains how the 
ontology, epistemology and research aims directed this decision. Detailed justification is 
given for how the case study was geographically bound to Mid-South Wales and the 
Brecon Beacons National Park (BBNP or the Park), including how the bounding reflects 
several important case criteria based mostly on theoretical concepts of peripherality and 
energy vulnerability. As the research has a qualitative foundation, discussion centers on 
justification and critique of qualitative methods and construction of knowledge. 
Reflections are also made as to researcher positionality and assumptions brought to the 
research as well as steps taken to address this. Interview participants are outlined with 
reasons why each group were selected for study and what data collection method will be 
used. Finally, an explanation of the tools used and methods followed for data analysis is 
provided. 
Chapters 6 and 7 outline the empirical results of data collection and analysis. Chapter 6 
focuses on the theme ‘Multi-scalar Political Peripheralization’. It starts by setting the 
energy policy context, providing a foundation to explore political peripheralization, first 
in the core-periphery relationship perceived by interviewees between the UK and Welsh 
Government, regionally within Wales between rural and urban areas and then within the 
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BBNP, between Park core purposes and Park communities. The chapter highlights how 
at regional scales, allocation of public spending and its strategic application along with 
declining public services make visible to communities their peripheralization. Political 
peripheralization then links with energy transition injustices in several ways; in 
misaligned core-periphery energy aspirations, in increased facilitation of energy 
production within peripheries, and in limited public assistance for domestic energy 
transition comparative to more populated and ‘more deprived’ places.  
Chapter 7 focuses on the themes ‘Peripheral Economy and Income’, ‘Peripheral 
Infrastructure’ and ‘Peripheral Housing Stock & Tenure’ unpacking how these 
interwoven aspects of peripherality impact upon energy vulnerability and transition. 
Initially peripheral economies and incomes are explored, followed by explanations for 
and experiences of the necessity of personal transport. Following this, focus is placed on 
peripheral energy infrastructures, highlighting restrictive access, weak structure and 
additional costs associated with it. Finally, the influence of peripheral housing stock type 
and energy efficiency on energy vulnerabilities is highlighted, linking the combined 
influence of this with energy consumption and high energy prices. This section also 
briefly explores the influence of housing tenure on abilities to alter such living conditions 
and thus energy vulnerabilities. Within each section links are made with low-carbon 
energy transition and how this is utilized to counteract energy vulnerabilities, but also 
where it is unobtainable for some. 
Chapter 8 synthesizes the discussions of Chapters 2-4 and the results of Chapters 6 and 
7 to illuminate the interplay of energy justice and spatial justice. Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 
are dedicated to answering the three main research questions. Section 8.2 explains how 
elements of peripheral disadvantage are experienced by communities within the case 
study area, and how these experiences can link together spatial injustices and energy 
injustices. Section 8.3 elucidates connections between peripherality and energy 
vulnerability, demonstrating how elements of peripheral energy vulnerability are spatially 
contingent, creating energy peripheries. Section 8.4 then unpacks how and to what effect 
low-carbon transition is taking place within energy peripheries. Section 8.5 summarizes 
the overall conclusions of the thesis, highlighting the empirical and theoretical 
contributions made. Finally, recommendations are made for policy and energy 




This research contributes to and advances energy vulnerability and transition literature, 
elucidating the tripartite interplay between peripheralization with energy vulnerability 
and energy transition. The research demonstrates that spatial injustices inherent within 
periphery development link and interplay with energy injustices. Energy vulnerability, as 
a form of energy injustice holds spatial contingency, thus energy vulnerability 
experienced within a peripheral context is influenced by elements of peripheral 
disadvantage. Processes of spatialization and energy vulnerability together influence 



















Chapter 2. Energy Vulnerability: Linking energy justice, social 
justice and vulnerability 
2.1 Introduction 
Energy is an extremely important resource for sustaining human activities. The energy 
economy is one of the largest in the world, becoming part of nearly every aspect of 
modern life, infiltrating economies, politics, culture and social relations (Sovacool et al. 
2014). It is an essential resource and a necessary requirement for living to a socially 
acceptable standard. However, access to affordable and sufficient levels of energy within 
the UK (like in many places in the world) is unevenly distributed. Amongst others, some 
of the reasons for this include: the historic and current energy infrastructure has a set 
geographical reach, leaving some remote parts of the UK without access to mainstream 
energy flows; a liberalised energy market which works to capitalist logics does not 
remediate poor energy access in places where costs cannot be recouped quickly, and in 
which regulation has a limited impact on energy costs overall; or government policies 
whether around energy, welfare or housing issues that can (inadvertently) leave the 
poorest people paying the most towards their energy bills. This uneven access to energy 
can be seen as an ‘energy justice’ issue, resulting in uneven access to life-sustaining 
resources, with many people being unable to fully participate in society and at risk of 
physical and psychological harm.  
Energy justice is a concept and analytical framework that can encompass many elements 
of energy production distribution and consumption and is concerned with fair and 
equitable allocation of costs and benefits, transparent and inclusive procedures and 
respectful treatment of all people. As a framework, there are many concepts both new and 
old that may fall under the energy justice umbrella, including ‘fuel poverty’ and ‘energy 
vulnerability’. Fuel poverty has been part of academic study and the political agenda 
particularly in the UK and Ireland for many years and has been extremely important in 
both raising awareness and understanding of uneven access to energy. Despite raised 
awareness of fuel poverty and policy efforts towards its eradication, fuel poverty persists. 
As result and in line with growing understandings of its causes and consequences the 
concept has received some criticism. This centres on its narrow definition and 
interpretation of having three main dimensions: low income, fuel prices and energy 
efficiency. As recent studies into fuel poverty have pointed out, often its causes are far 
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more wide ranging and diverse than its current definition acknowledges. Some authors 
are now looking to alternative concepts to explore issues around fuel poverty, concepts 
that can encompass the how and why it comes to be and the wider range of impacts it may 
hold.  
The related concept ‘energy vulnerability’ has been advanced by the Interdisciplinary 
Cluster on Energy Systems, Equity and Vulnerability (InCluESEV) between 2009 and 
2011 (c.f. Hall et al. 2013). The concept has gained popularity in academic literature 
(Bouzarovski 2013; Day & Walker 2013; Hall et al. 2013; Middlemiss & Gillard 2015). 
There is no fixed definition, however, current understandings include energy vulnerability 
as “the propensity of an individual to become incapable of securing a materially and 
socially needed level of energy service in the home” (Bouzarovski et al. 2014, p.10) or “a 
situation in which a person or household is unable to achieve sufficient access to 
affordable and reliable energy services, and as a consequence is in danger of harm to 
health and/or wellbeing” (Day & Walker 2013, p. 16). Emerging as a result of various 
works into energy justice issues, energy vulnerability appears to be a concept that has the 
capacity to encapsulate multiple contributing causes and effects of energy injustice 
beyond fuel poverty.  
This chapter explores the evolution of the concept of energy vulnerability and 
demonstrates increased capacity, in understanding the wider factors that contribute to 
households being unable to access adequate energy and the wide-ranging negative 
outcomes this may have. It will start by discussing the origins of energy vulnerability as 
emerging from energy justice literature, reviewing definitions of energy justice and also 
of fuel poverty, exploring why some authors are looking for alternative concepts to 
understand household energy deprivation. It will then move on to consider the current 
understanding of energy vulnerability, describing its multi-dimensional, multi-scalar and 
temporal character, illustrating why these traits may mean it can encapsulate influencing 
factors that current conceptualisations only can when combined with others. Finally, it 
will outline how fuel poverty may be seen as an outcome or a precursor of energy 
vulnerability, and given this relationship, energy vulnerability is likely to be far more 




2.2 Fuel Poverty: Initial understandings of domestic energy 
deprivation 
Fuel poverty had been discussed in broad terms within the literature since it was first used 
by Isherwood and Hancock (1979), then Bradshaw and Hutton (1983) (as identified by 
Liddell et al. 2012; Moore, 2012). However, it was not closely addressed and taken 
forward within the literature until Boardman’s (1991) work (Liddell et al. 2012; Walker 
& Day 2012). Boardman suggested that a household was fuel poor if they were unable 
“to have adequate energy services for 10% of their income” (Boardman 1991, p. 227) and 
it is this definition that has been taken forward in UK national policy (referred to hereafter 
as the ‘10% measure’). In 1991, with some reluctance (Boardman 2015), the UK 
government released the Home Energy Efficient Scheme, which was a home energy 
efficiency scheme aimed at low-income households. Since then, fuel poverty, household 
energy efficiency and reduction in consumption remained on the political agenda. Initially 
discussed under the guise of “affordable warmth” under the conservative party, it was 
only when New Labour were elected in 1997 that the term fuel poverty was “allowed” to 
be used in official documentation (Boardman 2015, p. 2).  
Since then, fuel poverty gained increasing attention within social, political and academic 
spheres. Politically, the passing of the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act (2000) 
and the associated UK Fuel Poverty Strategy (2001) led to commitments in England, 
Northern Ireland and the devolved nations of Scotland and Wales to reduce fuel poverty1. 
As, fuel poverty is a devolved policy each country sets targets towards its eradication. 
England and Scotland have presented a target of eradication by 2016 and Wales by 2018 
(Scottish Executive 2002; Welsh Assembly Government 2010; Welsh Government 
2016a).  In 2011 the UK Government commissioned a review into fuel poverty and how 
it was measured (c.f. Hills et al. 2013), finding that the target set was unreasonable due 
to the “long term structural” characteristics of fuel poverty (Department of Energy and 
Climate Change [DECC] 2013a). Consequently, a new target for England was set to 
improve as many households with an Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) rating2 of 
Bands F and G to a B and C by 2030 (Department for Business Energy and Industrial 
 
1 See Appendix 1 for UK Government Fuel Poverty Policy 1991-2018. 
2 Energy Performance Certificate (EPC) are a legal requirement of all buildings sold or leased under the 
Energy Performance of Buildings (Certificates and Inspections) (England and Wales) Regulations 2007. 




Strategy [BEIS] 2018a). Scotland is currently in the process of updating its fuel poverty 
strategy with the Fuel Poverty (Target, Definition and Strategy) (Scotland) Bill (2018). 
The Bill seeks to define fuel poverty and agree a strategy that will result in no more than 
5% of homes in Scotland in fuel poverty by 2040 (Scottish Parliament 2018). In Wales, 
the Fuel Poverty Strategy (2010a) has not been updated since its release, indeed, it 
remains unclear as to how successful the strategy was in eradicating fuel poverty by 2018. 
The Welsh Housing Conditions Survey 2017-18 is projected to report on current levels 
this year (2019) (BEIS 2018a), and interim evaluations of Wales’ Warmer Homes 
schemes Arbed (2009) and Nest (2011), which aim to improve housing energy efficiency, 
have been favourable although have been unable to speculate on reductions in fuel 
poverty (Welsh Government 2015a; Ricardo Energy & Environment 2017). Despite 
eradication targets, the number of fuel poor households in the UK has continued to rise 
year on year. It appears that all policy eradication targets have been missed. 
Awareness of fuel poverty has grown both nationally within the UK and on an 
international level over recent years (Moore 2012; Hall et al. 2013; Roberts & Phimister 
2015). Within the UK, much of this has been attributed towards the continuing rising 
costs of energy (mainly between the year 2000 to present, with the exception of oil see 
House of Commons Library 2016a), along with research demonstrating the increasing 
numbers of households living in fuel poverty. A large body of work enhancing 
understandings of fuel poverty within the UK and Ireland developed, with a widening 
geographical scope to mainland Europe and beyond since the early 2000s (Bouzarovski 
et al. 2014; Hall et al. 2015). Such work highlighted the economic, social and health 
impacts being fuel poor can hold especially for socially marginalised or vulnerable groups 
(O’Sullivan et al. 2011; Middlemiss & Gillard 2015; Snell et al. 2015). These 
understandings have been communicated increasingly into the public sphere by the media 
and third sector, where links between policy, fuel poverty and ‘Excess winter Deaths’ in 
particular have been pronounced (c.f. Rankin & Butler 2013; BBC 2018a; National 
Energy Action 2018).  
The most recent report (at the time of writing) by BEIS Annual Fuel Poverty Statistics 
Report 2018 estimates that there are still approximately 3.65 million fuel poor households 
in the UK. Recent studies have demonstrated the negative impacts that being fuel poor 
has on individuals and households, for example, on morbidity, health, wellbeing and life 
chances (Barnes et al. 2008; Day & Walker 2013). There is also evidence for the negative 
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impacts living in a cold home can have on the social inclusion of the household. For 
example, Harrington et al. (2005) conducted a qualitative study into the health impacts of 
participants living in fuel poverty, finding that most of their participants felt that living in 
a cold home may exacerbate existing physical health issues as opposed to create them, 
but that it could cause feelings of social exclusion. Some participants reported reduced 
social interactions due to retiring to bed at earlier times to keep warm, limiting social 
activities within their homes due to embarrassment felt regarding its cold temperature and 
formations of dampness which create, or add to existing, feelings of isolation and 
depression (Harrington 2005). As such, fuel poverty is now understood to be detrimental 
to living a mentally and physically healthy life (Sovacool 2015), as the services that 
energy provides, such as warmth or lighting, are not “discretionary purchases, but 
absolute necessities” (Boardman 2010, p. 48).  
Thus, in addition to more direct impacts of fuel poverty, there are also indirect impacts 
due to the permeation of energy on “every aspect of our culture and even our into social 
relations” (Sovacool et al. 2014, p. 24).  For people to perform their everyday life, their 
energy needs must be met (Lucas 2012), these needs can include a “warm bed, a cooked 
meal or internet connection”, and will be dependent on “social practices” and 
“expectations” relative to their specific social culture (Bouzarovski et al. 2014, p. 6). If 
needs are unmet due to a lack of resource, in this instance energy, those people will 
experience difficulty in participating “in the normal relationships and activities available 
to the majority of people” within their society (Levitas et al. 2007, p. 9).  Furthermore, 
energy is increasingly a primary means of obtaining access to, or participating in, most 
dimensions of life (Sovacool et al. 2014), limited energy access does not just mean limited 
access to light and warmth, it also means limited access to political, social and economic 
dimensions of life, which is synonymous with social exclusion (Milbourne 2004; 
Anderson et al. 2012; Lucas 2012). The negative impacts of social exclusion on individual 
quality of life and societal equity and cohesion are well studied (Bradshaw et al. 2004; 
Milbourne 2004; Levitas et al. 2007) consequently fuel poverty can be understood as a 
matter of injustice (Harrington et al. 2005; Sovacool 2015).  
Many studies of fuel poverty point out that despite the number of strategies and schemes 
informed by the UK government aiming to reduce and ultimately eradicate fuel poverty, 
it remains prevalent and is increasing year on year (Jenkins et al. 2011; Guertler 2012; 
DECC 2015a). Since 2010, the government in the UK has implemented an agenda of 
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reduced public spending and tax rises in order to reduce the budget deficit and reform the 
welfare state (Reeves et al. 2013; Bailey et al. 2015). This neoliberal regime has attracted 
criticism around the uneven distribution of spending cuts at both a Local Authority level 
and household level. With Local Authorities in some of the most deprived areas 
experiencing a disproportionately high reduction in their spending power (Bailey et al. 
2015) and households with “below middle incomes”, particularly those in receipt of 
welfare benefits, such as disability living allowance, undergoing reductions in their 
income (Reeves et al. 2013; Collingwood 2015, p. 2; Snell et al. 2015).  Official schemes 
both directly and indirectly aimed at reducing fuel poverty have been impacted, with 
restructuring leading to reductions in funding to some such as the ‘Energy Company 
Obligation’ (ECO)3 and its associated regional schemes (Guertler 2012). Therefore, it 
could be argued that the austerity agenda being followed by the UK government is a likely 
contributory factor to continuing fuel poverty levels as it is not just policies and schemes 
aimed at fuel poverty that have an impact on fuel poor households. Indeed, policies 
around welfare, family, health and housing can have direct and indirect impacts on 
households’ ability to afford the energy they need (Middlemiss & Gillard 2013).  
Policies in relation to climate change have also been criticized for exacerbating situations 
of fuel poverty for many households. For example, the Feed-in-Tariff (FIT)4 schemes that 
commenced in 2010 received criticism because the initial capital needed by individual 
households or communities to participate in this subsidy scheme limited its uptake to 
wealthier households and communities (Knox 2010). Consequently, low-income or 
poorer households and communities are effectively excluded (Bickerstaff et al. 2013, p. 
3). Furthermore, costs associated with the implementation of climate change and low-
carbon energy policies in addition to some fuel poverty schemes, such as the Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO), are passed on to all energy customers via their electricity 
and gas bills. Thus, they have a “disproportionate impact on low-income homes” 
(Bickerstaff et al. 2013, p. 3; Atkinson et al., 2015; Institute for Public Policy Research 
2018). Creating a “triple injustice”, is that low-income homes consume the least carbon 
(Preston et al. 2013, p. 3). Spatially, ECO has cost rural customers £70 million in levies 
 
3 The Energy Company Obligation (ECO) requires energy suppliers to deliver energy efficiency measures 
to domestic gas and electricity customers in order to meet carbon emission and energy consumption targets 
outlined within the strategy. Each supplier is allocated a “proportional share of the ECO target relative to 
their share of the domestic gas and electricity markets” Ofgem (2016b). The strategy identifies priority 
groups as those receiving certain state benefits and the elderly. ECO is paid by all energy customers via a 
levy on energy bills. 
4 See Chapter 3, page 47 for more detailed explanation of FIT 
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over two years, when they have received less of the installed measures (accounting to 
only £3.5 million of spend) (Institute for Public Policy Research 2018). The combined 
result of these actions is that the cost of low-carbon policies within the UK, aimed at 
facilitating the energy transition are paid for by all, but only those with capital to invest 
will realise returns and be able to reduce the cost of their energy (Stockton & Campbell 
2011) and their energy consumption. This poses a risk of creating an “energy under-class” 
where low-income groups remain dependent on increasingly expensive energy (Walker 
2008, p. 4514), with no viable means of alleviating either their cost or consumption level. 
Other critiques of fuel poverty point to the way fuel poverty is understood and measured 
in the UK5, which is argued leaves many households living in fuel poverty being 
unrecognised, or with interventions in place to help them that do not apply to their 
situation (Liddell et al. 2012; Snell et al. 2015). In line with this is Bouzarovski et al.’s 
(2014, p. 8) critique of the “narrow triad” that inform the traditional 10% measure and 
define current understandings of fuel poverty: of low income, high energy prices and low 
levels of energy efficiency which can act to simplify understandings of factors leading to 
fuel poverty. Other critiques are of the language of fuel poverty which, it is argued, 
reflects the underlying understanding of the problem (Day & Walker 2013), linking fuel 
poverty with issues of energy prices and low income. In this way, current understanding 
of fuel poverty implies a largely budgetary issue, even though its cause and effects are 
much wider (Bazar 2007).  
In keeping with views that the concept of fuel poverty implies limited and largely 
budgetary or efficiency causes is the argument that fuel poverty measurements do not 
address the different and sometimes non-financial factors that lead to fuel poverty, and 
that it does not address issues of household needs. Households’ energy needs can be 
multi-dimensional, individual and can be affected by a wide range of internal and external 
factors. Studies of household needs have been carried out at both a national, regional and 
sub-regional scale. For example, studies such as Smith et al. (2013) and Roberts and 
 
5 In 2011, the UK Government commissioned an independent review of the definition of fuel poverty, to determine the 
appropriateness of the ‘10 % measure’. The review was undertaken by Professor John Hills of London School of 
Economics (c.f. Hills et al., 2013). The review proposed fuel poverty should be measured using a ‘low income, high 
cost’ (LIHC) measure. This measure means that a household is defined as fuel poor if its income is below the national 
poverty line (after energy costs) and its energy costs are higher than is typical for their household type. It also created 
a fuel poverty gap measure in which the depth or severity of fuel poverty for a household can be ascertained. The LIHC 
measure has received some criticism for reducing the numbers of households as identified as fuel poor, it has also 
received some praise for being more nuanced than the original 10 % measure.  The measure has been adopted in 
England but not within the other devolved nations of the UK, as such overall UK measurements and national 
comparisons still use the 10% measure (Moore, 2012; Preston et al., 2014). 
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Phimister (2015) consider fuel poverty from a sub-regional scale, by comparing the needs 
of rural and urban areas. Comparison of these areas has identified impacts due to 
differences in energy supply and housing type, with rural areas more likely to have a non-
mains gas energy supply, have a less competitive and more limited choice of fuel (Office 
of Fair Trading 2011) and live in older, less energy efficient houses (DECC 2013b). 
Roberts and Phimister (2015) found that there were differences in the persistence of fuel 
poverty and vulnerability to becoming fuel poor between both areas, with urban 
households being more likely to be in persistent fuel poverty, and rural households being 
more vulnerable to energy price increases.  
Smith et al.’s (2013) research for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation compared the total 
budgetary needs of households at different levels of spatial isolation (hamlet, village, rural 
town) with different compositions (retired couple, single adult, family of four and single 
parent). Results are then compared with earlier research by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation (see Bradshaw et al. 2008) based on budgetary needs for urban households. 
The study found that in all instances rural households needed a greater income to offset 
their higher spending costs, which were mainly attributed to transport needs. It also found 
that the level of income needed rose with the level of household rurality6.  
From a social perspective, studies have investigated different households’ energy needs 
emerging as a result of them being fuel poor (Middlemiss & Gillard 2015), disabled (Snell 
et al. 2015), or being young and living in rented accommodation (Bouzarovski 2013). 
Findings show that household energy needs can widely vary, due to different socio-
technical interactions, shaped by cultural and social practices that occur in each individual 
home (Ellsworth-Krebs et al. 2015). These interactions may be influenced by instances 
of infirmity, illness, or unemployment for example, which would likely involve people in 
these instances being at home more often than others, and therefore needing to use various 
forms of energy for longer periods throughout the day (Snell et al. 2015; Walker et al. 
2014). Also, for those households with individuals who are elderly or ill, or even those 
with young children, the use of energy for heat in particular may be needed much more, 
and again, over longer periods than others (Snell et al. 2015; Walker et al. 2014), meaning 
that households with these needs may be more likely to be fuel poor, no matter the price 
of energy or the energy efficiency of their home.  
 
6 Spatialised living costs are explored further in Section 7.4 
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Other studies have pointed out that even if a household is not formally considered fuel 
poor, they may still be living in energy deprivation. Anderson et al. (2012) used a mixed 
methods approach to find out how households with incomes below 60% of national 
median income cope with financial constraint. They found that most (63%) reduced their 
spending overall, including spending on essentials such as food and fuel in order to 
maintain their primary financial commitments. In terms of energy, this meant a decrease 
in the amount they consumed7. Energy deprivation is also evident in households who are 
not considered poor, but for a number of reasons, such as fear of overspending on energy, 
as an alternative to rationing another living requirement, or through choosing to live a 
frugal lifestyle, may self-deprive or “ration” their household energy, thereby “feeling fuel 
poor” and living with the same negative impacts as those who are fuel poor (Dubois 2012, 
p. 109). 
Fuel poverty also does not address restrictions on household agency in making dwelling 
efficiency adaption, using energy efficient appliances, or fuel switching. These can be felt 
by households who live in rented or social accommodation where such responsibilities 
are held by landlords. Consequently, even a household on a relatively high income, could 
be in fuel poverty if they are living in an energy inefficient dwelling, with inefficient 
appliances or using an expensive form of energy which would result in them spending a 
high proportion of their income on running their home. This situation would result in 
them having a smaller residual income. Or, as aforementioned, they could be living in 
energy deprivation by restricting their energy consumption to manage the household 
budget (Sovacool 2015). Thus, by taking these kinds of instances into account through 
adopting an energy vulnerable approach as opposed to a fuel poverty one, existing 
thoughts around who is fuel poor may be challenged. Alternative to stereotypes of 
“vulnerable consumers” based on social categories such as low-income households, 
elderly people or welfare recipients (Bouzarovski et al. 2014, p. 17) energy vulnerability 
can widen the range of those at risk to many more people than just the most socially 
vulnerable in society.  
Finally, as Bickerstaff et al. (2013) points out, there have been an array of concepts 
discussed within academic literature which are concerned with lack of ability to access 
energy at a domestic scale. These include energy poverty; energy insecurity; energy 
deprivation; energy precariousness; and fuel poverty. The most dominant research in this 
 
7 See Chapter 7 for exploration of energy practices 
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area are those concerned with fuel poverty and energy poverty. Traditionally considered 
as dichotomous (Li et al. 2014), fuel poverty can be seen to describe forms of energy 
deprivation in developed countries, with a focus on energy prices, household 
consumption and efficiency, while energy poverty has largely been used in relation to 
energy deprivation in developing countries, with a focus on equitable access to energy 
networks, and more recently micro-production (Bouzarovski et al. 2014). The 
dichotomous treatment of fuel poverty and energy poverty means that each offers only a 
limited understanding of causes of energy deprivation, when it has been identified that 
the factors each concept refers to can be present in both developed and developing 
contexts (Simcock & Petrova 2017).  
However, bringing together the two concepts risks further ignoring a key element already 
missing from fuel poverty conceptualizations: the influence of spatial difference. As 
already highlighted, different places have different climates and different energy, socio-
economic and political structures, all of which influence energy access, affordability, 
efficiency and cost. Therefore, combining fuel and energy poverty to address similarities 
in the phenomenon across space must also become nuanced in addressing more 
specifically spatial differences which affect how and why fuel poverty occurs in different 
places. 
Fuel poverty and the research around it have been successful in highlighting the extent of 
its prevalence in the UK and also the impacts it can have on households’ day to day life, 
as well as longer-term prospects. However, its definition has inevitably led to a limited 
understanding of its causes, an underestimation of the potential impacts to households 
and policy measures limited in impact. Increasingly research has sought alternative 
frameworks that can take account of the multiple and interlinked social, economic, 
political and spatial influences on domestic energy deprivation. Most recently ‘energy 
justice’ and its progeny concept ‘energy vulnerability’ have been conceptualised to 







2.3 Energy justice: A lens for understanding domestic energy 
deprivation 
The concept of ‘justice’ is well established, even if remaining in flux within various 
disciplines, such as political theory and law (Gross 2007; Schlosberg 2007). With regard 
to energy justice, it is political theory and its understanding of social justice which have 
provided the foundations for the concept. Social justice too is a well-established concept 
that has arguably been present within society in some form since being proposed by the 
ancient Greeks (Capeheart & Milovanovic 2007). As such, the literature for social justice 
is vast, nonetheless, a brief background is needed to inform the understandings of energy 
justice which follow.  
Contemporary understandings of social justice can be split into three main schools of 
thought: Liberalism, Marxism and Post-structuralism (Gregory et al. 2009). Liberal 
conceptions stem from such work of Rawls (1971) who understands social justice as fair 
distribution of societal costs and benefits (Gregory et al. 2009). Of particular note are 
Rawls’ two principles of justice, first, all people within a society should have as many 
basic liberties possible without infringing on other people’s liberties. Second, inequality 
in distribution of liberties can only be justified if it serves the least advantaged, known as 
the “Difference Principle” (Sovacool & Dworkin 2015; Rawls 1971, p. 75). Marxist 
approaches to social justice consider the concept from a capitalist society perspective, 
concerned with capitalist social processes that lead to conflict between labour and capital, 
class formations and resulting exploitation of workers. Post-structuralists consider 
socially constructed “axis of social differentiation” to be important factors in determining 
how just a society is, these can be thought of as social group markers such as race and 
gender (Gregory et al. 2009, p. 694). Without acknowledging such differences, the “deep 
material differences in social position, division of labour, socialized capacities, 
normalized standards and ways of living” will “disadvantage members of historically 
excluded groups” (Young 2005, p. 362). Of course, depending on the social justice 
perspective, different principles will be considered or given more prominence. However, 
in general, social justice can be understood as having two main concerns: the first being 
the fair distribution of societal costs and benefits; the second being the fairness of a social 
order (Gregory et al. 2009; Miller 1999).  
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During the 1970s and 80s, social justice was adopted by socio-political movements within 
the USA to challenge perceived unfairness with regards to the disproportionate negative 
environmental impact of various developments felt by minority social groups at the time 
(Agyeman & Evans 2004; Bulkeley & Walker 2005; Schlosberg 2013). Subsequently, 
social justice with regards to the environment and extraction or utilisation of natural 
resources developed into environmental justice. Environmental justice raises issues of 
equality regardless of societal categories, such as race, class or gender (Fuller & 
McCauley 2016), with a similar original premise to that of social justice, mainly 
concerned with the distribution of costs and benefits or ‘distributive justice’ (Gross 2007; 
Schlosberg 2007). However, the concept has since expanded to include issues of 
procedural fairness and recognition of those affected, referred to as procedural justice and 
recognition justice (Walker 2005; Gross 2008). 
Energy justice can be defined as “as a global energy system that fairly disseminates both 
the benefits and costs of energy services, and one that has representative and impartial 
energy decision-making” (Sovacool & Dworkin 2015, p. 436). While energy justice is a 
relatively new concept (Heffron et al. 2015), it encapsulates many of the different ways 
that the literature has attempted to address issues around rights to energy. In a similar vein 
to environmental justice, energy justice is commonly considered along three tenets: 
distributional justice, procedural justice and recognition justice (Hall et al. 2013; Heffron 
et al. 2015; Sovacool & Dworkin 2015; Jenkins et al. 2016).  
Distributional justice centres on equitable and fair distribution of the costs and benefits 
of an energy project to those affected by it, regardless of social categories such as age, 
race, income or education (Heffron et al. 2015; Sovacool & Dworkin 2015). A fair 
distribution would mean that those who experience the costs should experience an equal 
or greater benefit (Sabbagh & Schmitt 1998; Skitka et al. 2003; Agterbosch et al. 2007). 
Research within this context has considered costs and benefits arising from a “fossil fuel-
based global energy system” (Sovacool et al. 2016, p. 1). Taking a global perspective, 
this research illuminates how wealthier countries are able to benefit more readily from 
energy, for example, by securing constant energy supply. Conversely, the costs associated 
with high level of consumption in wealthy countries adversely impacts the global climate, 
with increased likelihood of negative consequences experienced world-wide, but most 
severely incurred by poorer countries who consume less energy (Sovacool et al. 2016).  
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At national and regional scales, distributional injustice has also been associated with both 
high-carbon and low-carbon energy systems. Milbourne and Mason (2017) while using 
an environment justice lens, emphasise how for centuries the cost of anthracite extraction 
in South Wales has been borne by communities close to extraction sites in the form of 
labour exploitation, cultural change and landscape and environmental damage with local 
benefits limited to job-creation. Links are evident between this and other research 
regarding large scale low-carbon energy production in Wales, where energy planning 
strategies are used to promote siting of renewable energy in areas that were previously 
industrialised (Cowell 2010). For example, the devolved Welsh Government policy 
Technical Advice Note 8 (TAN 8) identifies seven areas as potential wind farm sites or 
‘Strategic Search Areas’ (SSAs) (Welsh Assembly Government 2005). SSA selection, 
while based on largely geographical and geomorphological criteria (i.e. upland locations, 
coniferous plantations) are also areas of social and economic deprivation that in the past, 
or currently, are home to other natural resource extraction associated with energy 
production (i.e. anthracite extraction) (Cowell 2010).  
This holds implications for those who experience the cost, or negative outcomes 
associated with these forms of energy, such as: their visual presence, emotional impacts 
and possible local economic impacts. These costs are frequently being paid by poorer and 
less socially powerful populations of people ill-equipped to challenge siting decisions 
(Cowell 2010; Munday et al. 2011; Fuller & McCauley 2016). The above examples have 
highlighted distributional justice concerns at the point of energy resource extraction or 
energy production, however, such concerns can also be identified in the distribution of 
energy itself. This includes spatial distribution of energy infrastructure (Senedd Research 
2014), and regional differentiation of energy prices (House of Commons Library 2017a) 
both of which are unevenly spatially distributed in the UK and hold implications for 
energy access and affordability8. While these issues can be viewed as energy injustices in 
their own right, a double injustice is felt when the same places that bear the cost of hosting 
energy production are also the places with limited domestic energy infrastructure and 
higher energy costs. 
Procedural justice centres on the inclusiveness, fairness, transparency and democracy of 
decision-making processes (Agterbosch et al. 2007; Gross 2007; 2008). While the exact 
constitution of the concept varies between authors, different definitions share common 
 
8 Energy infrastructure, access and affordability are explored further in Section 7.4 
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principles such as, ability to participate and be heard; to have questions and concerns 
addressed; information available to make decisions; and to have bias in decision making 
suppressed (Sovacool & Dworkin 2015; Jenkins et al. 2016). With regards to energy 
projects, procedural justice may mean that all actors have the ability to find correct and 
up-to-date information, have avenues available to participate, have their opinions heard, 
and have processes for decision making that is clear and open to scrutiny. Procedural 
justice can also be applied to other aspects of energy, for example, both public and 
academic questions have been raised around the procedural justice involved with forced 
assignment of pre-payment meters to energy customers who fall into energy payment 
arrears (Citizens Advice 2016; Navanayagam 2016; Preston et al. 2014). Prepayment 
customers typically pay more for their energy than those who pay by other means, which 
can further compound indebtedness for those who are forced to have prepayment meters 
due to existing payment arrears. Additionally, prepayment meters are most common in 
low income households who can least afford to pay more for their energy, and in 
households where lack of bank accounts or internet access means that transferring to 
alternative payments or tariffs is not possible (Preston et al. 2014)9. 
Recognition justice is concerned with the equal and respectful treatment of all people, 
whereby their opinions are valued and they are given genuine involvement and standing 
in discussions and decisions (Heffron & McCauley 2014). With regards to energy, 
research around recognition has focussed on the ways in which groups of people can have 
their opinions disregarded due to stereotyping. One of the most prominent examples of 
this is evident in research investigating anti-development attitudes, specifically around 
windfarm developments. While early research such as those by Krohn and Damborg 
(1999) and Warren et al. (2005) attributed these public attitudes to NIMBYism (Not In 
My Backyard), the validity of NIMBYism has been debated and largely discredited by 
many such as Wolsink (2007), Aitken (2010), Ricci et al. (2010) and Walker et al. (2010) 
with the term now being felt to misrepresent and stereotype many of the people who it 
described as deviant or selfish (Agterbosch et al. 2007; Cass & Walker 2009). It is 
theorised that NIMBYism had direct impacts upon policies, codes of practice and how 
communities have been engaged with by authorities and developers, due to the pre-
conceptions of the population it evokes before any engagement is made. Such negative 
preconceptions can limit or exclude community involvement in developments (Cass & 
Walker 2009). Others have researched stereotyping around access to affordable energy 
 
9 Experiences with pre-payment meters are explored further in Section 7.4 
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and how labels attributed to different groups in order to assist them in some way can 
inadvertently mean that other groups in similar positions are unrecognised. For example, 
within energy policy in the UK a ‘vulnerable group’ label has been attributed to elderly 
sections of the population in order to recognise their higher energy requirements and 
weaker financial position (c.f. DECC 2012a; 2015a). However, this has meant that many 
other groups who may be just as vulnerable with regards to their energy provision, but 
perhaps for different reasons, are un-recognised and therefore, continue to experience 
difficulty in accessing affordable energy.  
Overall, energy justice has been adopted within a range of research to date, most notably 
in concerns around distributions of cost and benefits associated with energy production, 
and to a lesser extent in energy consumption. The three tenets of energy justice can be 
seen to encompass concerns for distribution, procedure and recognition which are not 
usually addressed in conceptualisations of fuel poverty, but which hold impacts for 
understanding how instances of fuel poverty manifest. Additionally, there is potential to 
broaden understandings of who is recognised as being fuel poor. While a focus of energy 
justice research has been on energy production, which traditionally may have been a 
separate issue to that of fuel poverty, bridging the gap between energy production and 
consumption is increasingly relevant as the energy system transitions from high to low-
carbon, centralised to distributed, whereby places of production are increasingly places 
of consumption. 
 
2.4 Energy vulnerability: An alternative conceptualisation? 
Energy vulnerability has developed from advances in fuel poverty and energy justice 
concepts. As with energy justice, which holds foundations in social justice and 
environmental justice theories, energy vulnerability too has some origins in social and 
environmental vulnerability. Vulnerability is a term used to describe a weakness, a way 
in which someone or something is susceptible to a form of negative impact or harm. 
Social vulnerability is a concept used in many disciplines, most often as a means of 
understanding either social harms as a result of exposure to various hazards, not 
necessarily socially derived, or as a means of understanding how and why certain people 
are susceptible to such social harms. This is evident in theories of social structures that 
explore how social interactions, institutions and cultural values can come together to 
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position some people or groups as vulnerable to harm, but how they can also affect their 
ability to recover from harm (Kuhlicke et al. 2011).  
Social vulnerability depends on how the combination of its “specific spatial, socio-
economic-demographic, cultural and institutional” dimensions align, it can affect people 
intermittently or constantly (Kuhlicke et al. 2011, p. 789). It also suggests that different 
people or groups within a society may be exposed to the same harm but, will experience 
it in different ways and varying severity. The reasons for this link social vulnerability 
concepts closely to those of social justice, as often uneven experiences and exposure to 
harm can be attributed to uneven or unjust societal structures. Thus, social vulnerability 
generally proposes that some social groups are more vulnerable to harm than others, 
namely, the poor, elderly, disabled, women, children and minority ethnicities and 
religions (Kuhlicke et al. 2011; Massey 1992; Soja 2009). In addition, due to the 
structurally reinforced nature of their vulnerability, the ability to leave a position of 
vulnerability is extremely difficult. 
This understanding of vulnerability has been adopted for use in climate change research 
and policy (Walker & Burningham 2011), where the social impacts of climate change or 
‘natural’ hazards are often exposed. Within this field, vulnerability is discussed in terms 
of three dimensions: potential exposure to harm, sensitivity to harm and capacity to adapt 
(Hinkel 2011). However, these three dimensions have often been investigated in isolation, 
with little exploration of their interrelationships (Hinkel 2011). In terms of applying 
vulnerability to an energy justice context, it is precisely the multi-dimensional and 
interrelated character of vulnerability that makes it so suitable for understanding issues 
of energy deprivation and as such, it is those inter-relations that should be explored. 
Traditionally, energy vulnerability has been applied to two main issues: the security of 
country’s fuel supply and specific social groups who are considered to be socially 
vulnerable. The first issue came about due to concerns over climate change, the effect on 
peak oil on energy prices and the security of fossil fuel supplies. This has been the subject 
of many academic studies (Bradshaw 2014; Demski et al. 2014; Gnansounou 2008) and 
political dialogue (Rogers-Hayden et al. 2011). The second instance is most prevalent in 
national political dialogue and energy market regulators such as Ofgem, where it is 
discussed in terms of protecting specific socially vulnerable groups from fuel poverty. 
While each of these issues are important in its own right, this section is concerned with 
the more recent use of the concept by authors such as Day and Walker (2013), 
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Bouzarovski (2013; 2014); Bouzarovski et al. (2014), Middlemiss and Gillard (2015) and 
Thomson (2016). Their understanding of energy vulnerability has been interpreted as “a 
situation in which a person or household is unable to achieve sufficient access to 
affordable and reliable energy services, and as a consequence is in danger of harm to 
health and/or wellbeing” (Day & Walker 2013, p. 16).   
Energy vulnerability as defined by Day and Walker (2013) (above) also moves the focus 
of energy deprivation from being considered an outcome of poverty itself. Instead, energy 
vulnerability “does not imply a particular emphasis or understanding of cause and effect” 
as opposed to conveying set outcomes, it conveys potential outcomes (Day & Walker 
2013, p. 16), thus allowing research that uses the framework to be more open to 
alternative or unpredicted areas of investigation. By using the word vulnerable, and by 
stating “in danger of” in their definition, also conveys a potentiality or precariousness 
rather than necessarily a situation of demonstrable, measurable existing harm (Day & 
Walker 2013, p. 16). Energy vulnerability has also combined previously separate 
concepts of fuel poverty and energy poverty into a single conceptual framework 
(Bouzarovski et al. 2014). This framework of ‘energy vulnerability’ allows for dual 
consideration of instances of physical poor energy access in addition to energy 
unaffordability, energy efficiency and consumption. It allows consideration together of 
energy production, distribution and consumption, thus, it allows for a more nuanced and 
comprehensive understanding of the reasons for both fuel and energy poverty which can 
potentially occur in the same places, affecting the same people individually or combined.  
As with social vulnerability, energy vulnerability is multi-dimensional and complex as it 
is caused by the coming together of interconnected contextual dimensions at a particular 
space in time that in turn have multiple impacts that themselves vary (Middlemiss & 
Gillard 2015) depending on their context (Wats & Bohle 1993; Walker 2009). Current 
literature regarding issues of energy vulnerability suggest that it can be subject to social, 
technological, natural and temporal processes that are unique to individual locals and 
households (Bradshaw et al. 2008; Day & Walker 2013; Druckman & Jackson 2008; 
Ellsworth-Krebs et al. 2015). Therefore, its character can be made up of infrastructure 
that connects a household to an energy supply, natural processes or institutional structures 
and policy. Furthermore, each one of these agents are in turn multi-dimensional and made 
up of other agents and so on.  
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An attempt to illustrate this phenomenon is presented in Figure 2.1 which is adapted from 
Polsky et al.’s (2007) Vulnerability Scoping Diagram (VSD). The VSD is composed of 
the three main dimensions of vulnerability: Exposure, which signifies the risk and length 
of exposure to harm; Sensitivity, how severe the harm would be; and, Adaptive Capacity 
which signifies agency and resources available to limit harm. In Figure 2.1 the three 
vulnerability dimensions are not joined, instead multi-way arrows join them to represent 
and emphasise the interaction between them. The outer segmented ring represents four 
main factors that can contribute to energy vulnerability. These have been identified as: 
Energy and the Energy Network, which can represent factors such as energy prices, access 
and technology type or availability; Politics and Policy, which can represent all political 
decisions, policies, schemes and subsidies both national and local in relation to energy 
and wider areas such as welfare, or housing policy; Domestic Context, which includes 
factors such as, household income, composition, energy needs, energy consumption, 
energy efficiency and social networks; finally is Context, which includes components 
such as, local geography, local history, local culture, local economy, social networks and 
local amenities. This outer circle is not joined to the middle circle as each of the four 
elements are present in exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. Indeed, each four 
elements interplay with each other and also the three dimensions of vulnerability, for 
example, energy policy affects both exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity as it has 
the potential to relieve or exacerbate who is exposed to higher or lower energy prices, 
who has the ability to produce their own energy and, thus, reduce their consumption and 
energy bills. It also affects the Energy Market and Network and Households. The 
interconnected nature of the four elements is depicted again with the use of arrows and 





Figure 2.1. Conceptualization of energy vulnerability. 
Source: Author (adapted from Polsky et al. 2007) 
This conceptualisation is helpful in highlighting multi-dimensional aspects of energy 
vulnerability, as well as multi-scalar aspects. For example, its multi-scalar nature may be 
visible through the relationship between macro-scale elements such as national policy, 
market conditions and prices, with micro-scale elements such as how energy efficient or 
old certain household appliances are. Each of these factors at widely different scales can 
be linked back to individual locations or households and affect each one in different ways 
depending on the multi-dimensional elements in play for that specific place at that time 
(Day & Walker 2013). Multi-scalar aspects are also in effect spatial aspects, for example, 
households are located in local contexts which in turn are within energy regime and 
political landscapes.  
Sometimes, how these factors come together can be surprising, as in Bouzarovski (2014) 
investigation into Europe-wide fuel poverty demonstrates that northerly countries with 
very cold climates have highest heat needs do not necessarily have higher levels of energy 
deprivation. This is attributed to “locally specific social, political and environmental 
circumstances” (Bouzarovski 2013, p. 278). Indeed, countries with much warmer 
climates, in the south that had the highest deprivation levels, mainly due to high levels of 
income poverty and poor insulation. Temporal influences could be evident in the 
differences between duration of vulnerability caused by certain factors. For example, a 
broken boiler could cause a household to be energy vulnerable over a few days (or longer, 
again depending on other factors at play), a very cold winter could last a couple of months 
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or a chronic illness could render a household energy vulnerable for a number of years 
(examples from Day & Walker 2013). Thus, people and households can move in and out 
of being energy vulnerable at different times and for different reasons. 
The complex and inter-related nature of energy vulnerability has led to several different 
approaches or theoretical framings being used for its exploration, including assemblage 
theory (Day & Walker 2013), variations of actor network theory (Buzar 2007), and emic 
vulnerability (Middlemiss & Gillard 2015). Buzar (2007) conducted an empirical study 
to investigate the relational geographies involved in creating situations of domestic 
energy deprivation in two Macedonian cities, Skopje and Stíp. While not specifically 
adopting assemblage or actor network theory, the approach was similar in that the 
relations between human and non-human actants were followed to understand the 
“intersection of a multitude of social and spatial webs” (Buzar 2007, p.1910). However, 
it also differs from these theories through the conceptualisation of the home as a central 
figure for the intersection of these webs. The study found that energy poverty in these 
cities, in these instances, were created through the relationship between three main 
factors: “institutional transformations, everyday lives, and housing structures” (Buzar 
2007, p.1920).  
Middlemiss and Gillard (2015) acknowledged that energy vulnerability resembles an 
assemblage, but instead of using assemblage theory their ontological stance was 
multidimensionality which they combined with a nursing framework of emic 
vulnerability. This appears to have given them the freedom to explore the multi-
dimensions of energy vulnerability, from a vulnerable household perspective, within a 
structured theoretical framework. Although the study explored vulnerability, it did so 
from a fuel poverty stance whereby a household’s vulnerability was measured in relation 
to how likely they were to be fuel poor, how sensitive they were to that and whether they 
had capacity to adapt to the situation. Therefore, even though they framed their participant 
answers in relation to fuel poverty, the framework they used ensured that wider 
contributing factors towards vulnerability were also considered, such as agency and 
power, multidimensionality and individuality of circumstances. As a result of their study, 
Middlemiss and Gillard suggest there are six main characteristics of energy vulnerability, 
namely: quality of dwelling fabric; tenancy relations; energy costs and supply; stability 
of household income; social relations and ill health. These indicators appear to include 
the main concerns highlighted by fuel poverty, but also include indicators that answer 
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much of the energy vulnerability concerns, such as the social relations, ill health and 
tenancy relations. Also, by re-positioning low income to income stability, they are re-
positioning the power from the level of income, to how reliable it is, again answering 
some of the fuel poverty concerns around income levels being an unreliable indicator of 
fuel poverty. 
Until recently, an explicit reference to spatial differentiation and its influence on energy 
vulnerability was missing from the literature. Simcock and Petrova (2017) have addressed 
this by attributing energy vulnerability to six driving forces to form a globally applicable 
energy vulnerability framework. The six driving forces are: Access to energy sources; 
Affordability of energy, either through the cost of energy or as a relative household 
expenditure to its income; Flexibility to change energy source or system; Energy 
Efficiency of building structures or household energy systems; Needs that create a greater 
energy requirement such as health, age and lifestyle; and Practices such as socio-cultural 
norms that may require energy over-consumption (Simcock & Petrova 2017, p.432). 
These drivers encompass multi-scalar and multi-dimensional influences on energy 
deprivation and builds on indicators developed by others, such as Middlemiss and Gillard 
(2015) (above). Such research encompasses socio-cultural and individual factors such as 
energy needs and practices in addition to economic and political factors that contribute to 
energy access and affordability and vary across space. This framework holds capacity to 
incorporate place-specific interpretations.  
Additionally, by focusing on factors that increase the risk of energy deprivation which 
can be personal to each household, which are applicable, in varying degrees and in 
varying interconnected ways, to different spatial contexts the framework negates the need 
for the established but two dichotomous understandings of energy deprivation: fuel 
poverty and energy poverty. Thus, it can be applied in developed and developing settings 
and allows comparison between different geographical settings. Place-specific 
understandings of energy vulnerability to be explored at a variety of scales, for example, 
in the UK, energy access is likely to be more problematic in places where energy 
infrastructure is more limited, such as rural areas, however, flexibility may be a more 
pronounced issue in places with high levels of private rented homes, such as urban areas. 
Potentially, different places, whether communities, sub-regions and regions can develop 
energy vulnerability profiles which will allow more nuanced and more effective energy 
vulnerability or fuel poverty strategies to be developed and implemented.   
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The energy vulnerability framework provides the opportunity to unpack the various 
elements that contribute to households becoming fuel poor, as arguably, fuel poverty 
should be understood as one of several possible outcomes of energy vulnerability, as well 
as a contributing factor. It allows the energy vulnerable to be redefined as anyone, even 
people who do not fit the standard definition of fuel poor, instead of usual stereotypes 
(Kuhlike et al. 2011) that persist in the UK, such as elderly people or people in receipt of 
welfare benefits (Day & Walker 2013; Bouzarovski 2013).  It also holds potential to 
incorporate geographical difference which variably affects each energy vulnerability 
driver. By adopting an approach that allows the full dimensions of energy vulnerability 
to be explored, how and why people are likely to be energy vulnerable can be better 
understood, leading to more accurate understandings of exactly who may be energy 
vulnerable in certain times or places and what can be done to relieve this.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Situations of energy vulnerability not only consist of households experiencing harm due 
to insufficient energy, but also, that even if not currently in an active situation of harm, 
they are at risk of being so. As the factors that may lead to a household becoming energy 
vulnerable are diverse and at different scales, so too may the possible range of harms that 
a household would be in danger of. Therefore, possible outcomes of energy vulnerability 
could include becoming fuel poor with the adverse effects that can bring. But it can also 
capture the adverse effects of those households who are preventing themselves becoming 
fuel poor through restricting their social engagements, restricting their diets, restricting 
their mobility, restricting their energy consumption or through working longer hours etc. 
These possible actions hold possible negative consequences: for social inclusion; physical 
and mental health and wellbeing; along with others that may not yet be defined. These 
actions also have the possibility of having multi-scalar impacts for example, parents 
spending longer in work may have impacts on their children and their attainment, 
reductions in spending may have impacts on local businesses, which if concentrated in a 
number of households in the same area can have impacts on the local economies, possibly 
leading to decline, or reductions in mobility may have impacts on the level of public 
transport use leading to possible reductions in transport services to certain areas.  
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The prevalence of people living within an energy vulnerable state is unknown. Fuel 
poverty figures suggest that there are 3.65 million households living in fuel poverty today 
(BEIS 2018a). Given that fuel poverty is a possible outcome of being energy vulnerable 
and that it is generally acknowledged that fuel poverty estimates are most likely lower 
than reality (Moore 2012), it is likely that those who are energy vulnerable is significantly 
higher. By attempting to understand the dynamics of energy vulnerability, it is argued that 
measures to tackle fuel poverty can become more nuanced and effective. However, it 
appears that it will also mean that a far wider range of people and a far higher number of 
people will be identified, possibly highlighting fundamental issues within society and 
governance generally, not just around energy and its governance. 
The fundamental necessity of energy for participation in modern life means that issues of 
justice in relation to fair and equal access to it are of the utmost importance. As such it is 
only right that the concept of energy justice is gaining prevalence within the literature. 
One of the main reasons for this is the use of the now widely known and recognised 
concept, both academically and also within political and public spheres within Wales and 
the UK as a whole, of fuel poverty. While fuel poverty has done much for advancing 
research and understandings of the multiple and diverse negative impacts living in fuel 
poverty can have, its well-known triad components of low income, low energy efficiency 
and high energy prices which alludes to largely budgetary causes and effects, has over 
recent times been criticised as being too narrow to allow a full understanding of the 
problem at hand. In addition to this, is the concept less well established within the UK of 
energy poverty which, although better encompasses equitable access to modern and safe 
energy networks, lacks the focus on affordability and efficiency that fuel poverty can 
bring. As a result, some authors now encourage the merging of the two concepts into one 
framework of understanding (Bouzarovski et al. 2014). Subsequently, the concept energy 
vulnerability, with its multi-dimensional, multi-scalar and temporal characteristics, is 
gaining recognition for its ability to be strong in areas where fuel poverty and energy 
poverty alone are weak. 
Energy vulnerability, understood as risk of exposure, sensitivity and capacity to adapt, 
that it is a mixture of energy network, political, household and contextual factors that 
come together over particular spaces at particular times, depending on each given 
circumstance means that the elements that create it are not fixed in space or time, 
Likewise, neither are the people who are energy vulnerable. However, this is messy and 
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complex, thus, energy vulnerability requires a framework that provides some structure 
but that also allows the inclusion of multiple and diverse factors. Thus, the energy 
vulnerability concept, comprised of six drivers has the ability to enable a much fuller and 
nuanced understanding of the factors that can cause household energy deprivation, as it 
allows space to account for the effects of geographical context on each driver. Adopting 
the concept energy vulnerability at a political level may allow for policies aimed at 
reducing household energy deprivation to become more effective, there is also the 
possibility that numbers of energy vulnerable households would be significantly higher 
than those currently identified as fuel poor. This would have massive implications for the 
type of policy that could be created to address this issue. 
The next Chapter explores how geographic concepts of place and scale can be adopted to 
take account of factors associated with peripheral disadvantage which impact upon low 
carbon transition capabilities. It highlights that linked to this are potential impacts for 
energy justice during transition where peripherality determines not only the trajectory and 













Chapter 3. Low-carbon energy transition: Implications for energy 
and spatial justice 
3.1  Introduction  
The “energy trilemma” conceptualises concerns around energy security, energy 
affordability and environmental sustainability (Poudineh & Jamasb 2012; Pye et al. 2015 
p. 673). Currently, energy consumption is largely sourced from fossil fuels, meaning 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emission remain. For countries, 
such as the UK, dependent on energy imports from few other countries, their energy 
supply is vulnerable to external contexts that can cause disruption to supply chains and 
fluctuations in the energy prices (Chalvatzis & Ioannidis 2017). To address the energy 
trilemma, many countries now aim to reduce their carbon emissions through limiting their 
reliance on externally sourced carbon-heavy fossil fuels by increasing indigenous 
renewable energy production and at the same time provide low-cost energy services to 
their populations (Poudineh & Jamasb 2012; Pye et al. 2015 p. 673).  
In the UK, binding international targets have been agreed that demand a reduction in the 
country’s carbon emissions and an increase in its use of energy sourced from renewables 
(Climate Change Act 2008; European Commission 2019). Most recently the UK has 
announced a ‘climate change emergency’ laying new legislation to “eradicate its net 
contribution to climate change by 2050” (Gov.UK 2019, para 1). This legislation is a 
driver of the UK energy transition, so far resulting in a growth in energy sourced from 
renewables (Department of Energy and Climate Change [DECC] 2016) and reductions in 
carbon emissions (DECC 2015c). However, despite the progress made against the targets 
there is growing awareness that longer-term targets will not be met. Awareness is growing 
too that as transition has progressed so far, the costs and benefits have not been evenly 
distributed. This uneven transition trajectory holds immediate implications for energy 
costs, in addition to longer-term concerns for increasing societal wealth gaps and potential 
lock-in to what will become increasingly expensive and carbon-heavy technologies. 
Accordingly, research on energy transitions has sought to explore how and why energy 
transitions have manifested in the past (Schot 1998) in order to inform the present (Foxon 
et al. 2010). Or have analysed the current transition in order to predict what its main 
influences are, how this may be managed and what energy future may result (Geels et al. 
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2016). While questions remain over whether the three aims of the energy trilemma can 
be resolved in unison (Poudineh & Jamasb 2012), research into energy transitions aims 
to advance understanding of transition dynamics in order that they can be directed 
(Turnheim et al. 2015) and become more ‘just’. 
While low-carbon transitions are occurring in multiple countries, their dynamics are 
generally explored within individual national scales, with traditionally less exploration of 
smaller-scale regional and sub-regional influences (Faller 2015). Focus on national scale 
transition is somewhat understandable in the UK where energy related policies and 
utilities are national scale, highly influential dominant forces in the current energy regime 
and transition (Geels et al. 2016). While understanding how this national-scale regime 
impacts upon the emergence of small-scale technologies and innovations - which are 
viewed as a ‘just’ means to obtaining transition success - is no doubt important, so too is 
understanding transition dynamics from a regional or sub-regional perspective (Faller 
2015). In order to do so, attention should be paid to local-scale, social, natural, technical 
and political contexts from which innovations emerge (Bridge et al. 2013).  
Established concepts such as scale, place and spatiality allow for the deeper understanding 
of how innovations form (Faller 2015; Longhurst 2015) and how transitions manifest and 
progress at different scales in different places, relative to others (Hawkey et al. 2013). 
These concepts synergise within a spatial justice framework. To date, transition literature 
has centred on socio-technical perspectives using multi-level perspective frameworks 
which explores structural and temporal processes of socio-technological transition, with 
an emphasis on the technological aspects (Nye et al. 2010; Seyfang & Haxeltine 2012; 
Geels et al. 2016). A second branch of transition literature has focused in on energy justice 
(Bouzarovski & Simcock 2017; Healy & Barry 2017; Monyei et al. 2018; Jenkins et al. 
2018). There has been less exploration of the role of sociological aspects of transition 
(Seyfang & Haxeltine, 2012), thus, socially constructed, relational and relative concepts 
of scale, place and space have been traditionally under-researched (Bridge et al. 2013; 
Faller 2015). Where this attention to space, places and scale have been addressed, it has 
resulted in studies that have mainly focused on urban regions and cities (Devine-Wright 
& Wiersma 2013; Bulkeley et al. 2014; Bouzarovski et al. 2017) with little attention paid 
to non-core or peripheral regions. This indicates energy transitions are not being fully 
understood. This chapter demonstrates the role for geographical concepts and spatial 
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justice in furthering understandings of energy transitions and highlights the need for 
further research of energy transitions in peripheral places.  
 
3.2  Low-carbon energy transition in the UK: A spatially uneven 
process  
Low-carbon transition in the UK has been driven forward by both international and 
national political, economic and environmental concerns regarding energy supply 
security, affordability and climate change otherwise known as the “energy trilemma” 
(Foxon et al. 2010; Hawkey et al. 2013; Pye et al. 2015, p. 673). Consequently, the UK 
is attempting to reduce national reliance on carbon-heavy non-indigenous energy supplies 
such as fossil fuels, by transitioning to low-carbon energy sources, such as renewables or 
nuclear. This ambition is reflected in and driven by international climate change 
agreements and EU and UK policy.  
Internationally the need to address climate change was formally recognised in 1992 when 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was 
established. The UNFCCC was responsible for administering the Kyoto Protocol (1997) 
which commits party countries to reduce their carbon emissions to prevent further 
interference with the global climatic system by stabilizing global temperatures. The 
protocol came into force in 2005, where 37 countries and the EU community each agreed 
to reduce global Green House Gas (GHG) emissions by 5% of 1990 levels between 2008-
12, and then by 18% between 2013-20 (UNFCCC 2019a). This was broken down into 
individual targets for each country reflecting their long-term past contribution to the 
current climate change and their current economic development. The protocol reflected a 
‘just’ target measure via “the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities" as 
it recognised “that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high 
levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial 
activity” (UNFCCC 2019a). Thus, a heavier burden in the form of higher carbon emission 
reduction targets was placed on developed nations. As part of the Kyoto Protocol where 
the EU agreed to 8% GHG reduction from 1990 levels. Within the EU a ‘Burden Sharing 
Agreement’ was also adopted whereby the target was divided between 15 member states 
with those most industrialized receiving higher targets that allowed those still 
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industrializing to emit GHGs at a higher level. Of this target, the UK committed to a 
12.5% reduction in GHG emissions. 
The Paris Agreement is a new international agreement that follows on from the end of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2020 and similarly aims to stop global temperature increasing more 
than 2°C. The Paris Agreement was ratified in 2016 and is effected from 2020. It differs 
from the Kyoto Protocol in that its targets are non-binding and each country creates its 
own nationally determined contribution to GHG emission reduction in addition to plans 
for managing and maintaining their targets. The Paris Agreement is open to developed 
and developing countries as well as other parties such as regions, local authorities or cities 
(UNFCCC 2019b).  
EU climate policy development is closely related to international climate agreements. In 
1990, the first European climate target was set: to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions of the European Community at 1990 levels by 2000. In 2007, EU member 
states (by then 28 countries) committed to the 2020 Climate and Energy Package (20% 
reduction in European CO2 emissions, a 20% increase in energy efficiency and 20% of 
energy for heat, transport and electricity from renewable sources) (European Commission 
2019). Building from the 2020 EU targets is the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework 
which sets three key targets for the year 2030; at least 40% cuts in greenhouse gas 
emissions (from 1990 levels); at least 27% share for renewable energy; and at least 27% 
improvement in energy efficiency. As an EU member state, the UK has agreed to a 
proportion of the GHG emission targets set out in EU climate change and energy policy 
(in addition to signing the Paris Agreement). Of the 2020 Package the UK has agreed to 
a 16% reduction in GHG emissions and to meet 15% of its total energy needs from 
renewable sources (Hammond & Pearson 2013; Hannon et al. 2013). The renewable 
energy obligation is further broken down as 30% of its electricity, 12% of its heat, and 
10% of its transport demand from renewable sources. 2030 targets for EU member states 
have not yet been agreed.  
In addition to its global and European obligations, the UK set its own national legally 
binding target in the Climate Change Act 2008, to reduce carbon emissions by 80% of the 
1990 levels, by 2050. This target has been broken down into five incremental carbon 
budgets, monitored every four years up until 2032 so far10. Additionally, the Energy Act 
 
10 UK 4 yearly carbon budgets measured against 1990 carbon emissions:  Year 1 2008-2012, 25% below; 
Year 2 2012-2017, 31%; Year 3 2018-2222, 37%; Year 4 2023-2027, 51%; and Year 5 2028-2032, 57%.  
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(2010), sets out three principal objectives: to financially support commercial-scale 
demonstration of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS); introduction of fuel poverty 
schemes; strengthening the powers of the UK Government and Ofgem to ensure fair 
energy markets for customers while delivering secure and sustainable energy supplies 
(Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change 2015). These acts have been taken 
forward by several strategic plans such as the Low Carbon Transition Plan and 
Renewable Energy Strategy (2009); UK Renewable Energy Roadmap (2011); Community 
Energy Strategy (2014); Clean Growth Strategy (2017); Air quality plan for nitrogen 
dioxide (NO2) in UK (2017); Implementing the end of unabated coal by 2025 (2018)11.  
Within these policy levers, several schemes have been implemented that aim to reduce 
UK CO2 emissions via encouraging investment in and up-take of low-carbon energy 
technologies in the UK and reducing energy consumption. These can be divided between 
those aimed at the private commercial, public and not-for profit sectors and those aimed 
at the domestic sector, most notable of these have been; the Climate Change Levy (2001-
15) which increased industrial energy efficiencies and encouraged energy to be sourced 
from renewables, leading to an estimated carbon emission reduction of 3.5 million tonnes 
by 2010 (House of Commons Library 2016b); and the Renewable Heat Incentive and 
Feed-in-Tariff (RHI and FIT) (2011/12) which supplied payment for the generation of 
renewable energy – for 7 years in the case of RHI, and for 20 years (originally 25 years) 
in the case of FIT - additional payment for export to the grid. Up to 2017 it is estimated 
that the RHI and FIT saved 23.5 and 1.5 million tonnes of CO2 emissions respectively 
(DECC 2015d; Department of Business Energy and Industrial Strategy [BEIS] 2018c).  
The electricity market reform in 2014 introduced Contracts for Difference (CfD) which 
has also influenced the growth of renewables (although cumulative impacts will take 
longer to be realised). Two rounds of CfD have taken place (2015 and 2017). In the 2017 
round, two wind projects delivered a strike price of £57.50 per MWh, on a par with new 
gas power and lower than subsidies for nuclear (Hinkley Point C). Additionally, policy 
interventions not directly within the Governments’ climate change remit can also hold 
outcomes for reducing carbon emissions, for example, schemes aimed at improving 
housing conditions usually hold some aspect of increasing property energy efficiencies 
and thus, indirectly carbon consumption. For example, the Energy Efficiency (Private 
rented property) Regulations (England and Wales) (2014) state that private landlords 
 
11 See Appendix 2 for UK climate change policy overview 
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must ensure their properties achieve EPC12 of at least E rating prior to leasing (BEIS 
2017a).  
Such policy interventions are not typically solely aimed at reducing carbon emissions, 
they are also devised to increase investment in the renewables market, increasing 
production, and reducing the cost of renewable technology. As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
demonstrate energy produced from renewables in the UK has grown over time, 
particularly electricity production. In 2017, 11.3% of all energy consumed was from 
renewable sources compared to 1.1% in 2004.   
 
 
Figure 3.1. UK energy use by source 1970-17. 
Source: Carbon Brief (2018) 
 
 




Figure 3.2. Electricity production in the UK 1996-17. 
Source: Carbon Brief (2018) 
Despite this progress, there remains questions as to whether the UK can meet EU 2020 
obligations. While the 16% reduction in GHG emissions will be met and overall a 15% 
renewable energy demand is likely, it is unlikely that the UK will be able to ensure that 
of this 12% will be heat demand and 10% will be transport demand (House of Commons 
Energy and Climate Change Committee 2016a). Additionally, the UK is not currently 
expected to meet its own fourth and fifth carbon budgets (2023-27 and 2028-32) which 
require 51% and 57% reductions respectively, compared to 1990 levels (Committee on 
Climate Change 2018). Several reasons have been cited for this and are outlined below.  
First, policy attention has largely focused on the energy sector itself, which although has 
been successful due to the increased diversity in energy sources and reductions in energy 
demand and CO2
 emissions. However, this focus has meant other sectors have been 
relatively neglected, as Table 3.3 shows, the transport sector, building sector and domestic 
sector have remaining relatively static or have increased energy demand (Committee on 




Figure 3.3. UK energy consumption by sector 1970-17. 
Source: Carbon Brief (2018) 
Second, policy has been “chopping and changing” often at short notice, negatively 
impacting investor confidence, development of UK supply chains, employment and 
development costs (Hawkey et al. 2013; CCC 2018, p. 12). The CCC (2018) points to 
several policy changes that have had negative impacts on UK targets and the economy 
more generally; the Zero Carbon Homes (2006) policy outlined that from 2016 all new 
buildings would need to generate as much energy as they consume, this was supported by 
tighter energy efficiency standards. However, the policy was discarded in 2015 less than 
a year before its implementation. This decision was critiqued as without such a policy the 
UK will continue to build housing which leave a legacy of higher energy consumption 
needs and thus higher domestic energy bills. It also held ramifications for the energy 
efficiency sector where employment levels dropped by around 45% in 2016 (Office for 
National Statistics 2018a).  
The FIT has been reduced several times since 2015 and is now scheduled to end in 2019. 
Its constant reduction has been cited as contributing to the 56% reduction of renewable 
energy investment in 2016/17 (Environmental Audit Committee 2018). Two competitions 
for carbon capture and storage (CCS) developments were cancelled by the UK 
Government at late stages, leading to a financial loss for developers who had formulated 
bids, and also for the Government itself of around £100 million (National Audit Office 
2017). In 2015 the Government also announced that it would not support additional CCS 
investment and would instead seek out more cost effective low-carbon developments such 
as nuclear (Carrington 2015; HM Treasury 2015a; HM Treasury 2015b). However, most 
recently CCS has once again become a policy priority (BEIS 2019b) while investment in 
new nuclear have become questionable (BEIS 2019c). Finally, policies aimed at 
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improving domestic energy efficiency had their budgets cut by 83% in 2015 (House of 
Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee 2016b). 
While the UK Government is responsible for delivering on the UK’s national and 
international targets, meeting them is dependent on cooperation and progress being made 
within the devolved nations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (Muinzer & Ellis 
2017). However, at devolved spatial scales, difference in low-carbon transition 
trajectories is evident. This may in part be explained by policy devolution, which has not 
been equally allocated to each devolved administration13. For example, while each has 
devolved competencies over new energy production developments (see Table 3.1) such 
as the type of energy, scale and location, these are uneven in scope and until April 2019, 
Wales held the least competencies. This has been cited as limiting “a more comprehensive 
Welsh-specific energy policy” (Llewellyn et al. 2017, p. 818) also holding implications 
for the type, scale and installed capacity of renewable energy As per Figure 3.4, aside 
from Northern Ireland, Wales has the lowest levels of installed renewable electricity 
capacity in the UK. For an explanation as to the apparent paradox of Northern Ireland’s 
highly devolved energy policy but low renewable energy installed capacity (c.f. Muinzer 
& Ellis 2017). 
Table 3.1. Devolution of energy related powers in the UK 
Country Energy 















Ireland   
Fully 
devolved 




Scope to shape 
delivery of 
some schemes  




No Powers Power to determine 
applications of up 
to 350 MW** 
Power to determine 
applications of up 







Full competence Full competence 
for England, partial 
for Wales; full 
competence over 
projects 350 MW+  
Full competence 
for English and 
Welsh Waters 




* Until the Wales Act (2017) energy policy was not devolved to Wales. 
**Until the Wales Act (2017) this power was limited to partial powers over planning policy and consent 
for smaller schemes only (below 50 MW). 
***Until the Wales Act (2017) this power was limited to determining applications up to 1 MW (with 
exception under Transport and Works Act 1992). 
Source: Cowell et al. (2015) 
 




Figure 3.4. Renewable energy capacity per UK country 
Source: BEIS (2018g)  
 
Each devolved nation has its own CO2 reduction targets (see Table 3.5) these are directly 
influenced through devolved competencies in demand-side measures for transport, energy 
efficiency, aspects of energy policy, waste, agriculture and land use (CCC 2018). 
However, as competencies over demand-side measures themselves are not equally 
devolved there are variances in the ability of each devolved nation to reduce emissions. 
This is evidenced in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5 where due to progress so far, overall, 
Scotland is the only administration likely to meet its 2020 targets (CCC 2018). 
 
Table 3.2. Devolved Administrations GHG reduction targets and progress. 









UK Climate Change Act 2008 35% by 2020 -41% -5% 
N. Ireland No separate climate change 
legislation.  
GHG reductions contribute 
to UK total under the 
Climate Change Act 2008 
35% by 2020 -16% +1.3% 
Scotland Climate Change (Scotland) 
Act 2009 
42% by 2020 -45% +2.5% 
Wales A Climate Change Strategy 
for Wales 2010*  
27% by 2020 -14% +4.8% 
* Superseded by the Climate Change (Carbon Budgets) (Wales) Regulations 2018. 





Figure 3.5. Devolved administration GHG emissions by sector. 
Source: CCC (2018, p. 246) 
 
As hinted at above, several factors contribute to regionally differential transition 
trajectories. These include a mix of elements that are directly impactful upon energy 
transition such as; devolved political power and ideologies, natural resources, built 
environment and infrastructure, and regional energy economics (including ownership and 
supply chains). Additionally, wider contextual elements hold influence, such as non-
devolved national policy and politics, the wider economy, internal and external historical 
and cultural framings. For example, in Wales, its relative high levels of GHG emissions 
compared to other devolved countries in the UK (and indeed many EU countries) is 
attributed to “its large industry sector compared to its size and population; harder to treat 
residential housing stock (hard to treat properties have solid walls and are off the gas 
network)…and the fact that it is a net exporter of electricity and energy services” 
(Georgakaki et al. 2015, p. 107).  
Additionally, large areas of Wales have poor transport connections, this can necessitate 
high dependence on personal vehicles, for example via “forced car ownership” (Mattioli 
et al. 2017, p. 95)14. Wales, as a devolved country with fewer devolved powers than 
Scotland and Northern Ireland also produces GHG and carbon emissions that are beyond 
the scope of its powers to alter. As Georgakaki et al. (2015) point out over 60% of Wales’s 
emissions are outside of Welsh Government authority. Indeed, energy infrastructure and 
distribution, regulation and production over 350 MW15 are not devolved, thus, Wales 
 
14 See Section 7.3 for exploration of personal vehicle ownership 
15 Power to consent energy projects of up to 350 MW was devolved to Wales in 2018. 
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large emissions due to gas combustion is a UK national competence. It also demonstrates 
the interconnectivity between places, as Wales’s gas emissions have risen as Scotland’s 
coal emissions have fallen – this mirrors national energy demand: as coal has been phased 
out, gas has helped filled the demand gap (see also Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  
It should also be pointed out that while much of Wales’ own transition ability may until 
recently have been limited, where there was ability to take forward transition, for example 
in setting carbon budgets, Wales has been slow to progress. Initial carbon targets were set 
out in A Climate Change Strategy for Wales 2010, two years after the UK and other 
devolved nations policy. Additionally, while carbon budgets were set for 2016-2020, a 
plan to achieve this was only ratified in 2019 (in Prosperity for All: A Low Carbon Wales). 
Consequently, while some of Wales slow progress in reducing GHG emissions (Table 3.2 
and Figure 3.5) is a result of external control over how and where emissions are produced 
within Wales, its own slow policy development has also restricted progress. 
Within this brief snapshot of Wales in the UK it is clear that historical, material, political 
and economic factors, and how they interplay within Wales and also relatively between 
other UK countries influences low-carbon transition progress. Thus, to fully understand 
low-carbon energy transition in the UK, plan future trajectories and ultimately achieve 
climate change goals, the scale it is understood as taking place within must alter to 
accommodate smaller scale influences in addition to accounting for the wider context. 
Reducing the scale of transition exploration necessitates a spatial lens because so many 
of the elements that influence the ability to take forward transition are spatially situated 
and spatially differentiated. This also allows further recognition of spatial and energy 
injustices that may be embedded within places and that may be reproduced as part of 
transition. 
 
3.3  Towards a ‘just’ socio-technical transition process 
Energy transition involves a large-scale change in the composition of primary energy 
supply that will be influenced by, and in turn will impact upon technologies, institutions, 
businesses and energy customers, to name a few (Rotmans & Loorbach 2008). Much 
research has explored how low-carbon transition may progress, investigating the main 
influences on this progression (Geels et al. 2016) and what influence this may hold on 
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social structures, energy and political governance, and landscapes (Foxon et al. 2010). 
Energy transition is a change to the current energy regime, with the regime being the 
dominant energy system in place at that time (Foxon 2013). Regimes are stable 
configurations of politics, markets, infrastructures and social networks (Grin et al. 2010), 
this stability and complex configuration means regime change can be difficult. Within the 
UK, it is argued that a “market logic” dominates, and the regime consists of centralised 
systems and technologies and large-scale actors and distribution networks (Foxon 2013, 
p.11). While a stable regime such as this with barriers at all levels from production, 
infrastructure and distribution, market dominance and consumer behaviour make 
transition difficult, as section 3.2 demonstrates it is not impossible. However, it is 
debatable how ‘just’ transition is.  
The fundamental changes brought by low-carbon transition on socio-economic and 
political structures at all scales, combine with growing concerns on the inclusivity of 
transition processes to necessitate deeper understandings of how and why it unfolds in 
particular ways and how can it be ‘justly’ progressed. Energy transitions are extremely 
complex and involve “multiple scales, geographies and temporalities” (Turnheim et al. 
2015, p. 240).  The complexity of structures and number of actors at all scales, in addition 
to the numerous interplays across time and space means, “there is no single vantage point 
from which socio-technical transitions can be comprehensively analysed or steered” 
(Turnheim et al. 2015, p. 241). Consequently, several approaches attempting to unpack 
energy transition have developed. Of these, two dominant frameworks have emerged, a 
socio-technical framework and an energy justice framework (Sareen & Haarstad 2018, p. 
624).  
Socio-technical frameworks focus on energy production and supply, exploring how 
technological innovations can be fostered and become normalized, or mainstreamed, and 
thus challenge existing socio-technical regimes. Energy justice, whilst often accounting 
for supply-side dynamics, also focus on the demand-side, exploring fairness and equity 
with the “distribution of costs, risks and deprivation associated with energy” (Sareen & 
Haarstad 2018, p. 624). Given their different foci, each framework has emerged from 
distinct scholarship areas, socio-technical holding foundations in science and technology 
studies (Sareen & Haarstad 2018) and energy justice holding foundations in social and 
environmental sciences and law. This section will unpack each framework in turn. 
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Socio-technical frameworks focus on the interaction of technical, institutional and socio-
political change processes (Turnheim et al. 2015) and essentially understand that 
“technology is always mediated by social practices, institutions, systems and structures” 
(Sareen & Haarstad 2018, p. 625). Thus, socio-technical theorising seeks to understand 
how and why some technological innovations, initially developed within safe spaces or 
protected niches, become integrated into social regimes while others do not (Rip & Kemp 
1998; Sareen & Haarstad 2018). Such framings have developed to include; multi-level 
perspective (MLP) (Geels 2005) and technological innovation systems (Mattes et al. 
2015); transition management and strategic niche management (Loorbach 2010; 
Meadowcroft 2009); and actor-networks (Nye et al. 2010). Additionally, different 
transition modelling methods have advanced, for example; quantitative system modelling 
attempts to predict energy transition outcomes through exploring possible behavioural 
and techno-economic options; initiative-based learning focuses on micro-scale projects 
and the interplay of actors in their development and scaling-up (Turnheim et al. 2015).  
While each framework offers a certain focus to transition research, MLP is most often 
used for research with a socio-technical quantitative modelling and actor-networks are 
most often used for initiative-based learning modelling (Turnheim et al. 2015). Each 
analytical framework holds similarities in focuses on temporal and hierarchical processes, 
however, as each approach is undertaken in isolation the field of transition research has 
been criticized as being incomplete and therefore having limited policy and practice 
benefits (Turnheim et al. 2015). Of the different frameworks MLP as a framework for 
socio-technical transitions has become most explored and developed within European 
research (Foxon 2013).  
MLP was originally put forward by Schot (1998) as an analytical framework for exploring 
historical technological developments, and also by Rip and Kemp (1998) as a means of 
understanding technical change. It is the most recent conceptualisation of MLP put 
forward by Geels (2005), then Geels and Schot (2007), which has been most advanced 
within the literature (Grin et al. 2010; Sareen & Haarstad 2018). This current 
understanding combines both original approaches by Rip and Kemp (1998) and Schot 
(1998), whereby technical transitions can be understood to occur due to an alignment of 
socio-technical trajectories at three structural levels, niche (micro), regime (meso) and 
landscape (macro) (Grin et al. 2010). The three levels operate within a ‘nested hierarchy’ 
whereby niche level is embedded in the regime level and the regime level is embedded in 
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the landscape level (Grin et al. 2010; Lopolito et al. 2011). But it is the regime level 
changes that are fundamental to transitions being successful, therefore, a transition in the 
case of the MLP can be viewed most notably as a change in an existing regime (See Figure 
3.6). Regime change however, is difficult, as existing regimes resist the changes of 
transition due to lock in, embeddedness and path dependency (Foxon et al. 2010). For 
regime change to occur, social and technical innovation at a niche level and pressure 
exerted on the regime from the wider landscape need to be synchronised so that space 
made at regime level through landscape pressure can be filled by niche level innovations 
that are ready at that time (ven den Bergh & Bruinsma 2008; Grin 2010; Lopolito et al. 
2011; Jørgensen 2012). 
Lock-in can also occur as part of the transition process. For example, UK low-carbon 
policy and subsidies have emphasised some renewable energy sources, such as nuclear, 
onshore wind, and more recently solar PV, over newer, untested technologies such as 
tidal. This is due to the more established technology’s relative cost effectiveness, ready 
technology and energy returns (Pearson & Winter 2013; CCC 2017), although the cost-
effectiveness of different technologies in the UK is still debated (Pfenninger & Keirstead 
2015). This new regime ‘lock-in’ holds influence over technology development as it 
becomes more difficult for newer technologies to break out of their niche and access the 
market as they are not tested on a larger scale and cannot achieve the same economies of 
scale as more established technologies. This could mean that low-carbon technological 
developments that would better meet UK energy needs at a lower-cost (longer-term) are 
being depressed in favour of better known, older technologies.   
Within the energy literature MLP has been used for mapping historical energy transitions 
(Verbong & Geels 2007), the understanding of which in turn has enabled MLP to be used 
as a tool for imagining how the current energy transition is unfolding (Foxon 2013) and 
how that may continue as time progresses (Geels et al. 2016; Longhurst & Chilvers 2016). 
A major output of MLP research within this field is that of transition pathways (Foxon et 
al. 2010; Geels 2016, Turnheim et al. 2015). Transition pathways are defined as “patterns 
of changes in socio-technical systems unfolding over time that lead to new ways of 
achieving specific societal functions” (Turnheim et al. 2015, p. 240). As such, it is argued 
that understanding the dynamics and particular context-specific factors that lead to the 
evolution of certain transition pathways, the process itself can be managed in order that 
58 
 
the resulting regime change is steered towards set goals (Loorbach 2010; Turnheim et al. 
2015). 
 
Figure 3.6. Multi-level perspective on transitions. 
Source: Geels and Schot (2007) 
Foxon (2013) expands on the traditional MLP theory that transition pathways arise 
through the dynamic interaction of technological and social factors at different scales. 
These interactions are mediated by the actions of three main actors in the UK: Civil 
Society; Market; and Government. The three actors hold influence over the transition 
process, however, usually only one of these will be the dominant force and consequently 
will determine the outcome or new regime in their favour (Foxon 2013). Foxon et al. 
(2010) and Foxon (2013) suggests three possible transition pathways - ‘Thousand 
Flowers’, ‘Market Rules’ and ‘Central Coordination’ - each shaped by the dominant actor 
within a transition process. For example, Thousand Flowers represents a transition 
originating in civil society and a more ‘bottom-up’ approach, that would involve a 
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transition with concerns for equity, biodiversity and the environment and may result in 
de-centralisation and de-growth; Market Rules represent a pathway most similar to the 
current regime, whereby the energy market has minimal interference from government or 
civil society and remains centralised and dominated by the existing large energy firms; 
finally, Central Coordination sees an active role for the government in (amongst others) 
selecting future energy technologies, stimulating the energy market directly and indirectly 
through influencing customer behaviours and placing regulations on new-builds (Foxon 
et al. 2010).  
Low carbon transition represents more than a change to the energy regime, “it is also a 
challenge in terms of making sure societal costs, risks and benefits of that shift are 
distributed in a way that can be considered ‘just’” (Sareen & Haarstad 2018, p. 624). 
Therefore, there are increasing calls for socio-technical and energy justice framings to be 
re-conceptualised as one. Energy justice transition frameworks focus on either 
“humanising” existing socio-technical frameworks (Jenkins et al. 2018); or emphasising 
the social and material structures and processes involved in shaping the speed and 
trajectory of transition (Bridge et al. 2013) which influence to whom the costs and benefits 
of transition may fall throughout the energy system (production, distribution, 
consumption and waste) (Bouzarovski & Simcock 2017; Healy & Barry 2017; Monyei et 
al. 2018).  
In humanizing socio-technical transitions Jenkins et al. (2018) integrates the three-tenet 
energy justice approach (recognition, procedure and distribution) into all levels of the 
MLP framework (niche, regime and landscape). At a niche level developments can be 
exclusionary. For example, Jenkins et al. (2018, p. 69) point out, electric vehicles at a 
niche level have social and environmental benefits, but “they can perpetuate already 
widening gaps between the wealthy and poor, as well as potentially raising new forms 
and geographies of injustice”. At a regime level, energy justice can humanize sometimes 
vacuum based policy making that “locks in” regions and nations to an energy pathway 
for a number of years (Jenkins et al. 2018, p. 70). Finally, at the landscape level, placing 
energy justice as a priority here, can lead to cracks in the regime level that would allow 
niche level innovations that incorporate it to break through more readily than those that 
do not. However, changes at the landscape level are incredibly slow moving, political and 
imbued with self-interest, as such it may fall to niche, regime and wider society to 
pressure the landscape into change.  
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In their “whole energy system approach” to a “just transition” Healy and John (2017, p. 
451) highlight the role of existing socio-economic structures in creating dependencies, 
which can “lock out” new low-carbon innovations by “locking in” large scale investment 
in carbon-heavy developments for a number of years. Additionally, concerns for 
employment opportunities or regional growth which are currently dependent on fossil-
heavy energy technologies, but that would be reduced by low-carbon alternatives, should 
be legitimised. Re-framing just energy transition as a need for divestment in fossil fuels 
illuminates: the debilitating influence current carbon-heavy energy incumbent actors have 
on transition progress; injustices for those impacted by the current regime; and injustices 
created by low-carbon transition. This makes possible the identification of specific 
changes which facilitate transition and also address energy injustices. Healy and John 
(2017, p. 453) put forward that politicians and policy makers play a pivotal role in their 
decision-making for example, regarding energy subsidies, the energy-economy or in 
creating pathways or new options for labour and citizens who otherwise may become 
“stranded” as low-carbon transition progresses. 
While both approaches to conceptualising a just energy transition differ, they share a 
strong premise; that without integrating energy justice and transition theory together, low-
carbon transition risks replicating further or worsening uneven socio-economic and 
political distributions of power, opportunity and representation. This can occur by 
disenfranchisement, exclusion from transition process, increased socio-economic gaps 
and causing those with the least political and socio-economic capacity, including those 
currently marginalised, to be disproportionately negatively affected by distributions of 
transition costs and benefits. Additionally, they both highlight the role of powerful 
incumbent actors in slowing and diverting transition, Jenkins et al. (2018) point to the 
landscape level of the MLP while Healy and John (2017) trace back injustice to its root 
causes within the energy system as a whole.  
These insights are important as low-carbon transition is increasing the range of energy 
generators and their distribution spatially. This is evident in the UK where energy policy 
has expanded the ability to generate and profit from energy from the traditional ‘Big 6’ 
to the public sector, third sector and community groups and households. This new usually 
smaller-scale distributed energy production raises new issues of justice, such questions 
have asked why are some households able to produce energy and therefore generate some 
form of income or bill reduction, while others cannot? And, what differential impacts 
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may this hold for those who can or cannot participate in energy transition in in such a 
way? Such questions have received some attention within the literature which has largely 
focussed on how policy affects the inclusivity and fair access to energy production. For 
example, the FIT and RHI allow households who install low-carbon production in their 
homes to benefit from reduced energy bills (as they consume their own energy first) in 
addition (in the case of FIT) to exporting surplus energy to the national grid and 
generating an income. However, due to the initial financial investment by the household 
to install such technologies and level of autonomy over the building structure itself, 
energy production schemes have been criticised for benefiting wealthier, home-owner 
households (Walker 2008; Stockton & Campbell 2011; Bickerstaff et al. 2013). The 
inequity between those who can generate energy and those who cannot is worsened 
further as all energy consumers in the UK have subsidised such schemes, regardless of 
income level or energy consumption.  
While transition pathways and possible energy futures for the UK derived from the MLP 
are debated, there is no doubt that the MLP has been important in furthering 
understanding the dynamics of energy transitions. In particular, the role of the regime and 
the possible barriers it can present for transition, such as inertia, lock-in and path 
dependency (Foxon et al. 2010; Jenkins et al. 2018) which can be evident in different UK 
scenarios. However, MLP, and transition literature more generally, have been criticised 
for a number of reasons. Some of this is in relation to the way existing transition analytical 
frameworks, in particular the MLP, can overly homogenise what are in reality diverse and 
complex relationships between and within structural levels (Smith et al. 2010a) and actors 
(Raven et al. 2012). Similarly, critique has highlighted that the framework does not easily 
account for non-path dependent developments, for example, forms of disruption that 
could occur at any stage of the ‘pathway’ (Sareen & Haarstad 2018). Interplay between 
different elements within each level are unaccounted for as they are bound or partitioned 
in both space and time (Smith et al. 2010a; Essletzbichler 2012).  
The national-centric view that is employed within most transition research, particularly 
that using MLP is problematic (Bridge et al. 2013; Raven et al. 2012).  The focus on 
national level, especially for transition research that focuses on the UK, is in part related 
to the close inter-relationship between national level politics and the ‘big 6’ large scale 
energy utilities in the UK and the high level of dominance and influence these actors have 
over the current energy system (Turnhiem et al. 2015). This regime operates under a 
62 
 
highly centralized governance system and via a centralized infrastructure of production 
and distribution (Hannon et al. 2013; Foxon 2013) with high levels of embedded sunk-
costs leading to lock-in by actors and built infrastructure and consumer behaviours 
leading to embedded consumption habits (Bridge et al. 2013). In addition, the reliability 
of energy and relatively cheap prices the current system in the UK have added to 
embedded consumption behaviours, which all in all, presents a strong, stable regime that 
holds many obstacles for niche development and eventual regime change (Hawkey et al. 
2013). However, it is possible that the centralised nature of the energy system in the UK, 
with its limited number of actors makes transition more streamlined and easier to govern 
(Committee on Climate Change 2018). Regardless, the dynamics of low-carbon transition 
is changing the configuration of the current energy system. It is becoming increasingly 
decentralised with increasing numbers of diverse actors that vary in scale and motivation. 
This means that it will be increasingly unlikely that the energy system and its modes of 
governance will fit within the existing MLP model. 
Finally, most niche level innovations, at least initially, occur at a local or regional level 
(Smith et al. 2010a). Neglecting differences in spatial scale can mean that the full impact 
of developments at a niche level, or how these developments may be nurtured to push 
into the regime, may not be fully understood. For example, Essletzbichler (2012, p. 796) 
suggests that the development of “energy regions” and smart grids are likely to happen at 
a “non-core” or peripheral regional level, these developments hold the possibility for 
these regions to reduce their imports and even generate revenue from sale of their surplus 
energy. This can impact not only their local level energy regime and economies but also 
the broader national regime through possible scaling-up and replacement or 
transformation of existing regimes that operate at a national scale (Essletzbichler 2012). 
Additionally, ignoring locality will inevitably lead to a limited understanding of niche 
development and why such development is spatially uneven (Raven et al. 2012).  
Therefore, transition theories must more adequately account for scalar, spatial and place 
specific factors can only offer a partial understanding of transition dynamics. This holds 
implications for transition management and policy and practice (Loorbach 2010; 
Turnhiem et al. 2015). MLP as a dominant framework within the literature for exploring 
energy transitions currently does not fully address these influencing factors, instead 
dominant transition literature focuses on large-scale national transition dynamics or 
comparisons between countries. As some have highlighted, a geographical perspective 
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has the capacity to account for these and other missing transitional elements (Raven et al. 
2012; Bridge et al. 2013; Hanson & Coenen, 2015; Faller 2016), and because “when it 
comes to energy, geography always matters” (Calvert 2016, p. 107). 
 
3.4 Accounting for geographies: A spatial justice framework 
By incorporating geographical perspectives into transition research “the way in which 
spatial processes shape energy systems and influence capacity to transform” can be 
understood (Bridge et al. 2013, p. 332). This expands existing understandings of transition 
processes and the outcomes that may result from predominantly temporal and structured 
process analytical frameworks, which without a spatial focus, have limited accuracy in 
predicting future imaginaries, or limited effectiveness when applied to policies and 
practice. It has been recognised in recent years that a geographical focus on energy 
transition is needed as energy is a fundamental element in the development of spatial 
differentiation, affecting physical, social and political distributions of value and power 
(Calvert 2016; Bridge et al. 2018). It is such elements and how they are distributed across 
space, creating places that drive forward energy transition. Thus, energy transition 
trajectory will be informed in large part by where transition is taking place. There have 
been a number of studies that have approached energy transition research with a spatial 
lens (c.f. Raven et al. 2012; Fuller 2016; Yenneti et al. 2016; Bouzarovski & Simcock 
2017). This section will unpack how geographic concepts of scale, place and proximity 
have advanced transition theory before identifying their synergy within a spatial justice 
framework which may be the most appropriate geographical lens for exploring energy 
transition.  
Scale refers to a number of components of the energy transition. From a socio-technical 
perspective scale identifies niche, regime and landscape levels while energy justice refers 
to scales of costs and benefits arising from energy production processes (Sareen & 
Haarstad 2018). Considering scale from a spatial perspective allows a widening of the 
concept, including the physical scale of energy production and consumption i.e. micro 
(household), meso (sub-regional, regional) and macro (national, global) (Turnhiem et al. 
2015). Spatial scale can also refer to scales of power and the capacity for action of the 
actors involved, i.e. energy importer versus exporter or energy producer versus consumer 
(Bridge et al. 2013; Turnhiem et al. 2015). It impacts upon how political power is 
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organised and exercised over space, or within different places, be it streets, 
neighbourhoods, cities, regions, nationally or globally. Whereby local civil innovations 
or organisation can be interpreted as small scale and national institutions or national 
energy providers being large scale, however, even this is open to interpretation, especially 
if factoring in global actors in which case they become large scale and the national and 
civil/local actors reduce in scale accordingly.  
Within the current regime in the UK at a political level the status quo of large-scale 
centralised transition solutions prevails, in part due to preferences for a more easily 
managed central system and a dependence on large scale energy producers for reliable 
energy supplies (Bridge et al. 2013). This leaves smaller scale energy producers or niche 
innovations politically marginalised, affecting their access to available finance and 
energy markets. Marginalisation of small scale de-centralised projects at a national level 
could possibly contribute to non-engagement of people working and living within smaller 
community or town scales during transition. While socio-technical transition frameworks 
help to exemplify these issues, largely attributed to national level lock-in and path 
dependency (Hawkey et al. 2013), there is a growing body of research that now addresses 
the lack of attention to transition at different scales (Hanson & Coenen 2015).  
For example, some research has focused on exploring the importance of inter-
relationships at different scales as a means of advancing transitional projects and 
innovations and the interplay between technology, regime particularities and actor agency 
(Fuenfschilling & Truffer 2016). Other research has used scale to focus on specifically 
sub-regional or regional dynamics and the actors driving transition forward at this level 
(Hodson & Marvin 2012; Spath & Rohracher 2012; Mattes et al. 2015), while the inter-
relationships and interplay of actors between different scales has also received attention 
(Truffer & Coenen 2012) with some suggesting that this area in particular is still under 
theorised (Matte et al. 2015). Research with a sub-regional or regional focus has tended 
to focus on urban locations such as cities (Bulkeley et al. 2011; 2014; Devine-Wright & 
Wiersma 2013; Hawkey et al. 2013; Rutherford & Coutard 2014; Bouzarovski et al. 2017) 
with little attention to date paid to non-core or peripheral regions and the unique 
characteristics within these regions that may influence transition within these places. Such 
scaling down of transition research would be of benefit in the UK where, as per section 
3.2, it is evident transition trajectories differ between devolved countries.  
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Places can be both absolute, physical spaces and/or locations that are used by and hold 
that meaning to people (Bridge et al. 2013), this can be highly diverse and individual. 
Individual interpretations of place are themselves are formed by how people “know the 
world” through their historical, cultural and political experiences and viewpoints 
(Creswell 2015, p. 18) along with more tangible factors such as the physical location of 
the place, its landscape or environment and history (Longhurst 2015). These differences 
affect how places are experienced and lived which in turn impacts upon how transitions 
progress in these places (Essletzbichler 2012; Shove & Walker 2014). As energy 
transition is likely to impact upon cultures and lifestyles (Rotmas & Loorbach 2008) this 
in turn will impact upon how energy is embedded within local landscape and built 
environments, and the different ways consumers may access and use energy in different 
places (Shove & Walker 2014). This too plays a role in determining the form of energy 
transition and illustrates the spatiality of transition processes. 
In addition to places being ‘lived spaces’ and reflecting the perceptions of the people who 
use them, they also have different “relational assets” (Raven et al. 2012, p. 70) which can 
include endowments, social relations and conventions. These physical and socially 
created assets can lead to spatial differentiation between places, whereby the levels of 
knowledge, skills, capital, social capital and identity that they influence in turn impact 
upon the distribution of resources, products, services and amenities (Raven et al. 2012). 
As most of these endowments are largely the result of human activities, they are 
themselves subject to continuous evolution over time as socio-demographics and 
economies change, some are present regardless of human activity. For example, “local 
natural resource endowments” (Hansen & Coenen 2015, p. 99) which are geographical 
features or natural resources (Baker & Mehmood 2015) that hold some form of value, 
cultural, social, political or economic. With regards to low-carbon energy, resources of 
value could be in the form of waterways (micro-hydro), highland plateaus (wind turbines) 
or south facing fields (solar-PV). As such, in addition to local infrastructure capacity and 
social acceptability (Hansen & Coenen 2015), the availability of natural resources could 
somewhat dictate whether low-carbon transitions are a viable option for some places and 
if so, what types of technologies may be used and at what scale.  
Other endowments that differentiate and define places are human created and therefore 
relative. These can include socio-demographics and cultures which impact upon 
knowledge, behaviours, social structures and capital and social capital (Raven et al. 
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2012). In relation to low-carbon transitions, these may influence the ability of different 
places to plan and organise transitional energy projects or develop and progress 
innovations (Baker & Mehmood 2015). Research has demonstrated that places of current 
social deprivation are also places of land degradation and have little community capacity 
(Robbins & Rowe 2002, cited in Middlemiss & Parish 2010, p. 7560) meaning that, at 
least as the current energy transition stands, these same places are likely to experience 
transition in a more passive way. For example, through simply paying more for their 
energy (subsidising renewable energy policy) (Bickerstaff et al. 2013) or through being 
selected as viable sites for private low-carbon energy production developments (Cowell 
2010; Cowell et al. 2012). Therefore, these places are likely to have little say in what 
technologies are pursued, in what locations and what impacts there may be on landscapes 
and economies16. However, more affluent places with high land values and high social 
capital may be in a stronger social and financial position to actively pursue a low-carbon 
transition of their choice. This is where issues of lock-in and marginalisation of alternative 
energy developments within the current regime become apparent, whereby even places 
on the best positions to pursue low-carbon energy projects may experience difficulty in 
realising their plans.  
For instance, at a community scale, energy production projects owned in some part by a 
community themselves have gained a reputation both politically and within the literature 
as being a means of not only creating income, but, of increasing community cohesion, 
development and resilience (Haggett & Aitkin 2015). In order to start a community 
energy project and then benefit from these positives a high level of agency, social capital, 
expertise, organisation and time (or ‘community capacity’) (Middlemiss & Parish 2010, 
p. 7560; Adams & Bell 2015) is required from individual community members. 
Communities without the ‘capacity’ needed to take an energy production project forward 
will find it extremely difficult to take advantage of community energy production. 
However, research has demonstrated that not only are “communities unequal in capacity” 
(Bristow et al. 2012), but that communities with low capacity also tend to be those in 
poverty and experiencing social exclusion (Robbins & Rowe 2002, cited in Middlemiss 
& Parish 2010, p. 7560) suggesting that those who most need the benefits that a 
community energy project can generate, may find it hardest to achieve.  
 
16 Section 6.3 explores experiences of large-scale and community lead energy production 
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Community capacity with regards to the sharing of benefits that an energy project can 
bring is not just confined to community owned projects, but also those owned by external 
agencies such as energy companies, who offer community benefits (usually monetary 
annual payments) to “affected communities” (Bristow et al. 2012, p. 1109). In these 
instances, the loose application of community, usually based on geographic boundaries, 
can be positive in that a wide range of different social groups can be considered part of 
the community and therefore benefit, however, questions have been raised over the ability 
of different groups to assert themselves within such discussions (Bristow et al. 2012). 
Other instances of perceived inequality within communities is possible if the project is 
funded through a cooperative model for example, in which only those with financial 
capital to invest would see direct benefits (Haggett & Aitkin 2015). Thus, these projects 
have the potential for being exclusionary to those within a community who for various 
reasons are not positioned to participate. This can cause or renew divisions between 
different social groups who are perceived to have benefitted and those who have not 
(Walker & Devine-Wright 2008; Hobson et al. 2014). Policies and political rhetoric have 
been criticised for disguising such in-community divides or inequities by using terms such 
as “localism”, “local” and “community” when discussing community energy projects 
creating perceptions of inclusivity and community homogeneity (Walker et al. 2007, p. 
75). 
Endowments can also be considered in the material form of a place for example, in past 
and current land use or in its building stock. These material endowments can impact 
greatly on how land is designated and on the energy needs of people living within the 
buildings. For example, studies have demonstrated that many areas within the UK, with 
industrial pasts that have left the land largely degraded have been highlighted as key 
places for energy production (Cowell 2010). This links with social endowments, whereby 
these places are also typically socially deprived, and therefore less able to influence 
energy development plans (Cowell 2010). With regards to concepts of social capital, 
social networks and knowledge exchanges, research has explored the effects of these on 
niche management and regional energy projects (Seyfang et al. 2013), the scale-up of 
innovations into regimes (Longhurst 2015) and intra-personal social networks as an 
influence on consumer behaviour (Catney et al. 2013). The research carried out by 
Seyfang et al. (2013) consisted of a survey sent out to all the existing community energy 
projects within the UK (at the time), to establish how and why the groups had developed 
and what their general activities were along with their networking activities within the 
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energy sector. They found that over 80% of the survey respondents had used their 
networks to either give or receive help and that this had been between energy projects 
within the same localities. Thus, not only are actor-networks important for maintaining 
community energy projects, but so is proximity. 
Proximity then is generally regarded as an important positive factor for network building, 
collaboration, knowledge sharing and ultimately innovation progression (Seyfang et al. 
2013). It should be noted that proximity, as with space, can be both an absolute measure 
whereby there exists absolute physical distances between places or actors, and a relative 
measure whereby close collaboration, shared interest or aims can bring actors closer 
together relatively even though they may be absolutely distal (Raven et al. 2012). Relative 
or relational proximity, and the emergence of knowledge or innovation clusters has 
received much attention within the literature (Rotmans & Loorbach 2008), but, the effects 
of absolute distance on energy transitions has received much less. For example, as 
mentioned, much of the transition research that has a regional focus has studied transitions 
in urban areas such as cities or core areas. These areas are generally physically in close 
proximity to smaller towns and also have a larger amount and variety in scale of resource 
assets. Thus, transitions in non-core physically proximately distal locations, with fewer 
and limited variety of resource assets and may (or may not) have higher amounts of 
natural resource assets is likely to be highly different.  
Incorporating geographical lens’ such as scale, place and proximity to explore energy 
transitions highlights the multiple interconnections between energy and space. It 
illuminates how transition trajectory is a socio-technical process, but that it is also a socio-
economic, socio-political and therefore, fundamentally spatial process. Thus, 
understanding transition involves unpacking place-specific, socio-economic and socio-
political processes which interplay within and across multiple scales to affect spatial 
differentiation. Furthermore, within differentially spatialised places, ability to be 
recognised, to be involved in transition processes, or to make use of endowments fairly 
and experience ‘just’ transition is contingent on a places relative spatial position. Spatial 
justice could provide such an analytical framework as it already brings together 
understandings of the co-dependencies between spatial difference, scales of power, and 
ability to access and use socially valued resource.  
Work has commenced in adopting a spatial or spatially just framework within transition 
literature. Such work considers the influence of various scales (of places, actors and 
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energy developments) and spatial difference exerts on transition trajectory, including how 
‘just’ it is or is not (Sareen & Haarstad 2018). Sareen and Haarstad (2018) combine 
concepts of socio-technical transition and energy justice transition with spatial concepts 
of scale, spatialization and relativity to investigate energy transition in Portugal. Their 
approach was “responsive to characteristics of specific cases, to their spatial scales and 
to the political economy of their context while retaining cognisance of justice 
implications” and found that socio-technical transitions are “entangled” with justice 
concerns which “play out in different ways across contexts and scales” (Sareen & 
Haarstad 2018, p. 630). Yenneti et al. (2016, p. 96) adopt a spatial justice lens to 
investigate how low-carbon transition whilst conceptualised in India as “progressive 
development” can actually be used to further disenfranchise places with little socio-
economic or political power. This disenfranchisement is carried out for the benefit of the 
nation (large scale), where the costs are paid by the villagers (small scale) via processes 
of accumulation by dispossession. As Yenneti et al. (2016) point out, a spatial justice lens 
highlights how such even distributions of the costs and benefits of transition are reflective 
of already uneven spatial distributions of social, economic and political power. In this 
way, a spatial justice lens is key facilitating the mobility of energy transition in a way that 
avoids such repetitions of uneven distribution. 
Understanding the effects of scale and differential spatial justice is essential for 
understanding how and why energy transitions occur in different places.  By introducing 
scale to transition research and scaling down from national level to regional and sub-
regional scale new paths are exposed that allow exploration of a number of other factors 
that have bearing on how transitions may unfold (Matte et al. 2015; Raven et al. 2012). 
For example, it allows for deeper understandings of the dynamics of ‘place’ in different 
locations, how economic, historical and cultural factors shape how people live in different 
places and thus how they may view transition processes and what may be acceptable and 
achievable in different places. It allows for the exploration of the interplay of power 
between different actors at within and between levels, such as operators, planners, 
engineers, politicians and local residents and the impact they have in shaping energy 
transitions through the development of innovations and on a local level, changes in culture 
and behaviours (Faller 2016; Matte et al. 2015). As “distinctive local conditions shape 
evolutionary change” (Faller 2015, p. 86) and that “the spatial diffusion of energy 
technology is culturally contingent” (Bridge et al. 2013, p. 336) understanding natural 
resource endowments in addition to social, cultural and economic endowments at a place-
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based level is essential in understanding why transitions occur in some please (and not 
others). Therefore, energy transition cannot be understood as a homogenous national 
process, it is more likely and evident in the literature that transitions can occur 
simultaneously in different places and will be unique to the opportunities presented within 
each place. 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
Energy transitions are highly complex and dynamic processes that involve changes to 
existing energy regimes that are influenced by a wide range of factors from political, 
energy and wider economic conditions, social and cultural and also natural and 
environmental. Thus, energy transitions in turn are likely to have causal effects on all of 
these factors. Energy transition also involves different scales of organisation, power, and 
innovation and it occurs in different ways in different places. Diversity between how 
transitions manifest in different places can be attributed to scales and amounts of natural 
local resources, local (social) resources, local histories and politics and also wider 
influences such as national policies and the embeddedness of the current regime. While 
there is a wealth of literature focused on understanding the dynamics of energy 
transitions, much of this has done so using the MLP and as such much of these elements 
have been somewhat neglected. 
The view of energy transition from a UK perspective focuses on policy drivers that aim 
to create regime change towards transitional goals. It provides a perspective on how at a 
national level, the regime is changing and in what ways, it also allows to a certain extent 
energy injustices to become evident. However, it treats the nation as a homogeneous space 
with transition likewise appearing from this perspective to be uniformly progressing 
across this space. Indeed, due to the dominance of transition viewed as a national scale, 
“it can be challenging to derive insights into the regional potential of different 
technologies and transition pathways” (Georgakaki et al. 2015, p. 97). Additionally, it 
ignores the spatial elements of low-carbon transition, not least important because of the 
spatial distribution of energy systems and increasing distribution of energy generators, 
but also because spatial injustices are already present and will affect how, by whom and 
where transition will progress.  
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Over recent years research has been carried out that addresses issues of scale, place and 
space (Essletzbichler 2012; Raven et al. 2012; Bridge et al. 2013; Faller 2015). Further 
demonstrating the importance of these concepts and advancing transition studies and 
theory. However, while this literature focuses on regional energy transitions, much of it 
is done so from urban and city perspectives (Bulkeley et al. 2014; Devine-Wright & 
Wiersma 2013), leaving understandings of energy transitions from a non-urban or non-
core perspective under-developed. Exploring energy transitions from this perspective is 
essential for the advancement of transition theory, as transitions are highly spatially 
contextual and therefore, non-core or peripheral transitions are likely to be highly 
differential to that of urban or city transitions. Thus, while energy transition 
understandings remain incomplete, so too will attempts to manage or steer transitions 
towards specific goals (Loorbach 2010). This has political implications on a national level 
for the UK whereby low-carbon transition is essential for meeting international targets 
(DECC 2015c; 2016) it also holds issues for justice whereby there remains a risk of 
reproducing already present uneven spatial distributions of social, economic and political 
power. 
The next Chapter focuses on Wales to highlight the connections between processes of 
spatialization, spatial justice and energy vulnerability. These processes affect the relative 
spatial positioning of Wales within the UK but are also in play within Wales, affecting 
spatial differentiation of intra-Wales. Such peripheral positioning also affects the 











Chapter 4. Energy peripheries: Spatial injustice and energy 
vulnerability 
4.1  Introduction  
Peripherality is commonly explored as part of economic core-periphery models, used to 
understand uneven economic development between places at global, national or regional 
scales. Alternatively, social constructionists understand peripheries as imagined, 
marginal places, socially created through their difference from central places, but not 
necessarily related to development. In each instance, periphery is used to define places 
that are different from and outside of the core.  Capitalism as the dominant world system 
has shaped core cultures and norms in many countries, including the UK. As a result, such 
cultures and norms hold strong focus on economic functions such as consumption and 
growth. Consequently, peripheries as understood from a social constructionist perspective 
can be representative of socio-economic values. The strong economic element present in 
social peripheralization creates a link with economic peripheralization. Further 
strengthening this link are understandings of economic processes as fundamentally social. 
Therefore, peripheralization of place involves both economic disadvantage and processes 
of social and political marginalization.  
Relatively weaker social, economic and political position also affects private investment, 
with small labour pools and sales markets, in addition to issues of poor transport and 
energy infrastructure means peripheries are less attractive to capital. As energy is a market 
commodity, energy access and affordability are directly influenced by such interplays. 
Poor energy network coverage in peripheries, formed in part by wider core-periphery 
dynamics, affect energy access. It also holds implications for energy affordability 
whereby network losses (c.f. Hammond 2000) due to longer transmission distance to 
peripheries increases the price of energy, or where lack of network access necessitates 
alternative energy is sourced, usually at higher price. Such material energy structures can 
influence energy practices whereby more frequent electricity ‘cut-off’ or higher prices 
influence the use of multiple energy sources and the use of equipment with the capacity 
to run without electricity. High volumes of energy inefficient and harder to make efficient 
housing stock in some peripheries, means that satisfying energy needs can require higher 
levels of energy consumption.  
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Overall, energy has and continues to play a key role in uneven spatial development, based 
on how and where it is sourced from, who it is distributed to, for what purpose and at 
what cost. Interplaying with other elements of spatialization, such as “lack of 
agglomeration advantage” or the “tyranny of distance” (Copus 2001, p. 541) energy has 
contributed to the economic growth in some areas and decline in others. Such processes 
are visible at national and regional scales and are affected by both material energy 
structures as well as social structures and their interplay (Shove & Walker 2014). The 
intertwined and inseparable relationship between spatialization processes and energy 
holds implications for energy vulnerability, again at multiple scales. At a domestic scale, 
the six energy vulnerability drivers as outlined by Simcock and Petrova (2017) can all be 
spatially contingent when considered from a peripheral perspective, implying increased 
likelihood of energy deprivation in the periphery. 
Drawing on broader literature as well as the example of Wales this chapter illuminates 
the connections between processes of spatialization, spatial justice and energy 
vulnerability. Wales as one of four devolved nations of the UK is relatively peripheral in 
terms of its economy, and political and social representation and power. This weak 
position marginalizes Wales’s needs and ambitions overall, but also in terms of energy, 
whereby decisions regarding energy developments above a certain scale are taken by 
central UK government reflecting wider national needs. Additionally, regulation of the 
energy market and infrastructure is beyond the controls of Wales and is carried out by 
central regulators Ofgem. Within such structures Wales will experience difficulty in 
altering its peripherality and meeting the energy needs of its population. Spatialization 
processes are at play within regions of Wales, for example, differentiating rural 
peripheries and peri-urban Valleys from urban centers. At this smaller-scale (despite 
heterogeneity between peripheries) similar social, economic and political marginalization 
of peripheries holds multiple negative consequences for energy vulnerability manifested 
at a domestic scale. 
This chapter starts by unpacking core-periphery development, after which connections 
are made between such spatial processes and spatial justice, most notably how energy 
production, the resources needed to produce it, network distribution and energy prices are 
positioned beyond periphery control. Finally, the chapter focuses on the interplay 




4.2 Spatial differentiation: Core-periphery development 
Traditionally, the concept ‘periphery’ is spatially defined and is often employed within 
economic, development and social studies to indicate a location that has economic, 
cultural or political disadvantage. To be peripheral, a place has to be on the periphery of 
something, therefore, when exploring issues of peripherality, comparison is often made 
with a core or centre, in terms of economic prosperity. Consequently, spatial peripheries 
are usually derived and measured by comparing levels of economic activity between 
different geographically bounded areas using market accessibility models (Bell 1996) 
most commonly in the form of core-periphery models. By using core-periphery models 
to explore issues of uneven economic development at various scales economic and 
development geographers initiated a model that has heavily influenced development 
policy on a global scale since the mid-nineteenth century (Gregory et al. 2009; Ottoviano 
& Thisse 2004). 
Initial core-periphery theories were pioneered and advanced within trade, economic, 
development and political geography disciplines. One of the most prominent theories was 
the ‘dependency theory’ of Frank (1969) who argued that globally there were developed 
(core) and under-developed (periphery) countries. Capitalist world market economy mean 
that production focused on market exchanges, but the exchanges between core and 
peripheries are characterized by the monopoly the core holds over markets (Simon & 
Ruccio 1986). Developing countries are in weak trading positions, as such, their trade 
with the core takes an extractive form, exacerbating their existing underdevelopment 
(Simon & Ruccio 1986).  
Later, the ‘World System Theory’ was developed by Wallerstein (1979) who argued that 
divisions of labour and the share of the wealth derived from such labour was unevenly 
spread globally and in a geographical form, as some countries are able to exploit the 
labour of others for their own benefit. This uneven spread of economic activity is due to 
a social organization of the workforce (c.f. Frank 1967) and is attributed to the capitalist 
economy. Wallerstein put forward that, due to capitalism’s innate dependence on 
accumulation of wealth, it is only logical that those countries already in the strongest 
economic positions will seek to remain so by both retaining and growing economic 
power. Inevitably those countries will need to expand their markets to other economically 
weaker countries who can provide low-cost labour, as well as natural resources and 
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products, thus perpetuating the position of powerful core and weaker periphery countries 
(el-Ojeili 2014).  
In the 1990s ‘New Economic Geography’ (NEG) re-imagined core-periphery models as 
an economic and neo-classical perspective (Pain 2008). Informed by prior neo-classical 
development theories such as ‘cumulative causation’ (Myrdal 1957), and retaining a 
capitalist logic, NEG was pioneered by Krugman (1991) and further advanced by Fujita 
et al. (1999). NEG seeks to make core-periphery modeling mathematically robust and 
take into account core-peripheries in places with few natural resources, which likely 
developed in different ways to those with natural resources (Copus 2001; Ottoviano & 
Thisse 2004). NEG core-periphery models focus on meso-scale developments, that is, 
they largely focus on changes within single countries or regions while retaining a 
dichotomous dialogue between two different locations, cores and peripheries.  
Simplified, NEG core-periphery models propose key factors that contribute to the 
agglomerative effects in a core comparative to a periphery. First, NEG proposes that it is 
more profitable for firms to concentrate production activities in set locations as opposed 
to being more widely dispersed as they can take advantage of “scales of economy” 
(Ascani et al. 2012, p.3). Second, transport costs are accounted for, highlighting the 
benefit of firms servicing markets close to their area of production as the cost of transport 
reduces a products profitability (Ascani et al. 2012). Finally, “external economies” take 
account of the wider benefits firms achieve through concentrating production activities, 
for example, through taking advantaged of “pooled labour” and “technological spillover” 
(Ascani et al. 2012, p.3) allowing them to further increase their efficiencies. These 
industry agglomerations hold impacts on socioeconomics within the area also. As more 
firms are established and grow, so too does competition in the market, thus, the cost of 
living for residents in the area will decrease due to the decrease in local price index 
(Forslid & Ottaviano 2003). The attraction of economic activity and employment leads 
to population increases, further growing the labour pool and trade market (Forslid & 
Ottaviano 2003).  
The outcome of this is a circular feed-in effect (Forslid & Ottaviano 2003) where over 
time, core areas gain in population size, economic activity and industry investment. This 
in turn attracts further population and industrial growth. Areas peripheral to the core will 
experience opposite effects, of depopulation due to out-migration and both public and 
private disinvestment, impacting infrastructure such as public “transportation, health, 
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educational, cultural and leisure services” and therefore, socio-economic shrinkage 
(Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013, p. 9).  
This is a “self-reinforcing process” that is informed by place past socio-spatial 
development which strongly determines whether it will grow or decline (Hudson 2015, 
p. 27). The self-reinforcing nature of core-periphery development, in addition to its 
foundation in capitalist systems, leads to increasing pronounced “quantitative and 
qualitative” differences between the two spaces over time (Hudson 2015, p. 25). 
Additionally, trajectories of either thrive or decline can become locked-in (Myrdal 1957; 
Hirschman 1958; Krugman 1991). Thus, uneven development, and spatial differentiation 
as characterized by core-periphery is symbolic of, and indeed crucial to, capitalist 
economic development (Smith 1994) and once initiated can be difficult to escape. 
However, it should be noted that as “places can appear, disappear, change in size and 
character…accordingly to the way people construct them” (Shurmer-Smith & Hannam 
1994, p. 13), peripheral places may not always be considered peripheral and core places 
will not always be core. This is especially relevant within a capitalist system where 
“capitalist development results - inevitably and unavoidably - in capital eroding the place-
specific conditions of profitable production that first attracted it to a place” (Hudson 2015, 
p.30). After such profitability is removed, capital flows to new places, leaving even places 
already considered peripheral, further economically disadvantaged. 
Uneven development has also been theorized using Marxian political economy theories. 
Such theories argue that within core and peripheral areas themselves, internal socio-
demographics are continuously at play, creating micro-hierarchies, whereby the 
population is split by income levels, class, education, gender and race. In many places 
this can result in sections of these populations being segregated or peripheralized. For 
peripheralized populations in core areas, this often means living in densely populated 
neighborhoods, on low incomes. This impacts on many things from public investment in 
schools and local services, to how well housing is maintained. With regards to education, 
when public funding is limited in areas where the population are already stigmatized, this 
runs the risk of continued stigmatization for the next generation of those people. This 
creates further limitations in changing where or how they live. This process can also occur 
in peripheral areas, whereby socio-economic divides can lead to further peripheralization 
of people who are arguably, already living in a periphery. 
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Core-periphery models, and NEG core-periphery models in particular, have received 
some critique, because they assume a high level of equilibrium. For example, initial 
contexts such as the number of available workers, their wages, and market outputs are 
assumed to be the same in different regions. Also, as noted by Copus (2001) NEG based 
models of core-periphery are “driven almost exclusively by distance costs” (Copus 2001, 
p. 539) and agglomeration pulls. While there is no getting away from the existence of 
these differences in costs between core and periphery areas, at least when considering 
traditional heavy industries, there is an argument to be made that the growth of the service 
sector and decline of heavy industry should alter the formation of the models and 
understandings of how core and peripheries develop (Ottoviano & Thisse 2004). 
Additionally, due to improvements in infrastructure and communication structures, along 
with the growth of the internet and e-commerce, some argue that peripheral development 
is becoming increasingly defined by aspatial elements (Copus 2001; Grimes 2003).  
Critique of core-periphery models has also identified that they often focus on the core 
dynamics and secondary peripheral impacts instead of exploring periphery dynamics in 
their own right (Hayter et al. 2003). Copus (2001) addresses this criticism with an analysis 
of traditional peripheral development based on NEG regional core-periphery models (see 
Figure 4.1). Copus (2001) suggests that traditionally peripheral regional agglomerative 
disadvantage is attributed to causal, contingent and associated elements. Causal elements 
are those that are created by the remoteness of peripheral places relative to core centers 
of population and economic activity. The first of these elements is the “increased travel 
and transport costs” that can be measured both economically and in time taken, termed 
“the tyranny of distance” (Copus 2001, p. 541), whereby additional costs either in time 
or money that would be incurred by businesses who may otherwise invest in peripheral 
areas deters them and makes core areas all the more attractive for investment. The second 
is the “absence of agglomerative advantage” (Copus 2001, p. 540), which includes 
elements such as the absence of markets, demand and labour pool. Contingent elements 
are dependent on the presence of causal elements, these can include higher costs of service 
provisions and low levels of new business development and innovation. Finally, are the 
associated elements such as sparse populations, dependence on primary industries, poor 




Figure 4.1. Conceptualization of peripheral disadvantage 
Source: Copus (2001, p. 540) 
Copus’s model also acknowledges some socio-political influences on peripheralization, 
for example in accounting for “weaker influence on governance” (Copus 2001, p. 540). 
This marries with most recent spatial theorizing which considers social and political 
processes in addition to economic processes that both influence ‘the production’ of space 
and are continuously influenced by space (Lefebvre 1991; Harvey 1996; Massey 2005; 
Soja 2009). Socio-cultural influences that will vary between people and groups create 
meaning and value attributed to spaces, which may differ between those living within the 
space and those outside of it. Such meanings and value are relative as well as symbolic, 
they will also be subject to how a place is positioned relative to other places (Massey 
1994; Pritchard & Morgan 2001; Murdoch 2006). These claims can be applied to core 
and peripheral places, first, the degree to which a space is symbolic and representative of 
the dominant social culture and values will determine its meaning and importance 
(Creswell 2015). Those spaces highly symbolic can be understood as core places, while 
peripheral places will be those that do not fully represent these dominant cultures and 
values and can become stigmatized. Second, core and periphery are relative concepts, 
meaning each is at least in part defined by its relative position in relation to the other. So, 
for a peripheral place to exist, there must be a core place that it is peripheral to.  
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Core-periphery concepts simplify complex processes into simple terms that immediately 
invoke understanding, increasingly such understandings associate core or periphery with 
classifications of urban and rural. These simplifications also lead to generalizations and 
stereotyping, with core and peripheral places perceiving the other negatively. Social 
theory argues that it is those within society that hold economic, political and socio-
cultural power that determine and distribute normative rules and values (Schneider & 
Ingram 1993). Spatially these elements of power are usually concentrated in core places, 
meaning the core will “reproduce and reflect the perspectives, ideologies and the ‘political 
unconscious’ of the cultural framework producing them” (Vanolo 2010, p. 26). Thus, as 
due to the relative position of power of the core compared to the periphery, it could be 
argued that the negative perceptions and discourse of the core are more influential and 
therefore, more damaging. Oversimplification of complex reasons for differences 
between cores and peripheries mean that material issues such as low employment levels 
or social and economic deprivation become viewed as cultural problems instead of 
development or economic problems (Erikkson 2010). Such perceptions are further 
legitimized in media and political discourse (Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013). 
Negative perceptions and stereotyping of people and place have wide influence and 
material outcomes - “representations are often more determining than hard facts in 
influencing our actions” (Vanolo 2010, p. 26). The core usually holds a political majority 
and consequent dominance, along with economic wealth - considered symbolic of merit 
and hard work (Jones 2015) - also projects representations of itself, culture and lifestyle 
as superior to peripheries and as markers for peripheral assimilation (Allen 2003). This 
includes when core development is contingent on peripheral resource exploitation, for 
example in the formation of “resource peripheries” where natural resources are removed 
and sold for profit elsewhere (Hayter et al. 2003, p 16). In such instances, peripheries are 
often expected to be grateful for core investment, even though peripheral economic gains 
are generally limited to low-skilled employment opportunities (Knowles et al. 2008) and 
further economic “instability, crisis and dependence [on the core]” (Hayter et al. 2003, p. 
19). Often, stereotyping and stigmatization of “whole regions and their inhabitants” 
fosters and legitimizes the “territoralization of social injustice in terms of access to 
material and symbolic resources on sub-regional, regional, national or trans-national 
scale” (Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013, p. 9). Stereotyping of peripheral places can also 
affect institutional arrangements and practices (Shields 2002) whereby political decisions 
around economics and wellbeing for example, are taken on their behalf by the core 
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(Botterill et al. 2000) and are not necessarily in their best interests (Schneider & Ingram 
1993).  
Material peripheral formation has traditionally focused on the influence of economic 
forces and presence of natural resources. However, contemporary theorization 
understands that such economic forces are themselves socially produced and also 
interplay with wider social and political processes which, along with historical and 
cultural influences, create meaning and value that is attributed to space (Heatherington 
1998; Harvey 1996; Massey 1992). This interplay of values, meanings, actions and 
processes “filters through the web of interconnections that make up the living world” 
(Harvey 2000, p. 218) continuously producing knowledge, meaning and materiality 
(Schmid 2008). Thus, core-periphery development is “not just a product of the uneven 
distribution of natural resources and the influences of nature on economic geographies, 
but [arises] out of the constitutive social relations of capital” (Hudson 2015, p. 29). Spatial 
categories and territorial divides are therefore a product of social forces of politics, 
economics and culture, articulated through the influence of the spatial (Soja 2009). As 
political, economic and cultural forces are unevenly distributed within society, 
spatialization is also unevenly experienced and creates places of domination, exploitation 
and marginalization (Lefebvre 1991; Hayter et al. 2003). The core-periphery concept can 
then be used to understand spatial differences in economic, political and social power and 
thus recognize places that are at risk of domination, exploitation and marginalization 
during low-carbon transition. Currently theorizations of the spatiality of energy 
vulnerability or transition are emerging (c.f. Hagg et al. 2012; Baker et al. 2014; Balta-
Ozkan et al. 2015; Calvert 2016; Bouzarovski & Simcock 2017; Bouzarovski & Triado 
Herrero 2017; Simcock & Petrova 2017; Weller 2018), few have considered explicitly 
the influence of core-periphery processes. Thus, there remains a gap in understanding the 
interplay between processes of peripherality, energy vulnerabilities and low-carbon 
transition. 
 
4.3 Spatial injustice and peripheralization: The case of Wales 
Spatial justice holds its origins in works by Harvey (1973) regarding justice and space 
and was discussed under concepts of “Territorial” and “Distributive” justice. Through 
81 
 
these concepts’ spatial perspectives on social justice17 were explored at a regional or 
‘territory’ scale, raised questions as to the applicability of the concepts to smaller scale 
spaces. Further critique was levied at the concept due to its dependence on social justice, 
raising questions as to whether a concept of spatial justice was needed as it only appeared 
to highlight social justices in space. Such critiques have been somewhat addressed by 
Soja (1980) and Pirie (1983) who highlight that while social structures, interactions and 
indeed justice or injustices occur within spaces, space itself is a social construction, as 
such, the social and the spatial are co-constitutive and mutually reproductive. In other 
words, the social production of space reproduces social structures including elements of 
injustice (Dikeç 2001; Soja 2010). For this reason, spatial justice can never truly be 
separate from social justice. 
Most recently, spatial justice is understood to encompass both elements of material spatial 
distributional inequalities in addition to the processes that produce and reproduce such 
inequalities (Harvey 1996; Dikeç 2002; Soja 2010). In doing so, spatial justice provides 
an “intentional and focused emphasis on the spatial or geographical aspects of justice and 
injustice” (Soja 2009, p. 2). Spatial justice unpacks dynamics behind locational 
discrimination, political organization of space and geographical development, all of 
which impact upon the spatiality of socially valued resources and opportunities to use and 
benefits from these resources. This can include location and availability of public 
services, employment and education as well as infrastructural resources such as energy 
production and distribution networks. In this way spatial justice highlights wider forms 
of social injustice, which due to the materiality of human existence and the dialect 
between society and space, have spatial consequences. 
Uneven development that creates core and periphery places can be understood as a form 
of spatial injustice whereby core places are systematically advantaged - economically, 
culturally and politically - compared to peripheral places (Hayter 2003). As peripheral 
development creates a self-reinforcing vicious circle of disadvantage (Copus 2001; 
Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013) peripheral spatial injustice can too be circular. As 
understood by Soja (2009, p. 2) spatial (in)justice is both “outcome and process” as the 
uneven geographies that are produced through socio-spatial processes act to recreate 
further uneven development and resource distribution.  
 
17 See also Section 2.3 
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Examples of core-periphery dynamics and spatial injustice are available around the globe 
and at multiple scales. Within the UK there are many examples of core-periphery 
dynamics at play. Wales is a peripheral UK country in many respects including: 
materially, as it occupies the Western fringe of the UK (see Figure 4.2); economically, in 
terms of its relative economic outputs; politically, having only recently gained its own 
government which holds limited powers than other devolved countries; and socially, 
evident in how Wales and Welsh people are perceived by the rest of the UK, most notably 
the core (England), and how stereotyping and stigmatization remain largely unquestioned. 
Each of these aspects of peripherality is unpacked below. 
 
Figure 4.2. UK constituent countries 
Source: Author 
Wales was conquered in the late 1200s and later annexed in 1536 by England, during 
which English rule and law was imposed and the Welsh language, one of the oldest in 
Europe, was banned (Pitchford 2001; Pritchard & Morgan 2001). A class division also 
took place where gentry assimilated to English norms while culturally Welsh peasantry 
worked land under the mixed English and Welsh elites. As Pitchford (2001, p.45) states, 
during such subjugation “the targets of ethnic aggression are stigmatized in the process”. 
Already existent and long-held English-Welsh division, followed by later Welsh class 
division, laid foundations for tensions and perceptions of the ‘other’, for example an 1847 
Report on the State of Education in Wales reported that Welsh people were 
“degenerate. . . dirty, ignorant, bigoted and contented; promiscuous; wanting chastity; 
immoral; violent and vicious” (cited in Adams 1996, p.28). Such perceptions of English 
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superiority and Welsh inferiority persist today in media and political forums (c.f. Cornock 
2018; Cosslett 2018) and are unbalanced by Welsh views due to a lack of Welsh media 
(Public Policy Institute for Wales 2017). A recent example of public belittlement of 
Welsh culture and language occurred in The Times newspaper in 2018 after it was 
announced Plaid Cymru – a Welsh political party – had raised a petition opposing the 
proposed new name for the Severn Bridge: “The Welsh, or some of them, are moaning 
that a motorway bridge linking their rain-sodden valley with the First World is to be 
renamed… They would prefer it to be called something indecipherable with no real 
vowels, such as Ysgythysggymlngwchgwch Bryggy” (Huws 2018, p1). 
Perceptions of Wales as undeveloped are perpetuated by economic measures and 
comparisons with other UK countries - England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In most 
instances Wales “languishes at the bottom” (Dickins, 2016) (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4), 
indeed, Wales has had the lowest GVA per capita of the UK countries since 2001 
(National Assembly for Wales 2018a)18. However, as Pritchard and Morgan (1998) point 
out, Wales has been the most successful of the UK countries in attracting global 
investment, but in terms of internal UK investment it receives the lowest levels. This is 
attributed to the continued negative perceptions held of Wales and Welsh people, by other 
UK countries (Pritchard & Morgan 1998), thus highlighting the dualistic interplay 
between economic and material outcomes with social perceptions and prejudice. Morgan 
(2006, p. 190) argues that the North-South economic divide between, notably Wales (and 
the North of England) with the South of England is “the most serious form of territorial 
inequality in the United Kingdom”. Wales’s economic peripherality is not only evident 
at a national level, considering economies of EU countries, the UK (including Wales) has 
the second largest economy contributing 16% (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita) 
towards the total EU GDP (Eurostat 2017). However, Wales contributes only 0.5% GDP 
per capita, positioning it as one of the weakest economies in the EU overall (Eurostat 
2017a).  
 
Wales’s poor economic position is often largely attributed to the enduring effects of the 
decline of Wales’s coal and metal industries in the 1900s (Botterill et al. 2000). At its 
peak, coal mining in Wales employed over 250,000 people, which by the 1980s had 
reduced to around 25,000 (Beatty & Fothergill 1996; Milbourne & Mason 2017). 
Currently employment is limited to few hundred people in open-cast mining or mine 
 
18 See also Section 7.2 
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restoration. However, aside from securing an income, it is questionable how much mine 
labour and the wider communities economically benefited from such industries. While 
huge profits were generated, this mostly “slipped” (Argent 2013, p. 323) from Wales to 
the benefit of external industry proprietors (Carter & Jones 1989). It can be argued the 
cost of such development was paid by the mineworkers and their families who 
experienced lower wages in Wales than the UK average, poorer housing, poor education 
and poor health (Pitchford 2001). The landscape and natural environment too bore cost 
as “mine owners approached the land as a commodity to be exploited”, little or no regard 
was given to the environment during mine excavation, timbre sourcing and dumping of 
waste (Milbourne & Mason 2017, p. 30). The dominance of heavy industry with largely 
unskilled labour-forces and consequent high levels of unemployment in its decline 
reaffirmed existing stereotypes of Welsh people being backward and Wales itself being 
the “backwaters of Britain” (Pitchford 2001, p. 50). This again highlights the interplay of 
socio-economic processes in the formation of core and periphery. As highlighted in 
section 4.2 stereotypes and stigma interplay with other material issues such as, slow 
economic development to become cause and evidence for each other’s existence, 
ultimately becoming a truism. Thus, weak economic development becomes a self-
inflicted lack of hard work or merit (Jones 2015) unrelated to wider context of historical 





Figure 4.3. GVA per head of population  
Source: Office for National Statistics 
(2015) 
Figure 4.4. Income estimates 2013/14 




As per Section 4.2, stereotypes and stigmatization of peripheral places legitimizes action 
that result in their exploitation. While there are numerous examples of such processes 
taking place in Wales (c.f. Milbourne & Mason 2017) a striking example may be the 
flooding of the Afon Tryweryn Valley in North Wales in 1965 to create a water reservoir 
to service the English city Liverpool (Griffiths 2014). Capel Celyn was also a culturally 
significant place for Wales, one of the last remaining completely Welsh speaking villages 
that up to the point of its inundation maintained a traditional Welsh way of life (Milbourne 
& Mason 2017). Ten farms were also dispersed from the area resulting in the sale of their 
farming equipment and stock and the loss of their cooperative community (Griffiths 
2014). The plans were contentious and protested by many people and the overall process 
and outcome typifies core-periphery socio-political dynamics in several ways. In the 
positioning of ‘big’ versus ‘small’, of ‘powerful’ against ‘powerless’ of ‘modern 
industrial’ against ‘traditional agriculture’ and of ‘English’ against ‘Welsh’ (Griffiths 
2014, p. 453). 
 
Politically, Liverpool City Council applied for an Act of Parliament, thus negating any 
requirement to consult with Welsh planning authorities. Despite the bill being voted down 
by 35 out of 36 Welsh MPs, it was approved overall by Westminster (Saville-Roberts 
2015). This highlights the powerlessness and disregard of Welsh civic and political 
opinion. The treatment of the Welsh community and wider protesters by Liverpool City 
Council was callous and indifferent, and the council refused to hear any objections. 
Indeed, after the fact, it has become known that Liverpool City Council chose to flood an 
area of Wales over uninhabited areas in England as they could obtain water at lower cost 
to potentially re-sell at a profit (Saville-Roberts 2015). This is perhaps a further affront 
to Wales where £4.5 billion per year could be generated through water sales to England 
(Osmond 2012), but due to trading restrictions on water, no renumeration can be made 
for such trade (Jones 2015; Nation.Cymru 2018). Protests against the inundation did not 
end after the event. On two separate occasions attempts were made to explode the dam or 
its machinery. Today an unofficial monument to the valley has been painted onto a 
derelict wall reading ‘Cofiwch Dryweryn’ or ‘Remember Tryweryn’. However, despite 
its cultural importance in Wales this wall has not been officially protected or recognized 
by the Welsh Government and has suffered several acts of vandalism, including in 




The flooding of Tryweryn was not the first use of Welsh resource for UK-national needs. 
For example, the expulsion of over 200 farms in the west of the Brecon Beacons for 
military training has been cited as causing a major divide between predominantly Welsh-
speaking west Wales and predominantly English-speaking east Wales, as prior to this the 
Welsh-speaking farms connected the two (Griffiths 2014). These actions have been 
connected with the slow dissolvement of the Welsh language (Griffiths 2014). Tryerwyn 
was a turning point for many in Wales who resented the lack of Welsh political power 
and autonomy and/or who feared the Welsh language and culture were dying out. Indeed, 
Tryerwyn coincided in time with already active, but somewhat radical, Welsh-Nationalist 
movement. Thus, Tryweryn is recognized as symbolizing the resurgence of Welsh 
politics, increased calls for devolution and increased recognition for the Welsh language 
in Wales (Milbourne & Mason 2017). 
 
While the establishment of the autonomous Welsh Assembly Government in 1999 has 
brought more political powers to Wales, devolution has not been as complete as in 
Scotland or Northern Ireland. Wales does not retain full control over many policy fields, 
including water, transport and energy. An example of this is in transport policy where 
Wales has fewer devolved powers than Scotland and Northern Ireland19. Additionally, 
while Wales holds 11% of UK rail track, it has only received 1.5% of rail funding since 
2011 (Welsh Government 2018c). The limited power over its transport networks has led 
to debate around passenger fares as rail passengers in Wales incur the highest cost rail 
travel in the UK (Staffell et al. 2018). Also, the Welsh Government requested devolution 
of rail powers, during creation of, and after passing of the Wales Act (2017), which were 
rejected (see Table 4.1 for devolved transport powers). Finally, plans to electrify the Great 
Western Mainline were scaled back in 2018 resulting in plans to electrify the line to 
Swansea being cancelled. This decision has been deemed “unfair” by the Welsh 
Government (2018c, p. 2) especially as the electrification had been heralded as a means 
of connecting smaller cities in England and South Wales with London and thus increasing 
bi-lateral flows of employment and prosperity. Now there are concerns that in Wales 
“journey times will at best be similar to those achieved in the 1970s” (Welsh Government 




19 See Sections 3.2 and 8.4 and Chapter 6 for further discussions of Welsh devolution 
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Table 4.1. UK Transport policy devolution  
  Wales Scotland N. Ireland 
Road Limited Totally Totally 
Rail Mostly* Mostly Totally 
Bus Limited Totally Totally 
Air None Limited None 
Sea (Ferry) None Substantial None 
*Note. Devolution of rail powers were increased under The Welsh Ministers (Transfer of Functions) 
(Railways) Order 2018.  
Adapted from: Mackinnon et al. (2010) 
 
There is also concern that the high-speed rail link (HS2), being developed at the same 
time, from London to Birmingham will have a negative impact on the Welsh economy. 
Furthermore, the non-devolution of rail powers to Wales means that rail developments in 
Wales and England will continue to be considered together. This impacts the amount of 
block grant20 afforded to Wales. Additionally, as Welsh and English rail infrastructure 
budgets are combined, spending in England, for example on the HS2, results in reduced 
money available for Welsh rail development. For next year’s budget (2019/20) it has been 
estimated that Wales’s transport budget will be £25 million less than the year prior due 
to the HS2 (ap Gwilym 2015). Altering this context to a degree is that additional funding 
has been secured for rail improvements in Wales via the Cardiff Capital Region deal 
(CCR). The CCR is predicted to encourage increased economic activity in Wales.  The 
Cardiff City deal in particular will receive £1.229 billion in funding over 20 years, £375 
million from UK Government and the rest from Welsh Government, the EU and 10 Welsh 
Local Authorities within the CCR region (National Assembly for Wales 2017). Of this 
funding £734 million has been designated as funding for a new metro system for the 
region, including rail and other travel facilities (National Assembly for Wales 2017).  
Fragmented devolution has led to tension between the UK and Welsh governments, 
further aggravated by each being led by opposing political parties and feeds into 
speculation that Wales is “the first and final colony” (Price 2018, p. title). The uneven 
allocation of devolved powers in Wales compared to other devolved countries is regarded 
 
20 “The block grants are the element of the devolved administrations’ funding which comes directly from 
the UK Government. Once the block grant has been determined, the devolved administrations have freedom 
to make their own spending decisions in areas of devolved responsibilities within the overall totals. 
Spending by the devolved administrations is not funded exclusively by the block grant. The devolved 
administrations are also funded by “local and devolved tax revenues, other revenue-raising powers 
(including fees and charges, and sales of goods, services and assets), grants from European institutions, and 




as unfair and unnecessary (Upton 2014). Especially around areas that are perceived to 
affect the Welsh economy, such as energy and transport. The tensions over policy 
devolution have gradually produced concessions from London. For example, with the 
passing of the Wales Act in 2017, a new ‘reserved powers’ model of devolution is in place 
whereby areas outside of the Welsh Government powers are listed with anything not 
included being devolved. This model is now most similar to Scotland and comes into 
effect in Wales on 1st April 2019.  
In line with core-periphery concepts whereby peripheries experience economic, social 
and political disadvantage relative to cores (Copus 2001; Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013; 
Hayter 2003), Wales is a periphery of the UK. However, within Wales processes of core 
and periphery are evident. Core places include the southern cities of Cardiff and Swansea 
within urban Local Authority areas such as Swansea, Cardiff and Newport, with 
peripheral places, generally speaking, being areas that are spatially located north of these 
cities. Such areas include predominantly rural Local Authorities, such as 
Carmarthenshire, Ceredigion and Powys, and Valleys Local Authorities such as Blaenau 
Gwent, Merthyr Tydfil and Rhondda Cynon Taf (Statistics for Wales 2008). For rural 
areas, peripheralization has been a long process, starting in the main part due to 
industrialization in the 1800s which saw the migration of vast numbers of the rural 
population into new centers of industrial activity (Saville 1957; Milbourne & Mason 
2017). This activity concentrated on natural resource extraction (most notably coal) and 
transportation to urban dock areas for use in the metal industry or export. Industrial 
revolution also interplayed with agriculture, offering new opportunities for 
mechanization, reducing the need for large numbers of human labour (Yang & Zhu 2010). 
As such, rural areas in Wales have become peripheries, characterized by sparse and 
widely dispersed populations and relative weaker economies reliant on agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors. Over recent years, the public and tourism sectors have become 
more prominent in the economy. The Valleys were where much of the extractive activity 
of the Industrial Revolution was based in Wales, however, they have continued to suffer 
negative effects of the sudden loss of such industries during the 1980s. These negative 
effects include high levels of economic inactivity and unemployment. Both areas 
generally have weaker economies than urban centers, reflected in their GVA outputs 
(National Assembly for Wales 2018a).  
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Social perceptions of the areas are similarly negative to those of Wales as a whole. This 
is particularly evident in discourse of the Valleys which are apparently ‘unbearably sad’ 
(Easton 2013) and synonymous with decline and deprivation (Tannock 2015). Such 
perceptions are formed by visible evidence of economic depression coupled with negative 
portrayal in the media and political rhetoric. For example, Tannock (2015) highlights an 
instance of representations of Merthyr people in national media as “work-shy population 
lacking even the most basic skills and ambitions” (Sky News 2010, cited by Tannock 
2015); this was reinforced by the then British Secretary of Work and Pensions Iain 
Duncan Smith, who quoted from the news report and advised the people of Merthyr to 
get on a bus to Cardiff where there were lots of jobs waiting. Thus, as with Wales, 
oversimplification of the reasons for low economic status and the numerous barriers faced 
in altering this for the Valleys becomes a characteristic of the people who live there. 
Stereotyping of places and the people within them has normative and material outcomes 
(Schneider & Ingram 1993), as “the fate of the group is bound up with the words that 
designates them” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 483), this “helps to legitimize processes of uneven 
development” (Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013, p. 20). First, it homogenizes places and 
the people within them, which means in the case of economic depression, regeneration 
interventions may not be suited to the actual population or place. Second, when 
stereotypes are essentially negative, as with that of Wales generally, or Merthyr more 
specifically, they can act to disincentivize private investments and legitimize lack of 
public investment, thus impacting upon the wellbeing of the people within those places. 
A further alternative spatialization process is present within these peripheries, in the form 
of the spatialization of designated areas as national parks21. National parks fall within the 
International Union for Conservation of Nature’ definition of protected area, as “clearly 
defined geographical space, recognized, dedicated and managed, through legal or other 
effective means, to achieve the long-term conservation of nature with associated 
ecosystem services and cultural values” (International Union for Conservation of Nature 
2008). A result of social and environmental crisis during the Industrial Revolution, 
national parks embodied beautiful, natural, clean and healthy spaces, in direct contrast 
with growing industrial centres at the time. This, in combination with newly romanticised 
visions of the countryside and growing working class civil rights placed political pressure 
on Government to increase access to the countryside, which until then had been restricted 
by private landowners. In 1949 Parliament passed the National Parks and Access to the 
 
21 Sections 6.4 unpacks perceptions of political marginalization in the Brecon Beacons National Park 
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Countryside Act in recognition of these issues and putting into law the means of creating 
designated areas of natural beauty to not only be protected and conserved, but to be 
accessible to the public.  
National parks were chosen as spaces that were both outstandingly beautiful in terms of 
their landscape and close to centres of population, their boundaries were overlaid onto 
existing spaces of rurality and peripherality, governance and daily life. However, due to 
being chosen as exemplars of natural beauty “the nation’s finest landscapes” (Rennie 
2006, p. 224) and nature and cultural heritage, they may also influence local identity, 
acting as, or preserving, symbolic attributes of the nation and national identity, putting 
into physical form places of legend, myths, moralities and history (Gruffudd 1995; Palmer 
1999). Representing a “slice in time” (Foucault 1984, p. 6) and increasingly symbolic of 
the nations they sit within, the character, ecology and culture of each national park is what 
define them and gives them symbolic and economic value. National parks as such are 
“sacred centres” (Smith 1991, p. 16 cited in Palmer 1999), and are afforded not only 
special designations, but also different rules and governance relative to other landscapes.  
In addition to the concerns around poor living conditions in industrial centres, national 
parks also formed part of a solution to concerns of growing urbanisation and its spread 
into the countryside, offering a means of preventing urban sprawl in certain rural areas. 
Perceptions of the countryside as “better, more fulfilling and community driven. Where 
man and nature worked together side by side, hand in hand” (Palmer 1999, p. 8), offered 
an antithetical space to the poor living conditions and social conflict within urban areas, 
and are still widely perceived to offer an escape from modernity (Sharpley & Jepson 
2011; National Parks 2018b). Consequently, national parks are also places of experience, 
meant to open access to the countryside for all people, most notably people living in urban 
areas. Rural spaces are often “considered according their potential for satisfying urban 
needs” (Antrop 2004, p.30), thus, the privileged positioning of national parks may only 
be realised because of the functions they serve for the centre. 
National Parks’ overriding duties are to first conserve the landscape (and associated 
habitats and culture) and second to encourage its public use. The well-being of people 
living and working within them, while being acknowledged, is assigned to a ‘duty’ placed 
below the first two ‘purposes’ in priority. Here lays a conflict between the wants and 
rights of visitors to national parks and the lived experiences of the rural communities who 
inhabit them. The idealized vision of rural life expected to be experienced within national 
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parks, which is conserved via its purposes is, in effect, a romanticized vision of 
peripherality. Consequently, national park designation serves to maintain 
peripheralization, albeit, a romanticized version. 
Different peripheries within Wales - rural, Valley or national park - hold commonalities. 
All are located within a national scale periphery and thus, are highly influenced by 
decisions made externally. But also, the development of each holds some connection to 
the Industrial Revolution and to each other, this highlights the relativity of each place. 
Out-migration and decline in rural Wales was caused in a large part by the attraction of 
secure and better paid jobs in the Valleys and industrial centres. Likewise, the poor health 
and living conditions brought on by mass-migration and low-quality housing in the 
Valleys (and other similar areas in the UK) influenced the formation of national parks. 
However, even the connection of each to the Industrial Revolution and designation of 
national parks were themselves influenced by core UK interests. 
Additionally, despite differences between peripheral places in Wales, they are 
disadvantaged due to their peripheralization in similar ways – physical distance to core 
areas, few employment opportunities, low wages, poor access to services, poor 
infrastructures and weak governance influence. Such disadvantage directly impacts the 
lives of peripheral communities in the present and in terms of future prospects. For 
example, low public spending impact numbers of essential services, such as educational 
services, and subsequently impacts educational attainment and employment prospects. 
Poor infrastructures and power to alter them results in low agglomerative advantage, 
increases the tyranny of distance and living costs for peripheral communities. Weak 
governance influence, especially in terms of government institutions and political 
representation means peripheries’ needs are rarely heard, recognized or addressed.  
In terms of energy, spatial injustices that lead to peripheral disadvantage is likely to hold 
direct and indirect impacts on how energy vulnerable peripheral communities are. For 
example, lower incomes and higher cost energy affect energy affordability while poor 
energy infrastructures affect energy access. It may also follow that due to weaker social, 
economic and political positions, in addition to characteristics such as sparse populations, 
peripheries may be more likely to be favored as locations for new energy developments 
without gaining substantial benefits that come with ownership or stake holding, repeating 
past resource peripheralization. As Bryn et al. (2017) highlight, low-carbon energy 
production in Wales is unlikely to be economically transformative without Welsh 
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development of supply chains, R&D processes, maintenance and ownership. The lack of 
social, economic and political power held by peripheries in comparison to cores also 
implies inhibited ability to change their peripheral position and create more just 
landscapes. This is explored further in the following section. 
 
4.4 Spatialized energy vulnerability 
Energy has huge impacts upon both material and social space. Spaces of energy 
production and consumption are often physically bound to specific geographical 
locations, with production depending on the energy source and how it is being extracted 
from the physical environment, and consumption depending on the form the energy takes 
in being used by consumers (Bridge 2010; Bridge et al. 2013). Thus, whether during its 
extraction, transportation of consumption or its secondary uses, as in how it harnessed to 
create raw materials or large-scale manufacturing, energy has and continues to play a 
huge role in the creation of the various landscapes including the uneven development of 
core and periphery.  
Historically energy played a major role in the economic development of countries that 
are commonly considered “advanced, industrialized” (Hammond 2000, p. 305) or 
“developed” (Chow et al. 2003, p. 1528). As energy can be considered the “lifeblood of 
technological and economic development” (Chow et al. 2003, p. 1528) the availability of 
fossil fuels within countries, such as the UK, enabled them to play significant parts in past 
energy transitions, including the Industrial Revolution of the 1800s (Hammond 2000). 
Being at a forefront of such change and over a resource (coal) that had almost limitless 
capacity and influence over social structures, economics and politics meant that the UK 
was able to rapidly develop and grow their economy. This reinforced their global 
hegemonic position gained during colonialism and has ensured that even when direct 
hegemony was lost, and world economies shifted from heavy industry to a focus on 
finance and service industries (Pitzle 2004), the UK remained part of the ‘developed’ 
core.  
Regionally, within the UK, the impact that energy has in creating spatial core and 
peripheral places is materially visible. Its past power is evident in the still present 
industrial hubs of the Industrial Revolution, urban centers such as Manchester and 
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Swansea; the old peripheries that serviced these industrial hubs, the more remote 
coalfields and docks of the North of England and South Wales; and the continued sparsity 
of population in rural peripheries after vast labour migration. As with global core-
peripheries, past regional core-peripheries in the UK remain despite the decline in heavy 
industry and energy that was required to fuel it. The current material structure of the 
energy system in the UK also continues to follow old industrial patterning. The strongest 
and most extensive network coverage and main power stations are typically located close 
to densely populated urban areas, in order that they may be used to their maximum 
potential and therefore maximum profit (Soja 2010). This spatial arrangement contributes 
to the creation of core and peripheral spaces of energy access that mirrors existing 
economic core-periphery structures. It also means that places spatially distal to the core 
energy network will not experience the same reliability, affordability or access to energy 
(Roberts et al. 2015) as it costs more for energy producers to service remote areas and 
areas of low population (Sovacool et al. 2014). As such, energy costs in Wales are some 
of the highest in the UK (House of Commons Library 2017a), and for peripheral areas 
without access to mains gas network alternative fuels are again, more expensive (Senedd 
Research 2014). In this way energy interplays with other peripheral disadvantages to 
make business development in peripheries less attractive, reinforcing peripheralization.  
Politically, Wales’ limited powers over energy production and network regulations mean 
that despite being a net exporter of electricity, it cannot use such supplies to the benefit 
of the Welsh population. Additionally, energy ambitions that do not fit with national 
ambitions can be curtailed by the political core in Westminster. Frustration in Wales’s 
restrictions over large scale energy developments recently came to the fore when the UK 
government declined to support the Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon (SBTL) development. 
The proposed lagoon was envisaged as a pathfinder development, meant to test tidal 
lagoon technology in the UK and if successful commence the development of further 
lagoons, the size of which (in Mega Watt [MW] capacity) is currently outside of Welsh 
Government remit. The development had gained support from communities close to the 
project, development consent from UK government and a £2 million pledge from Welsh 
Government. It was also subject to an independent review in 2016 which found the 
development would cause “no-regrets” (Hendry 2016, p. 89): 
I don’t believe there would be any debate in decades to come about whether 
this was the right thing to do, even if it ended up as the only lagoon constructed 
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– but I would expect it is much more likely to be seen as the decision which 
started a new industry, and all done at the cost of a small number of pence to 
consumers each year (Hendry 2016, p. 89). 
Despite this, the SBTL was unable to secure a Contract for Difference (CfD)22 with the 
UK Government as the cost was deemed not “value for money” and energy generated 
would be “variable” (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [BEIS] 
2018b). Critiques of this decision have argued that it didn’t allow for the 120-year lifespan 
of the lagoon, inclusion of this factor in financial calculations makes the SBTL 
comparatively lower cost in the longer-term (Messenger 2018) highlighting inbuilt bias 
against tidal energy technology and other renewable energy forms (Hendry 2016). This 
decision appears symbolic of the reduction in renewable energy subsidies implemented 
by the UK Government since 2015, with no renewable energy targets set for the UK after 
2020. The change in priority of renewables comes as increased priority is placed on 
nuclear energy. In Wales, in synchronicity with SBTL debates, the UK Government has 
tendered and approved a CfD for a new nuclear reactor at Anglesey, North Wales (Wylfa 
Newydd), although it was not unwelcomed by Welsh Government, investors in this 
development have recently pulled out so for now its future is uncertain.  
At a regional level there can also be conflicts between Welsh Government energy 
ambitions and Welsh communities. The Welsh Government views low-carbon energy 
transition as a means of diversifying and growing its economy and there is the ambition 
“to create a sustainable, low-carbon economy for Wales” and to be a world leader in low-
carbon renewable energy production (Welsh Government 2012, p. 5). Changing the 
source of energy necessitates new energy production technologies are built in Wales. 
Welsh peripheries with natural resources, space suitable for renewable energy 
development, small populations and weak economic and political power hold limited 
ability to take advantage of such opportunities for their own benefit. Such peripheries risk 
being exploited as in previous rounds of development that required Welsh natural 
 
22 CfDs are a reverse auction that pays a subsidy to developers of low-carbon energy which is a flat 
(indexed) rate for the electricity they produce for 15 years (BEIS 2019a). The rate is the “difference between 
a ‘strike price’ – a price for electricity reflecting the cost of investing in a particular low-carbon technology 
– and the ‘reference price’– a measure of average GB market price for electricity” (BEIS 2018d, p. 3). 
Should electricity prices increase above the agreed rate, the additional cost is met by the Low-carbon 
Contracts Company (LCCC) (a government-owned company), should the cost fall below, the developer 
pays the LCCC the saving. This way the developers and electricity customers are protected from dramatic 
changes in the market and risk for investors is reduced. 
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resource, such as coal mining and metal industries, forestry and water (c.f. Milbourne & 
Mason 2017). 
As energy has permeated modern culture and plays a part in creating social norms, lack 
of energy consumption - whether through lack of accessibility, unaffordability or personal 
choice - can be seen as a form of deviance and lead to marginalization, social and political 
exclusion and stereotyping. For example, as economies grow, so too does energy 
consumption (Chow et al. 2003; Fankhauser & Jotzo 2018), with energy itself becoming 
a major element in the evolution of social and cultural norms, at least in ‘developed’ 
economies. Subsequently, as energy is increasingly needed for some of the most basic 
day to day activities and its consumption is a means of participating in socio-cultural 
norms, those who do not consume energy at an equivalent level to others in their society 
cannot participate fully in normal relationships and activities (Levitas et al. 2007). The 
inbuilt bias of the energy system towards capitalism and economic growth means that for 
many people, either through their additional energy needs (Ellsworth-Krebs et al. 2015; 
Snell et al. 2015), low incomes (Middlemiss & Gillard 2015) or lack of connection to 
mainstream energy sources (Roberts et al. 2015), purchasing the energy they need can 
become unaffordable. Therefore, for many, participating fully in a society where high 
levels of energy consumption are normative is extremely difficult, negatively affecting 
social structures, social inclusion and mental health (Harrington et al. 2005; Walker et al. 
2016) in addition to morbidity, health, wellbeing and life chances (Barnes et al. 2008; 
Day & Walker 2013; Sovacool 2015; Gillard et al. 2017).  
For Wales and its peripheral regions, peripheralization has in part been driven by energy. 
Additionally, peripheralization inhibits abilities at all scales to decide energy source and 
location of production, energy distribution, and energy cost. As Figure 4.5 conceptualizes, 
elements of peripheral disadvantage and energy are interlinked in numerous messy ways, 
the presence of each element and driver, either singularly or in combination, holds 
impacts for other elements and drivers, including the reinforcement of their presence. 




Figure 4.5. Elements of peripheral formation combined with associated energy vulnerabilities.  
Source: Golubchikov and O’Sullivan (2020) 
 
Acknowledging energy’s embeddedness within spatialization processes infers possible 
spatial contingency of energy vulnerabilities. Within the literature the spatiality of energy 
justice (Bridge et al. 2013; Balta-Ozkan et al. 2015; Yenneti et al. 2016; Bouzarovski and 
Simcock 2017) and energy vulnerability (Bouzarovski 2013; Day & Walker 2013; 
Simcock & Petrova 2017) have begun to be conceptualized. However there remains a gap 
for the empirical exploration of the influence of space and spatialization processes on 
energy vulnerability. As per Section 2.4 most recently the causes of energy vulnerability 
have been attributed to six driving forces: Access to energy sources; Affordability of 
energy either through the cost of energy or as a relative household expenditure to its 
income; Flexibility to change energy source or system; Energy Efficiency of building 
structures or household energy systems; Needs that create a greater energy requirement 
such as health, age and lifestyle; and Practices such as socio-cultural norms that may 
require energy over-consumption (Simcock & Petrova 2017, p.432). Each of these 







Table 4.2.  Energy vulnerability drivers linked to peripheralization elements 
Energy Vulnerability 
Driving force 
Description Spatial -Peripheral 
Contingency 
Access Lack of ability to access energy 
appropriate for household 
needs 
Poor regional/sub-regional 
energy infrastructure & old 
domestic energy systems 
Affordability High ratio between costs of 
fuels and household income 
Remoteness from core increases 
fuel costs 
Flexibility Lack of ability to change 
energy service provision 
Energy infrastructure and place-
specific building style create 
‘lock-in’ 
Energy efficiency Disproportionate high loss of 
energy 
Domestic energy systems and 
building style can be place-
specific 
Needs Greater energy requirements 
due to personal circumstances 
Aging populations, reliance on 
transport  
Practices Lack of knowledge, socio-
cultural norms 
Place-specific coping practices 
and/or energy systems 
Adapted from: Simcock and Petrova (2017) 
For peripheries in Wales, all the spatially contingent energy vulnerabilities appear to be 
present. Evident in poor energy infrastructures (gas and electric) which coupled with 
distance from centers of energy production create difficulties in access and affordability; 
poor energy infrastructure and dominance of older harder to heat or insulate homes means 
there is little flexibility for households to change their energy source or energy efficiency; 
faster rates of aging populations can increase energy needs as typically older people 
require higher temperatures for longer periods. Additionally poor transport infrastructures 
coupled with services deprivation and limited local employment necessitates a reliance 
on personal transport, necessitating a need for increased energy consumption in the form 
of vehicle fuel which together with other running costs adds strain to household budgets; 
lastly there are place-specific energy practices, such as the use of solid fuel range cookers, 
developed to overcome poor energy infrastructures but that contribute to increased energy 
consumption23. As peripheries in Wales appear to possess all six energy vulnerability 
drivers, the likelihood of experiencing energy deprivation is enhanced.   
Energy has and continues to play a key role in uneven spatial development, based on how 
and where it is sourced from, who it is distributed to, for what purpose and at what cost. 
Interplaying with other elements of spatialization, such as (lack of) agglomeration 
 
23 Experiences of these drivers of energy vulnerability are illuminated in Chapter 7 and unpacked further 
in Chapter 8 
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advantage or the ‘tyranny of distance’ to fuelling economic growth in some areas and 
affect decline in others. Such processes are visible at national and regional scales and are 
affected by both material energy structures as well as social structures. The intertwined 
relationship between spatialization processes and energy holds consequences for energy 
vulnerability, again at multiple scales. At a domestic scale, the six energy vulnerability 
drivers as outlined by Simcock and Petrova (2017) all appear to have spatial contingency 
when considered from a peripheral perspective, implying increased likelihood of 
instances of energy deprivation for such places. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Energy takes many forms, materially energy is a natural resource (or generated from 
natural resources) and requires physical extraction or production, and it is distributed in 
material space. Economically energy is a market commodity, and socially energy is a 
necessity for multiple components of every-day life. While this list is not exhaustive, in 
these different forms energy plays a fundamental role in creating both material and social 
spaces and in the development of core and periphery. Core and periphery development 
represent spatially organized uneven power relations, where peripheries are 
disadvantaged relative to the core (Copus 2001; Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013). The 
circular nature of periphery development means that peripheral disadvantages both create 
and reinforce their relative weak position to the core, including marginalization of 
population needs (Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013). Spatially arranged marginalization 
can create banal and overt prejudice towards places and their populations. This 
undermines periphery’s abilities to assert their needs politically, hinders economic 
development and restricts access to socially valued resources. This is a spatial injustice. 
As energy and the natural resources needed to generate it have played a key role in uneven 
spatialization processes, they are also fundamental to the creation of spatial injustice. 
Spatial injustice and energy injustice are connected by spatially contingent control over 
energy resource whether in its production, distribution or consumption.  
As one of four countries forming the UK, Wales’ relatively weak social, economic and 
political position has led to Welsh human and natural resources contributing towards the 
needs of the UK as opposed to those of Wales. Within Wales similarly asymmetrical 
dynamics are at play between regional core and peripheries. Thus, spatial injustices are 
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present at a Welsh-national and regional scales. There are numerous examples of spatial 
injustices in Wales, from natural resource exploitation in the form of water or 
comparatively weaker transport infrastructure and substantially lower allocation of public 
transport funds. However, energy provides a lens that most readily illuminates spatial 
injustices created by social, economic and political dynamics that manifest both 
materially and socially and at multiple scales.  
In Wales the connection between spatial injustice and energy injustice is visible at many 
scales: in unequal access to policy powers and disregard of civic and political 
representation; in the lack of autonomy over natural resources and inability to profit from 
resource trade; and lack of ability to affect the cost of energy to its own populations. 
Regional peripheries within national peripheries may suffer a double disadvantage. Being 
affected by national level peripheralization which for example increases the cost of their 
energy compared to other places. But additionally, being subject to lower-scale peripheral 
disadvantage, such as poor energy network coverage, older harder to heat homes, high 
energy consumption practices, low-incomes, low employment opportunities, low levels 
of public services including transport, and ‘forced car ownership’. All of these can create 
energy vulnerabilities where energy access, affordability and energy efficiency are 
difficult to achieve, there is little flexibility to alter existing contexts, energy practices 
meant to circumvent access issues and meet energy needs result in higher energy 
consumption or higher cost energy. Thus, spatial injustice leads to increased energy 
vulnerability, consequently peripheries are especially energy vulnerable. 
In considering Chapters 2-4 together the following research gaps are made visible: First, 
there is a need to understand spatial drivers of energy vulnerability; second, there is a 
need to understand the spatial elements of transition; and third, there is a need to 
understand both energy vulnerability and low carbon transition from a peripheral 
perspective. Limited understanding of the interplay between energy vulnerability, energy 
transition and peripherality holds a risk that spatially contingent energy vulnerabilities 
will remain unaddressed and possibly lead to spatialized fuel poverty. It holds a risk that 
transition benefits will be limited and costs will increase for peripheral places.  
Additionally, there is potential for low-carbon transition to address issues of spatially 
contingent energy vulnerabilities, but without understanding either, these opportunities 
cannot be grasped. The next Chapter outlines the methodology adopted for this research 
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in its attempt to meet these research gaps and illuminate the interplay of energy 































Chapter 5. Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the methodological framework which structured the 
thesis examination into the impacts of energy transitions on vulnerable peripheral 
communities. The research adopts a predominantly qualitative, inductive approach to 
primary data collection, in combination with interrogation of secondary quantitative and 
document-based data. This mix of data allows for in-depth understandings of personal 
experiences of peripherality, vulnerability and energy transition to be gained via 
interviews and focus groups while also positioning such experiences within their wider 
socio-economic, political and cultural context. In this way, the research unpacks the 
interplay between processes of vulnerability, peripherality and energy transition, 
exploring how these processes coalesce to affect how, where and why transitions occur 
(or not), in addition, how energy transitions affects vulnerability and peripherality is also 
illuminated.  
The research understands that peripheries are heterogeneous in their formation and 
disadvantages, and that energy vulnerability is experienced by singular or multiple 
vulnerability ‘drivers’ which are variable depending on specific contexts. Additionally, 
energy transitions are understood as multi-scalar processes influenced in different ways, 
at different scales by the social, economic, and political position of its actors. Within the 
three key foci of this research: energy vulnerability; energy transition; and 
peripheralization, policy has played a key role. The position of policy making institutions 
in urban centres, uneven distributions across regions and sub-regions of policy powers, 
funding and autonomy can interplay with economic and social peripheralization 
processes. Transition literature has pointed to the strong influence of policy in driving 
transition towards certain goals, crediting policy targets and incentives for the progress 
made in the UK in reducing Green House Gas (GHG) and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions 
and increasing renewable energy production. Fuel poverty literature has highlighted that 
misaligned policy objectives can leave many in fuel poverty unrecognised and 
consequently unassisted. Thus, a key area of research interest centred around the role of 
policy and political governance in processes of peripheralization, energy vulnerability 
and energy transition. The following research questions were posed: 
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a) How is peripherality experienced within and around the Brecon Beacons 
National Park, Wales? 
- How do political, economic and social factors interplay at multiple scales to 
influence peripherality at regional scales within Wales? 
- How does the production of peripheries at multiple scales influence 
experiences of periphery at a sub-regional/local scale? 
- How is peripherality experienced at a sub-regional scale? 
- How and to what effect does peripherality impact and interplay with energy 
vulnerabilities? 
 
b) How does energy vulnerability manifest within and around the Brecon Beacons 
National Park, Wales? 
- How is energy vulnerability experienced within a periphery? 
- What are the key conditions affecting energy vulnerabilities in a periphery?  
- How are key energy vulnerability conditions affecting peripheries produced? 
- How are peripheral communities counteracting energy vulnerabilities?  
 
c) How is low-carbon energy transition experienced within and around the Brecon 
Beacons National Park, Wales? 
-  How do energy vulnerability and peripherality interplay with social, 
economic and political contexts to influence involvement in low-carbon 
practices and innovations? 
-  How do low-carbon energy practices and innovation impact upon 
vulnerability and peripherality? 
-  How do low-carbon energy practices and innovations interplay with the 
socio-economic evolution of peripheral places? 
 
A case study approach was adopted that bound the research area to mostly rural 
peripheries but also some exurban and Valley peripheries of Mid-South Wales, UK that 
are based in and around the Brecon Beacons National Park (BBNP). In this way, a broad 
range of differential scales of policy and peripheral experiences could be explored that 
could uncover variegated reasons for and experiences of energy vulnerability and energy 
transition. The research used interviews, focus groups, observation, document analysis 
and quantitative statistical analysis to uncover and connect the interplay between the 
processes of peripheralization, energy vulnerability and energy transition in Wales. 
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5.2  Methodology: A qualitative case study 
A paradigm can be understood as “a set of assumptions about the social world, about what 
constitute proper techniques and topics for enquiring about that world; a set of basic 
beliefs, a world view, a view of how science should be done (ontology, epistemology, 
methodology)” (Punch 2014, p. 351). Ontologies, epistemologies and methodologies can 
vary between researchers and impact to greater or lesser extent all aspects of a research 
design (Blaiklie 2009). Thus, it is important that the position of the researcher in relation 
to these philosophies is clear in order that any knowledge claim based upon their research 
is also made clear (MacIntosh & O’Gorman 2015).  
Ontology is concerned with what exists in social reality, the conditions of their existence 
and their relationship with other things in existence. Ontological theories can be broadly 
split into two opposing schools of thought, relativist and realist. Realists view the world 
objectively, as such they believe reality is ‘out there’ in the world, independent of 
researcher influence and occurring whether or not it is discovered or measured in a 
research process, but it is possible to find and explain “universal principles and facts” 
(MacIntosh & O’Gorman 2015, p. 57). Relativists on the other hand, take a subjective 
world view, whereby, reality is socially constructed and consequently, there is no such 
thing as a set reality ‘out there’. Instead, reality is fluid, in constant flux and is constructed 
by individuals who themselves are influenced by their own cultures, histories and 
viewpoints and where they are positioned in a particular space at a particular time 
(Bryman 2016).  
Epistemology is concerned with how knowledge is known, and what constitutes reliable 
knowledge. Traditionally, within scientific research a positivist approach dominated, 
focusing on the use of objective methodologies (Bryman 2016) to measure reality that is 
‘out there’ and will remain so whether it is measured or not. Therefore, research can be 
replicated and obtain the same results each time. As such, positivist approaches search 
for evidence or ‘truth’ to build or form part of causal laws, and over time have become 
mostly associated with empirical studies in the natural sciences. An interpretive position, 
however, maintains that there are distinct differences between the natural science and 
social science (Bryman 2016), whereby “physical systems can not react to predictions 
made about them, social systems can” (MacIntosh & O’Gorman 2015, p. 65). This implies 
that social research can never truly measure reality, as through the act of research itself, 
the reality as it was will change and adapt to the research context. Additionally, as 
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individual’s perspectives, experiences and cultures that influence their viewpoints and 
behaviours in different ways, their engagement in research will be highly dependent on a 
variety of non-controllable factors, from how they view the research and researcher to 
how they personally feel at the time of the research. Therefore, if a social research project 
were to be exactly duplicated, it is highly unlikely that identical results would be gained. 
Recognising this variability, research with an interpretivist position will attempt to 
understand trends as opposed to truths or social law. 
Different ontological and epistemological positions are more naturally aligned than 
others, for example it is unlikely that research with a realist ontology would adopt an 
interpretivist epistemology as the two positions conflict with each other. This research 
has been conducted from a subjectivist ontology and interpretivist epistemology, that 
understandings gained are themselves subjective to the context of the research and the 
participants, where each of these are situated socially, culturally and physically in space 
and time (MacIntosh & O’Gorman 2015). In addition, research is carried out by 
“gendered researcher(s) who speaks from a particular class, racial, cultural and ethnic 
community perspective. The researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a 
framework, which specifies a set of questions, which are then examined in specific ways” 
(Outhwaite & Turner 2007, p. 580). As such, qualitative understandings of reality are 
variable and highly interpretive. Realities are subjective and co-constructed by research 
participants and the researcher, as by entering the research, the researcher inevitably alters 
that reality, thus, insights gained are always partial and additionally are subsequently 
interpreted by the researcher themselves, which means, that some forms of bias will 
inevitably shape such interpretations.  
As different ontologies can more naturally couple with certain epistemologies, 
methodologies with a qualitative approach are usually more closely aligned with 
relativist, interpretative paradigms. Considering the overall aims of this research along 
with a subjective ontology and interpretivist epistemology (or overall constructivist world 
view), the overall methodological approach lends itself to a qualitative inquiry. 
Qualitative research aims to understand social phenomena, personal views, ways of life 
and social structures and cultures by studying “things in their natural setting, [and] 
attempting to make sense of or interpret these things in terms of the meanings people 
bring to them” (Denzin & Ryan 2007, p. 58). It aligns well with interpretivist worldviews 
by understanding that partial and “multiple realities” are present simultaneously and can 
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be accessed through understanding the perspectives of others within the context of their 
reality (MacIntosh & O’Gorman 2015, p. 65).  
Creswell (2013) outlines five qualitative methodological approaches, narrative research, 
ethnography, phenomenology, grounded theory and case study with a combination of 
these suiting the research aims. Narrative research typically focuses on one or two 
individual’s life stories and experiences of a phenomenon in great detail (Creswell 2013). 
While this approach may have been suitable for investigating peripherality or energy 
vulnerability, it didn’t necessarily encompass well investigating the two together with 
energy transition as the focus would be too narrow. Ethnography examines shared 
patterns of behaviour, language and beliefs through researchers sustained emersion within 
the research context (Creswell 2013). This approach did not suit the aims of the research 
which focus on variegated experiences as opposed to culture formation. Finally, 
phenomenology involves the identification of a phenomenon and the investigation into 
the lived experiences by people of that phenomenon and Grounded Theory attempts to 
create new theory driven solely by data derived from research (Creswell 2013). These 
approaches appeared to suit several of the research aims in which exploring how and why 
people experience energy transitions is certain ways is key and new theoretical insights 
are hoped to be gleaned from the research data. However, phenomenology, does not 
appear to account for wider contextual factors that may shape these experiences, nor does 
it allow for the wider expansion of exploring the impacts of said transitions on a wider 
scale, such as groups or communities, which is also a key aim of the research questions. 
Grounded theory does not use existing theory as research framework; however, the use 
of theoretical frameworks forms a key part of this research design.  
Therefore, on further consideration, a case study methodology was chosen with elements 
of grounded theory used to decide sample size and in part, the thematic analysis approach 
later on. Case studies are sometimes used merely as a relative bounding tool, deciding 
what is to be studied (Richie & Lewis 2003; Stake 2005), increasingly and especially 
within qualitative research, case studies are thought of as methodologies, or as an overall 
research strategy (Yin 2014). This can involve using the case to bound the research, but 
also, to direct the overall research strategy, including data collection and how it is 
analysed (Yin 2014). It is this dual approach to case studies that this research adopted. In 
that respect, a case study methodology involves the exploration of “real-life, 
contemporary bounded system, or multiple bounded systems over time, through detailed, 
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in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information” (Creswell 2013, p. 
97). A case study methodology offered a framework for the exploration of personal 
experiences and community experiences, while also acknowledging wider contextual 
factors that impact directly and indirectly upon these experiences and transition 
phenomenon.  
While the ontological and epistemological considerations were important in deciding to 
adopt a case study approach, so are the type of research questions, degree of researcher 
control, and research timeline (Yin 2014). First, research questions for a case study should 
generally be “how” or “why” as these types of questions suggest an explanatory, 
qualitative strategy is needed, as opposed to “what” or “who” questions which suggest a 
quantitative approach may be best (Yin 2014, p. 11). Second, the degree to which a 
researcher wishes to control behaviours can be suggestive of whether a case study is the 
right choice. As case studies attempt to investigate phenomena within their real-world 
context little or no researcher control on the case are expected. This is contrary to an 
experimental approach for example, that may purposefully seek to influence the 
participants or phenomena under investigation in order to control for external influences. 
Finally, whether the phenomenon under investigation is contemporary or historical will 
help distil whether a case study is suitable, for example, where the research is focused on 
past events a historical approach would be better suited. Therefore, as this research design 
has adopted qualitative and exploratory research questions that seek to explain why and 
how contemporary energy transitions occur, accounting for external and contextual 
factors, instead of controlling them, it suits a qualitative case study methodology.  
Having identified the area of research, defined the research questions and decided that a 
case study methodology as the most fitting, the next step was to identify and bound the 
case. This meant deciding on whether the case would be a single or multiple case study, 
which in turn meant considering what the primary focus of the research was, whether it 
was to explore and describe a particular case, test theory or compare the same 
phenomenon in different instances. This was particularly challenging as the research aims 
could be investigated in a number of ways, for example, a single household or a single 
community project involved in energy transitions could be identified as single cases in 
their own right. Likewise, two or more households and/or community projects could be 
identified as multiple actors within a single case study. Finally, two or more households 
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and/or community projects could be identified as two separate case studies, whereby, 
comparisons could be drawn. 
When considering these options, much of the criteria was at least in part theoretically 
driven. For example, peripheral areas could be identified by Copus (2001) elements of 
peripheral disadvantage, i.e. lack of agglomerative advantage, proximity from centres, 
poor infrastructure, weak governance influence etc. Simcock and Petrova (2017) energy 
vulnerability drivers could identify possible places that were more energy vulnerable, i.e. 
places with difficulties in accessing energy, with inflexible energy systems or buildings, 
high energy costs and poor energy efficiencies. Finally, transition could be indicated by 
places where there was evidence of low-carbon energy production. However, practical 
considerations and constraints also influenced the selection of the case study. For 
example, how viable would it be to complete a multiple case study individually ‘in-depth’ 
within the research timeframe? Personal circumstances also meant that extending the 
research to places outside of the UK, and to some extent outside Wales, would be 
extremely difficult. Finally, as the research itself is part funded by the Brecon Beacons 
National Park Authority (BBNPA), there was a need for it to reflect some of the energy 
transition issues within the national park itself, although this need not be exclusive. 
Considering the case study criteria, it appeared that the case would be best investigated 
as a “single case” (Yin 2014, p. 51) bound in three ways. First, as an “exemplifying case” 
the aim of the case was to explore and understand the “circumstances and conditions of 
everyday situations” (Bryman 2016, p. 62). In this instance, the aim was to understand 
energy transition as a phenomenon that is occurring nationally, from a peripheral and non-
urban perspective. Second, the case was bound to instances of low-carbon energy 
transition, but also as the literature suggested transitions may be unevenly distributed, 
instances of ‘deviance’ or non-transition perspectives would also be sought. Finally, as 
the literature also suggested energy transition is largely influenced by policy and the 
availability of subsidies and grants, the case was bound in a way that replicates some 
governance and funding arrangements. Therefore, it was bound geographically in and 
around the BBNP, Mid-south Wales.  
The BBNP was established in 1957, it is one of three National Parks in Wales. As with 
all National Parks in the UK, the BBNP is physically situated within a periphery of Wales, 
between rural mid-Wales and the northerly points of South-Wales industrial valleys. The 
Park overlays nine Local Authority areas including; Blaenau Gwent, Caerphilly, 
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Carmarthenshire, Merthyr Tydfil, Monmouthshire, Neath Port Talbot, Powys, Rhondda 
Cynon Taf and Torfaen (Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1).  
Table 5.1. Local Authorities within the BBNP boundary. 
Local Authority Land area of BBNP (%) Population of BBNP (%) 
Rhondda Cynon Taf 3.9 3 
Carmarthenshire 16.7 5 
Powys 66.1 70 
Monmouthshire 11.1 21 
Torfaen 0.1 0.1 
Merthyr Tydfil 1.8 1 
Blaenau Gwent 0.2 0.1 
Source: BBNPA (2012) 
  
Figure 5.1. BBNP and Local Authorities.  
Source: Welsh Government (2017a) 
 
In most socio-economic studies, peripheral places in Wales are considered to be those 
that have limited access to services and employment and include small settlements or 
sparsely populated areas that are proximately distal from larger urban settlements (Parry 
2003; Wang & Eames 2010; Heley et al. 2011; Kitchen 2012). The Park is sparsely 
populated having 33,500 people living within its boundary equating to 25 people per km2 
compared to 148 people per km2 in Wales (Office for National Statistics 2017a; Stats 




The pattern of settlements within the park can be attributed to “a mix of traditional 
farming areas, mineral extraction, and more recent commercial, administrative and 
commuting areas” (Nathan Litchfield and Partners 2012, p. 11).  The west is characterised 
by many scattered farmsteads and just a handful of villages, it holds a “secondary key 
settlement”, in the form of two small combined settlements of Sennybridge and Defynnog 
(Figure 5.2) (Nathan Litchfield and Partners 2012, p. 11). The eastern side holds the 
largest 4 settlements in the Park; Brecon, Talgarth, Crickhowell and Hay-on-Wye, these 
four settlements hold 46% of the total population (Nathan Litchfield and Partners 2012, 
p. 11). See Figure 5.4 for location of BBNP relative to ‘Built up Areas’ (BUA) and cities 




Figure 5.2. Settlement distribution in and around the BBNP  
Source: Nathan Litchfield and Partners (2012) 
Including the BBNP area within the case study meant that other potentially interesting 
aspects of peripheralization, energy vulnerability and transition could be investigated. For 
example, the Park as a recognised entity, has its own planning authority (the BBNPA) 
which potentially could influence how, where and when energy transitions are carried out 
within and close to the Park boundary. Additionally, the BBNP has additional funds in 
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the form of the ‘Sustainable Development Fund’ (SDF) which goes towards sustainable 
development projects and education in the park, again adding a potentially influential 
dimension on how, where and who is involved in energy transition. A national park, 
which is an area of protected land, whereby the landscape, ecology and biodiversity has 
to be conserved, it is possible that climate change issues and therefore the need to 
transition to low-carbon energy is more of a concern for Park communities and the 
BBNPA. Equally, conservation landscape requirements, for example, in maintaining the 
visual appearance of the landscape may alter the trajectory of transition. Table 5.2 
demonstrates case study criteria and assumed fit with location selection.  
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Table 5.2. Criteria used to select case study area.  
Bounding criteria and area theoretical/conceptual assumptions 
Peripheralization  Wales occupies western fringe of UK and is politically and economically weaker than other 
devolved countries. 
 BBNP occupies Mid-south Wales, on the northern periphery of South Wales’ urban centres and 
centre of policy making.  
 Predominantly rural, the area has lower GVA than urban areas of Wales (National Assembly for 
Wales 2018a). 
 Rural Local Authorities in Wales typically receive less Revenue Support Grant than urban 
authorities24 
 Poor public services access; some settlements have no local services, e.g. access to schools, shops, 
recreation and leisure facilities, healthcare (Welsh Government 2015b). 
 Poor public transport links; many settlements within and around BBNP have no public transport 
provision (Public Policy Institute for Wales 2016). 
 Settlements in and around the BBNP area are a majority of sparsely dispersed settlements; rural 
villages, hamlets and isolated dwellings (BBNPA 2015).  
 The BBNPA presents an additional 
governance layer which may impact political 





 Poor energy infrastructure in Wales and limited powers to alter this impacting Wales’ energy 
access, security, energy efficiency and affordability (Cowell et al. 2015; National Grid 2018). 
 Rural areas in Wales have some of the poorest energy infrastructure in Wales (National Grid 
2018). Weaker electricity grid and approximately 50% of households not connected to mains 
gas (BBNPA 2013b). Further impacting energy access, efficiency, affordability and security of 
supply. 
 Energy costs more to those not on mains networks, and in instances of oil and LPG, can incur 
high upfront payments and delivery charges (Powys Public Service Board 2016). 
 In-migration of “affluent retiree(s)” (BBNPA 
2013a, p.65). may mean energy affordability 
issues are less pronounced. 
  
 
24 For further Revenue Support Grant discussion see Chapter 6 
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 Highest levels of the most energy inefficient building stock, and buildings that are hard to 
insulate are found in rural Wales, impacting energy efficiency, flexibility and affordability 
(Centre for Sustainable Energy 2015). 
 Cost of living can be higher in rural areas due to necessity of personal transport and energy 
costs, impacting household abilities to afford energy (Smith et al. 2010b). 
 Aging population in rural areas (Stats Wales 2017b) impacts energy ‘need’ i.e. more energy for 
heat, for longer periods of the day than other population groups.  
 The above implications on energy vulnerability drivers may also hold other impacts for energy 
needs and practices. 
Energy Transition  Local Authority in the area (Powys) has highest levels of low-carbon energy production (Welsh 
Government 2017a) (at the time of research design) 
 Evidence of low-carbon energy production at a household, community and institutional level in 
and around the BBNP (Ofgem 2019a; 2019b). 
 Evidence of energy conservation at a household, community and institutional level in and 
around the BBNP. 
 Low-carbon energy companies, including independent finance providers, have been established 
within and around the BBNP area. 
 RHI may be higher in rural area due to many homes being off-gas.  
  
 BBNPA holds sustainability team and SDF 
which help residents become more sustainable 
generally. Advice and project assistance have 
included energy production and conservation 
and contributed to the development of local 
companies. 
 Within the BBNP transition may be curtailed 
due to BBNPA conservation purposes; 




 Geographically viable for researcher. 
 Area somewhat familiar to researcher. 






5.3 Getting to know the case: Pilot studies 
To bound the study as above and to decide on research participants, “early understanding 
of the study contexts” was required (Richie & Lewis 2003, p. 67).  An extensive literature 
review was conducted that involved the examination of academic literature, official 
documents with relation to energy production, consumption, accessibility and 
affordability, in the UK and Wales and also in reference to the BBNP specifically. 
Additionally, several pilot data collection activities were carried out, comprising 
document analysis and exploratory meetings and interviews. These pilot studies were 
carried out simultaneous to many of the decisions made regarding how the case study was 
bound, whether it was a single or multiple case(s) and who the main actors were likely to 
be were informed by the results of the pilot investigations. 
Exploratory meetings were held with the BBNPA, and local energy consultants The 
Green Valleys (TGV) to ascertain the general context of the BBNP in relation to wider 
governance arrangements and funding and also in relation to park policies, socio-
demographics and specific energy accessibility and needs. Pilot participant observation 
was carried out at TGV’s Annual Stakeholder Meeting (07.10.2015) and at a Powys 
Public Service Board consultancy project seminar (16.11.2016). Finally, pilot interviews 
were carried out between August 2016 and January 2017 with several staff members from 
BBNPA, from two households, different community renewable energy projects, Natural 
Resource Wales and Powys County Borough Council. Each of these interviews were 
carried out using the same procedures as the main data collection phase with interviews 
audio recorded, transcribed and analysed. A researcher journal was maintained for 
reflexivity and notes were taken during participant observations.  
This pilot stage held multiple purposes, as well as making the case context more familiar, 
it also acted to identify key actors and specific research participants. It helped create 
relationships with some key gatekeepers, which is essential for the in-depth data needed 
for a single case (Creswell 2013). With regards to data collection it provided clarity as to 
which methods may work best for different interview groups and also offered an 
opportunity to trial interview questions. Finally, it also helped to solidify theoretical 
assumptions and confirm that the energy transition phenomenon was relevant to the case.  
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5.4  Data collection methods 
A “multi-method focus” (Denzin & Ryan 2007, p. 65) was chosen as “relying on one 
source of data is typically not enough to develop […] in-depth understanding” (Creswell 
2013, p. 98), which is essential for a single case study. Additionally, it offered the 
opportunity to triangulate the data, whereby data collected via different methods can be 
compared to assess whether the answers being given align. Therefore, three different 
qualitative data collection methods were chosen out of the six put forward by Yin (2014), 
namely semi-structured interviews (including focus groups), participant observation and 
document analysis. Additionally, secondary quantitative data sources were used to 
supplement and triangulate the experiences and views emerging from the qualitative data. 
Each method is discussed in detail below. 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen as the main research method as they can reveal 
evidence of the object of the investigation “including the contexts and situations in which 
they emerge” Miller and Glaser (2016, p. 51). The interviews involved asking open-ended 
questions aiming to explore the perception of participants and allowing them to express 
their point of view. For each interview, consideration was made as to which research 
questions could be answered by the participants and how the interview could form part 
of context building. This was influenced by who the participants were, whether from an 
organisation, community project or individual and also whether they were actively 
involved in energy transition or not. Following this, consideration was taken as to what 
type of interview was most practical and likely to get the most insights, whether that was 
a one on one or a group discussion. Again, this was tailored to the type of participant, for 
example, individual households were generally one on one, while community groups 
were highly variable, ranging from single person to a group discussion. However, while 
this was a consideration of the researcher, cues were taken from the participants as to 
which type of interview they would prefer. Table 5.3 details who the case study 
participants were and their appropriateness for research selection.  
Interview protocols were devised for each interview (see Appendix 3). These were not 
followed rigidly, instead they were used as a point of reference to ensure that key areas 
of exploration were not missed. This allowed interviews to flow like a conversation, with 
interviewees discussing issues in the order and way that they wished. Additional 
probing/steering questions could then be asked as a particular subject arose in the 
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conversation, thus, keeping the flow but allowing some direction to be placed. The venue 
for the interviews, again was largely informed by the participant and where they felt most 
comfortable, although if potentially too noisy for adequate audio recording, alternative 
venues were suggested. Most individual household interviews took place within 
participants homes, community interviews ranged between participant homes and a 
community venue (such as a community centre), while organisation and institutional 
interviews took place at official buildings (i.e. civic centres) or near-by cafes. All 
interviews took between forty minutes and an hour to complete, were audio recorded and 
transcribed. 
Focus groups are a form of interview method that involves a group of people participating 
in the same interview together. As with single person interviews, focus groups can be 
structured, semi-structed or unstructured, however whichever type of structure is used the 
role of the researcher is slightly different (Fontana & Fray 2005; Punch 2014). Within a 
group interview, the researcher “functions more as a mediator or facilitator, and less like 
an interviewer” (Punch 2014, p. 146) in this way, the focus groups did not have a to-and-
fro of question and answer, instead a question or a statement was put to the group and a 
discussion ensued around that. In this research a semi-structured approach was chosen for 
the focus groups as with the interviews, that way the group discussion could flow in ways 
comfortable for the group but direction was given in the form of questions asked or 
comments made by the researcher. As a group discussion involves more than one person, 
each with different personalities and potentially different views, effort was made to ensure 
each of the group was given opportunity to voice an opinion on topics raised so that those 
more comfortable voicing their opinion did not dominate the discussion. As with the other 
interviews, all focus groups took between forty minutes and an hour to complete, were 
audio recorded and transcribed. 
Document analysis includes searching, selecting and reading written material that was 
not produced for the purpose of this research. This was done during all stages of the 
research process, during the literature review, during selection of the case, during data 
collection and when interpreting the results. Bryman (2016) differentiates five main 
document sources; personal documents, official state documents, official private source 
documents, mass media outputs and virtual documents. Of these it was the last four that 
were analysed for this research for a number of different purposes. For example, during 
the literature review stage it was important to gather information regarding energy 
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vulnerability, this involved analysis of official state documents, official state sponsored 
documents (such as those from Ofgem), Official Private documents such as those of the 
Energy Trust, mass media documents such as news articles, and also academic papers. 
During data collection, documents included those passed on by interview participants 
such as newsletters from community groups, official regional governance documents 
such as county council research reports, government policy and statistics and also official 
BBNPA documents such as planning maps and strategic management plans. All 
documents accessed during the course of the research were critically appraised as to who 
had produced them, the purpose of the document, the intended audience and the context 
they were produced in. 
Observation within qualitative research involves observing situations as they naturally 
arise and taking an unstructured approach to data collection whereby observations are 
made “in a more natural and open-ended way” (Punch 2014, p. 153). Behaviours, actions 
and events are recorded in the order they occur (Punch 2014). This method was used when 
visiting places and meetings in which energy related or contextual related topics were 
likely to be discussed. This included attending meetings and workshops facilitated by 
community groups; the BBNPA; Local Authorities; Welsh Government; National Grid; 
and third sector fuel poverty or energy production organisations (see Appendix 4 for list 
of observation opportunities). During these events broad field notes were taken, 
describing the places, who was there, what was discussed and how it was discussed. These 
observations were used during data analysis to add context to the interview data. This 
method was not adopted as the primary data collection method, it was used as a means of 
adding to understandings of the case context. It also allowed for deeper understandings 
of the activities taking place and process of making decisions in the natural setting, and 
also how energy vulnerability, transition or peripherality are positioned in discussions 
and actions relative to other contextual factors. 
Secondary analysis was also used as a means of deepening understandings of the context 
of the research and thus providing further avenues or more detailed questions to be posed 
in interviews. It was also a means of data triangulation whereby claims made by 
interviewees could be checked against the secondary data, and evidence from secondary 
data could also be checked against evidence emerging from interviews. Thus, as with 
observations, this method is not considered the main data collection method, instead it 
acts to supplement the qualitative data gathered in interviews. There are advantages to 
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working with secondary data: it can contain large-scale data that would be beyond the 
scope of this research to obtain; the data is ready collected so analysis can be carried out 
immediately; and as long as care is taken as to the source of the data, it can be of high 
quality (Punch 2014).  
 
5.5 Data collection considerations 
The research strategy adopted was a qualitative case study which was chosen as it aligned 
with the interpretivist epistemology, constructionist ontology of the researcher and the 
type of research questions. While a qualitative approach reflects the grounded belief of 
“what constitutes acceptable knowledge” it also holds five main “preoccupations” 
(Bryman 2016, p. 392). These preoccupations can be understood as being key reasons 
why qualitative research is carried out generally and specifically for this research project. 
In addition, they can provide understanding for why qualitative data collection methods 
are chosen. Bryman (2016, p. 392) defines these preoccupations as “seeing through the 
eyes of the people being studied” (participant realities), “description and emphasis on 
context” (content specific realities), “emphasis on process” (social processes), “flexibility 
and limited structure” (loose research structure) and “concepts and theory grounded in 
data” (data driven theory), each will be discussed in relation to this research project. 
Social research attempts to understand and explore social realities, from an interpretivist 
epistemology, these social realities are created by the people who live within them. As 
such, these realities are personal to each individual and are continuously changing due to 
a multitude of factors, including the history, beliefs and culture of the individual and also 
other people who share these realities. Social realities are created through the meanings 
that these people attach to everything, from behaviours and language to particular places. 
In order to gain access to these realities and attempt to understand them, social researchers 
need to try and ‘see through the eyes of the participant’, to try and understand what 
particular behaviours, language or places mean to them and why (Bryman, 2016). This 
involves attempting to put aside personal views of reality and meanings as these may be 
very different to those of a participant and could lead to incorrect assumptions and 
interpretations being made from observations or what participants say. 
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Social research places an emphasis on gaining thick descriptions of research in order to 
convey as fully as possible the context of a given social world. The reasoning behind this 
is that “we cannot understand the behaviour of members of a social group other than in 
terms of the specific environment in which they operate” (Bryman 2016 p. 395), the 
context that people live or access at different times, influences their behaviour, and that 
different contexts may invoke different data collected from the same person. For example, 
if interviewing a social housing tenant on their energy use and needs in their own home, 
or in their landlord’s office, the same questions are likely to get different results because 
the context in which they are being asked is different. Likewise, if interviewing members 
of a community energy group on their project, a group interview will be more influenced 
by group dynamics and social hierarchies than individual interview. Therefore, to 
correctly interpret a group interview, a researcher would need to understand that group’s 
internal social order along with the wider contextual environment that they live in.  
As interviewing is “inextricably and unavoidably historically, politically, and 
contextually bound” (Fontana & Frey 2005, p. 695), consideration also has to be given to 
wider contextual influences that may inform interviewee responses. For example, when 
asking people about their energy concerns, during times of high fuel prices, answers may 
focus on financial costs of energy. Whereas during times of heightened concerns around 
climate change, focus may centre more heavily on the environmental cost of energy. 
During this research process, the price of oil has remained lower than in previous years 
(House of Commons Library 2016a) and the average cost of household energy decreased 
in 2016 compared to 2015 (Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 
[BEIS] 2016) in addition, the winter had been relatively mild (BEIS 2016). These current 
factors mean that for many people interviewed energy may not currently be a pressing 
concern, with other factors such as inflation increases affecting the general cost of living 
in the UK (Office for National Statistics 2017b) possibly taking a higher priority.  
Additionally, politically, the UK is undergoing a transition, with negotiations ongoing in 
how it will leave the EU, and a new government (since 2016) that have indicated that 
their political agenda will not focus on climate change, renewable energy. Evident in the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change now changed to Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, indicating a shift in priority from the environment and 
carbon reduction to an industrial focus; and further reductions or ending of some of the 
Governments key climate change subsidy schemes (Environmental Audit Committee 
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2018).  These political changes may impact on how people view the EU carbon emission 
targets and whether they will be relevant, and also possibly how favourably people view 
renewable energy in general. From a government and institutional authority perspective, 
these political changes will have direct impact on how different organisations work on a 
national and local level.  
In 2016 in Wales business rates increased and previously exempt micro-hydro were 
included, demonstrating a tax increase of on average 300%, making many schemes loss-
making (Messenger 2017). This was slowly rectified (not at the time of data collection), 
with an exemption reinstated for socially owned schemes and a cap on increases for other 
small-scale developments to 10% or £1,000 (Welsh Government 2018d). However, this 
was a topic of discussion within some of the interviews that no doubt influenced some of 
the perspectives of the Welsh Government and the economic vulnerability of smaller 
renewable energy schemes.  
Also, in order to understand key events or social phenomena and why they occur in certain 
ways, in certain contexts, the events, actions and activities that lead up to the occurrence 
need to be taken into consideration and understood. For example, in order to understand 
why someone may self-ration their energy supply, and possibly live in a cold home, as 
opposed to installing a new energy efficient boiler or house installation, which may be 
state subsidised the interconnected processes that led them to take that decision need to 
be understood. It maybe they are suspicious of the state and state services due to past 
interactions with them, it may be due to the social context in which they live whereby 
taking advantage of subsidised assistance would lead to stigmatisation or it may be that 
they are simply unaware of their entitlement. Either way, their decision to self-ration 
would not have been made in a vacuum and each possible reason outlined, although 
hypothetical, would be the result of different social processes within a certain social 
context that proceeded it. Thus, without understanding and accounting for process, 
questions around why people say or do certain things will not be fully understood. 
A qualitative research enquiry tries to avoid “imposing inappropriate frames of reference 
on people” (Bryman 2016, p. 397). This means that in order to ‘see through participants 
eyes’ and experience their social reality, as little structure as possible should be imposed 
on data collection because to impose structure and set direction would imply that 
assumptions had been made about what was likely to be encountered. These assumptions 
and would affect the ability of the research to capture wider or different perspectives and 
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therefore the truer reality. A looser methods structure and fewer assumptions about what 
will be discovered, means the research becomes more open to alternative realities and 
also remain flexible to change in line with what emerges from the data. While this 
preoccupation was adopted to a certain extent, and indeed is evident in the sample strategy 
which while directed by theoretical assumptions was also snowball and contingent, a 
theoretical framework was used and did impose some structure to data collection. 
Nevertheless, such theoretical framing provided a framework or foundation to the 
research enquiry (MacQueen & Narney 2012), however the data collection and analysis 
process were as ‘loose’ as possible within these frames. 
Findings and theories from this research have been ‘driven by the data’. This 
‘preoccupation’ strongly links with flexibility and also grounded theory methodology, 
whereby, generally within qualitative research an inductive approach is taken that allows 
theory to be generated from the data instead of imposing a theory onto the data. This 
approach was taken for this research despite a theoretical framework being adopted and 
the case study itself being chosen in line with some theoretical assumptions and concepts. 
The data collection, however, was not carried out to prove or disprove any of these 
concepts. Instead the research aimed to explore what was happening within the case in 
relation to these concepts, whether these concepts were relevant within the peripheral 
setting and if so, in what ways, thus providing further meaning. 
Finally, with regards to secondary data used within this research, as it is collected by other 
organisations, for other purposes which may conflict with this research purpose, care was 
taken to use official sources. For example, data was sourced from the Consumer Data 
Research Unit; the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; National 
Assembly for Wales Research Unit; Office of National Statistics; Ofgem; and Stats 
Wales. In instances that secondary data was manipulated, for example, in weighting 
housing data at Lower Super Output Area25 (or LSOA scale) to BBNP scale an official 
national park weighing tool was obtained from Welsh Government. The tool gave the 
proportion of dwellings in each LSOA within and without of the BBNP boundary and so 
other official data measured per dwelling at LSOA scale, such as FIT data from Ofgem, 
could be weighted. Additionally, the BBNPA shared a tool which weighted population 
 
25 Lower Super Output Area (LSOA) is an area measure based on postcode and population size. An 
LSOA contains an average of 1,500 people. 
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from a Local Authority level to a BBNP level, thus using this allowed Local Authority 
defined population data such as gender or GVA to be weighted to the BBNP. 
 
5.6 Sampling and recruitment 
Sampling involves selecting a set number of sites or people for study, this can be done in 
multiple ways, dependent on the overall research aims and methodology. A case study 
methodology can adopt a number of sampling techniques in isolation or sometimes 
combined, again dependent on the research aims. For the purpose of this research, the 
range of participants or units of analysis required for this case study suggested that 
different sampling techniques could be adopted. However, given the research focus on 
experiences of peripherality, energy vulnerability and low-carbon energy transition, the 
sampling strategy was aimed at households, groups and businesses within a material 
peripheral location, including those potentially energy vulnerable and those implementing 
some form of energy transition. These considerations were not singular and indeed there 
was cross-over between them (i.e. several households within the peripheral study location 
were energy vulnerable and had achieved some form of low-carbon transition).  
Embedded data collection allows for multiple ‘types’ of actors perceptions and 
experiences to be captured and compared within a context of a case study area. It suits 
well investigation into processes or phenomenon such as peripheralization, energy 
vulnerability and low-carbon energy transition which involving multiple actors at varying 
scales of size and social, economic and political power that are connected in different 
ways. Therefore, “embedded units of analysis” (Yin 2014, p. 50) or interview groups were 
identified as: households; community group; third sector; businesses; governance 
institutions; and other experts (see Table 5.3). Then within the interview groups ‘sub-
units’ or specific participants were identified that potentially may have different transition 
experiences, for example, within the household interview group are differential types of 
household tenure were selected, such as, privately owned, privately rented and socially 
rented. Embedded design also refers to the connection between units of analysis or in this 
instance different interview groups, Figure 5.3 conceptualises the links between the 




Figure 5.3. Conceptualization of interview group embeddedness. 
Source: Author 
 
A target sample quantity was not adopted in this research, instead a “guiding principle of 
saturation” was used (Mason 2010, p. 1). This is in line with grounded theory 
methodologies, whereby data collection ends when the results stop yielding new insights 
(Marshall et al. 2013). This also fits with the qualitative approaches more generally, 
whereby typically large volumes of data are generated and increasing sample size can 
mean data becomes “repetitive and eventually superfluous” (Mason 2010, p. 1).  
Additionally, in qualitative research the frequency of an occurrence of data (a statement, 
word or a code) is of less importance than the meaning of the data. Pragmatically, a large 
sample size in qualitative research is impractical in terms of researcher time and economic 
budgets.  
While this research adopted the guiding principle of saturation, it did so considering the 
heterogeneity of the population and the number and range of embedded or nested groups. 
Thus, out of the interview groups within this research households had by far the largest 
sample size, this reflects the variegated nature of individuals tenures, building types, 
energy sources, socio-demographics and experiences of transition which took a larger 
sample to reach saturation of data than those of set organisations such as community 
groups or policy governance institutions. Undetermined sample sizes can be problematic 
for those unfamiliar with qualitative methodologies, and research credibility can be 
questioned (Marshall et al 2013). This has led to a proposition of qualitative research with 
either grounded theory or case study methodologies “should generally contain 20-30 
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samples” (Marshall et al 2013, p. 21), while this was not considered a necessary target in 
this research, the sample size did exceed the recommendation. 
Factors that could influence both energy vulnerability and potentially ability to transition 
were also considered with household interview, thus, effort was made to sample 
households of various compositions (ages of residents, gender, number of people); 
various tenures (owned, privately rented and socially rented); building attachment 
(detached, semi-detached, terraced, flat/apartment); and building structure (solid stone 
walls, cavity walls or unusual construction). To understand the wider context and causes 
of each research focus, the sample also aimed to include policy governance institutions 
(those that make and carry out policy); third sector organisations and other experts with 
focus on one or more of the research areas. (See Figure 5.4 for mapped interviews with 
households, community groups and SMEs and Tables 5.4-5.11 breakdowns of household 
interview sample compared to Wales and where possible the BBNP).  
 
Figure 5.4. Wales built up areas (BUA), largest cities (population), national parks and locations of 
household, community and SME interviews (indicating study area) 
Source: Lle.gov (2019) 
 
As Silverman (2000) states, it is unlikely that case study sampling can be random, it is 
more likely to be purposeful and snowball due to the overall research design of 
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illuminating a set case. Additionally, the data collection and what participants and data 
are likely to be accessible “will be somewhat contingent” (Silverman 2000, p. 234). This 
is true of this sampling method whereby, following initial contact and data collection 
from gatekeepers such as BBNPA and TGV, further participants and avenues for data 
collection were illuminated and sometimes initiated by them. This included access to key 
players within the communities and the projects in hand. A further step for sampling was 
then meeting those key players who in some instances were gatekeepers for access to 
further community members. As such while sampling was initially purposeful, it was in 
most subsequent instances “opportunistic” (Creswell 2013, p.100) and highly 
“contingent” and “snowball” (Silverman 2000, p.234).  
This type of sampling in some ways relied on the rapport built between the researcher and 
research participants and gatekeepers, as without good rapport snowball sampling would 
have been unlikely, or at least, more difficult. This was a potential weakness with this 
strategy as it meant that there was potential for the sample number to be affected by 
personal perceptions of the researcher or the research project itself. Additionally, this type 
of sampling strategy does have elements of self-selection and bias, whereby those most 
active or involved with energy transitions or connected in some way to the organisations 
involved are more likely to participate in the study. This may cause the results of the case 
study to be skewed towards the experiences of those within the communities who are 
possibly the least energy vulnerable or peripherally disadvantaged.  
To address this and include as many different perspectives in relation to energy transition 
and community impacts attempts were made to seek out alternative or “deviant” cases 
(Creswell 2013, p. 158). Therefore, the sampling design became one of “purposeful 
maximal sampling” (Creswell 2013, p. 100) whereby different perspectives on the issue 
were sought out in addition to the ordinary and accessible cases, already built into the 
design. Thus, the sampling design overall was purposeful, this means people were 
selected “because they can purposely inform an understanding of the research problem 
and central phenomenon in the study” (Creswell 2013, p. 156). However, further to the 
initial sampling selection, sampling then became both purposeful and snowball/chain 
sampling thereafter, whereby initial participants suggested further participants that fit the 




Alternative recruitment methods were adopted to attract ‘deviant’ cases or interviewees 
that were not directly connected to those already interviewed. Such methods included: 
emailing community centres/village halls and community councils within the study area 
to ask to participate and to place poster advertising research; placing posters in shops, 
libraries and advice giving organisations within the study area (Appendix 5); advertise 
research to Local Authority housing groups via digital newsletter; advertise the research 
on-line via a Facebook page and using digital poster advertised by community groups 
within the study area; using organisation web-pages, Linked-in, and attendance at 
industry discussion groups to connect with other experts and pan-Wales third sector 
organisations.   
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Table 5.3. Case study participants. 
Participant 
Group 
Group Breakdown Sample 
number 





Owned/mortgaged   
Private rented  










Interviews/focus groups: Personal experiences & perceptions of peripherality/ 
vulnerability/ transition within their own lives and within context of their lives 
Motivations for transition (or not); 
Transition barriers/enablers; 
Transition process; 
Transition (or not) outcomes. 
  
Review of secondary data: Policy documents; population demographics; socio-
economics; household compositions; household tenancy; domestic FIT & RHI; 
housing stock; energy access; energy prices; transport. 
Thematic analysis and cross-referencing between 
units.  
  
Secondary statistical analysis: comparative analysis 
between Wales, rural areas within case study and 
BBNP area. Cross-referencing between other data 
sources.  
  
Document analysis: Welsh, UK and BBNPA Policy 
(relating to domestic energy production and 







groups* i.e. Village Hall 
groups 
  
Communities of interest** 




7 Interviews/focus groups: Community experience/perception of peripherality/ 
vulnerability/ transition 
Motivations for transition (or not) 
Transition barriers/enablers 
Transition process (ease, community inclusivity, aims, results) 
Transition (or not) outcomes 
  
Observation: How peripherality, energy vulnerability or transition is positioned 
in discussions and actions relative to other contextual factors. 
  
Review of secondary data: Policy documents; community group 
documents/websites; access to services; community groups in Wales.  
Thematic analysis and cross-referencing between 
units.  
  
Secondary statistical analysis: Cross-referencing 
between other data sources. 
  
Document analysis: Community group documents; 
Welsh, UK and BBNPA policy (relating to 






with: Fuel poverty and 





E.G. Brecon Advice 
Centre; St. Johns Food 
Bank; National Energy 
Action; Nest, Melin 
Homes. 
6 Interviews: Organisation remit would dictate overall interview focus, 
experiences & perceptions of peripherality/ vulnerability/ transition within their 
work or client base;  
key problems faced in addressing issues;  
were there any links between peripherality, vulnerability and transition? 
state of play in terms of their work with regards to addressing particular issues? 
  
Observation: Gain understanding of the activities taking place and process of 
making decisions in the natural setting. Observe how peripherality, energy 
vulnerability or transition is positioned in discussions and actions relative to 
other contextual factors. 
  
Review of secondary data: Policy documents; organisation 
documents/websites; statistics referring to particular area organisation covers.  
Thematic analysis and cross-referencing between 
units.  
  
Secondary statistical analysis: Cross-referencing 
between other data sources. 
  
Document analysis: Third sector organisation 
documents; Welsh, UK and BBNPA policy (relating 
to particular area: i.e. fuel poverty strategy or 
renewable energy projects in Wales). 
Business* SME’s (farming, tourism, 
education and finance 
industries) within study 




6 Interviews: Experiences & perceptions of peripherality/ vulnerability/ transition 
within their local area and implications for their business;  





Review of secondary data: Policy documents; business documents/websites; 
local economy statistics. 
  
Thematic analysis and cross-referencing between 
units.  
  
Secondary statistical analysis: Cross-referencing 
between other data sources. Weighting economic data 
to rural and BBNP area. 
  
Document analysis: Business organisation 
documents; Welsh, UK and BBNPA policy (relating 

















   
 
5 
Interviews: Experiences & perceptions of peripherality/ vulnerability/ transition 
within their remit area and implications for their constituents;  





Direct observation: Gain understandings of the activities taking place and 
process of making decisions in the natural setting. Observe how peripherality, 
Thematic analysis and cross-referencing between 
units.  
  
Secondary statistical analysis: Weighting of any 
pan-Wales data to rural area/BBNP scale;  
  
Document analysis: UK and Welsh Policy 
(devolution of power, contestation/differing 
ideologies/ambitions; climate change; fuel poverty; 
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Local Authority (Powys & 
Carmarthenshire housing 







   
4  
energy vulnerability or transition is positioned in discussions and actions 
relative to other contextual factors. 
  
Review of secondary data: EU, UK, Wales, Local Authority and BBNPA 
policy documents; Official research briefings; websites; statistics. 
welsh economy; Local Authority settlements; access 
to services; area economy (employment, incomes; 
industry sectors); public transport provision; housing 
standards). 
  
BBNPA policy (relating to national parks/designated 
landscapes; BBNPA economy; BBNPA planning). 
Other 
Experts* 








E.G. Energy Saving Trust; 
Cardiff University; Renew 
Wales; Institute of Welsh 
Affairs; Natural Resources 
Wales. 
9 Interviews: Organisation remit would dictate overall interview focus, 
experiences & perceptions of peripherality/ vulnerability/ transition within their 
work or client base; key problems faced in addressing issues; were there any 
links between peripherality, vulnerability and transition? State of play in terms 
of their work with regards to addressing particular issues. 
  
Direct observation: Gain understanding of the activities taking place and 
process of making decisions in the natural setting. Observe how peripherality, 
energy vulnerability or transition is positioned in discussions and actions 
relative to other contextual factors. 
  
Review of secondary data: Research papers; expert organisation 
documents/websites. 
  




*Specific interviewees within this group cannot be listed due to anonymity agreement 




Table 5.4. Household interview group breakdown (demographics, home building structure, energy sources and vehicle ownership). 










Energy 1 Energy 2 Energy 3 Energy 4 Insulation Vehicle 
Roof Cavity & 
Internal 
External 










 - Yes No No 2 





2 Pre 1900 Solid 
Stone 
Detached Solar PV LPG Wburner Solid fuel 
range  
Yes Yes No 2 
Owned  Male 45-
64 








Solar PV  - Yes Yes No 2 










Wburner  - Yes No No 2 
Owned  Female 65-
74 
Retired (early 
- ill health) 




Wburner  - Yes No No 1 
Owned  Female 45-
64 








Yes No No 2 




Oil Solar PV Wburner Yes No No 2 




Oil   -  - Unknown Unknown No 1 




 -  - Yes Yes No 1 
Owned  Female 45-
64 




Oil  -  - Yes Yes No 1 
Owned  Male 45-
64 




Oil  -  - Yes No No 1 
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Owned  Female 65-
74 




Oil Wburner Solid fuel 
range  
Yes No No 1 
Owned  Female 65-
74 








Solar PV  - Yes Yes No 1 
Owned  Female 45-
64 




LPG  -  - Yes No No 1 
Owned  Male 45-
64 




Oil Solar PV ASHP Yes Yes No 2 










 -  - Yes No No 1 
Owned  Female 45-
64 




Oil  -  - Yes No No 1 
Owned  Male 45-
64 




Solar PV Wburner  Solid 
fuel 
range  
Yes No No 1 












 - Yes No No 2 
Owned  Male 65-
74 






 -  - Yes No No 2 
Owned  Male & 
Female 






 - Yes No No 2 
Owned  Male 45-
64 



























































































































































































 - -  Yes Yes No 1 
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Table 5.5. Percentage gender in interview sample and Wales. 
  Female Male 
Interview sample 54 46 
Wales 51 49 
Welsh data source: Office for National Statistics (2011) 
The interview sample, Wales and BBNP percentages for gender are fairly consistent with 
a slightly higher sample in my data of females (54%) to males (46%). 
 
Table 5.6. Percentage age groups in interview sample and Wales and BBNP. 
  15-29* 30-44* 45-64* 65-74* 75+*   16-64** 65+** 
Interview 
sample 
5 8 35 38 14 45 55 
Wales 18 17 27 11 9 62 20 
BBNP N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 58 25 
*Age ranges as per Stats Wales (2018a) no breakdown of this data is available at BBNP scale. 
** Age ranges as per Stats Wales (2018b) 
The interview sample has a higher number of older age ranges than representative of 
Wales or the Park, the biggest difference is in age group 65-74 where this data contains 
38% but Welsh data is 11%. This is likely influenced by the increased availability of 
older, retired households for interview compared to those of working age. Additionally, 
the lower number of ages 15-29 will be influenced by the interviews only including 
householders over 18 years old.  
 
Table 5.7. Household composition (number of residents per home) in interview sample and Wales and 
BBNP. 
  No. Occupants 
Interview sample 1.9 
Wales 2.2 
BBNP 2.3 
Welsh data source: Stats Wales (2018c) 
The interview sample consisted of a higher inclusion of households with fewer occupants 
than that of Wales more generally or in the BBNP. This may link with the higher 
percentage of interviews of older age groups. 
 
Table 5.8. Percentage of different housing tenure in interview sample and Wales. 
  Owned Private Rented Social Rented 
Interview sample 60% 8% 32% 
Wales 65% 10% 13% 
Welsh data source: Stats Wales (2018d) 
133 
 
While the range of tenure is not exactly representative of Wales or Park data - the spread 
is similar with the highest levels of tenure being owned, followed by social rent then 
private rent. 
Table 5.9. Building attachment and age, interview sample and Wales and BBNP. 
  Detached Semi-
detached 
Terrace Flat Age - Pre 
1900 
Age - Post 
1900 
Interview sample 40% 37% 14% 9% 54% 46% 
Wales 28% 31% 28% 28% 63% 37% 
BBNP 43% 28% 21% 0.3% 67% 33% 
Welsh data source: Consumer Data Research Centre (2018) & BEIS (2015) 
The interview sample consisted of 40% detached homes, this falls between BBNP and 
Wales (43% and 28% respectively) and is closer to the BBNP number. Interviewed semi-
detached were higher than both the BBNP and Welsh average (37% to 28% and 31% 
respectively) while interviewed terrace sample was lower (14% to 21% and 28%).  
Interviews with households in Flats was 9%, higher than the BBNP (0.3%) and lower 
than Wales (13%). 
While the percentages are not closely matched, the spread of building types between 
interviewed sample, Wales and BBNP is; the highest proportion being detached, then 
semi-detached, then terrace, with the lowest percentage of homes being flats. 
The interview sample consisted of a similar spread of pre and post 1900 build homes as 
Wales and BBNP. It has a slightly lower percentage of pre 1900 homes, this may be 
affected by the higher percentage sample of socially rented homes (see table 5.9) who all 
lived within post 1900 buildings. 
Table 5.10. Percentage building material, interview sample only. 
  Solid Stone Brick Unconventional Unknown 
Interview sample 57% 30% 19% 16% 
 
No comparable data is available for house building material. 
 
Table 5.11. Percentage building material and mains gas access, interview sample, Wales and UK. 






Interview sample 95% 32% 16% 54 
Wales 91% 56% N/A 32 
UK 66% 69% 9% 52 
UK & Welsh source: Statistics for Wales (2010); DECC (2012b); BEIS (2015) 
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Most of the interviewed households has loft insulation (95%) this is comparable with 
Wales (91%). 49% of interviewed homes had some kind of wall insulation, again, this is 
comparable with Wales (56%). Households interviewed without mains gas access is very 
similar to that of the BBNP (54% and 52% respectively). 
 
5.7 Ethical considerations 
As a social science research project, there was an obligation to ensure that research 
participants were protected, that risks are not created and existing vulnerabilities were not 
exacerbated. Therefore, ethical approval was obtained and granted from the ethics 
committee of the School of Planning and Geography, Cardiff University (Appendix 6). 
The Cardiff University Code of Practice also guided the ethics of the research along with 
the University’s Research Ethics Guidance and following ESRC Key Principles for 
Research Ethics (2015). 
These principles meant that participation in the research was voluntary and only 
conducted once informed consent was obtained, the benefits of the research were 
maximised where possible and any predicted harm was minimised. In the instances of 
joint interviews, the participants were advised on group confidentiality with regards to 
other participant’s views and personal data. Additionally, the funding arrangements for 
the research was made clear to the participants, this was especially important in cases 
where people from the BBNPA or organisations and institutes connected to it were 
involved as it may have impacted upon what people were willing to share. In instances 
where people acted as gatekeepers to other participants, the intentions for the study were 
demonstrated to them and assurances were made regarding the use of data collected. This 
involved explaining what the study was about, how intrusive it would be to individuals, 
the types of questions and where the results would be shared.  
As the research focus is a fairly benign topic, there were only minor issues around 
possible participant harm. However, risks were present, for example, when interviewees 
are chosen because of the organisation they are affiliated with, but their views are 
contentious towards their organisation or partnership organisations. In such instances, 
reassurance was given of anonymity or interviewees asked to be made explicit that their 
views were personal (i.e. not representative of the organisation). Additionally, there was 
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a possibility that people may find discussing issues of energy accessibility or affordability 
uncomfortable or embarrassing. In such instances participants were reminded to only 
disclose what they were comfortable with, they were also reassured of confidentiality and 
asked if they wanted anonymity. All interviewees were advised that if they wanted to 
leave the research they could do so without having to give an explanation and without 
ramifications towards them. 
In the context of this project the most significant dimension relating to the privacy of 
participants involved was with regards to recording of data. Recordings and all other 
electronic data were stored in on the password protected personal computer with access 
restricted to that of the researcher. The hard data was kept in a locked drawer in a locked 
office. All the personal data was anonymized consistent with the Data Protection Act 
1998. All care will be taken to ensure that quotations and other data is not individually 
attributable, and each participant was assigned a pseudonym.   All primary data collection 
was carried out after informed consent was obtained from the individuals involved. Prior 
to this, each participant was sent an information sheet that described the purpose of the 
study, what it entailed, what will happen with data obtained and their right to withdraw 
from the research at any time. The information sheet contained researcher contact details 
and that of the project supervisors.  
 
5.8 Thematic data analysis  
An inductive thematic data analysis approach was taken, this is arguably one of the newest 
and yet most common data analysis approaches (Bryman 2016). This may be attributed 
to its similarity in process to grounded theory, whereby theory is generated from the data 
through a series of coding exercises. However, unlike grounded theory, thematic analysis 
can be used within research that adopts a theoretical framework and themes can be 
generated that tie in with theory as well as being able to generate new theory. Thematic 
analysis was chosen as it is well suited for larger data sets, the process is systematic and 
allows some quantitative analysis to be employed and it allows assertions to be made that 
are backed up by the text (data) (MacQueen & Narney 2012). The thematic analysis 
process adopted was based on that put forward by Yin (2014), Creswell (2013) and in 
part Bryman (2016). Such a process involves immersion in the data, the creation of codes 
that refer to relevant selections of text, the aggregation of codes into broader themes, then 
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the linking of such themes to generate an overall impression of the research findings. A 
code book was kept linking data, codes and themes through all stages of the analysis thus 
adding to analysis rigour and maintain an audit trail.  
First the data was organised by interview group then “played with” this involved putting 
the data into different formats and orders and comparing different data with each other to 
search for “patterns, insights or concepts that seem promising” (Yin 2014, p. 135). Thus 
initially “within-case analysis” was carried out as interview groups were analysed 
separately from other groups (i.e. household interviews were analysed separately from 
community group interviews) (Creswell 2013, p. 101). To begin with both interview data 
that exemplified many others within its group and interview data that appeared to be 
different to those within the group were analysed. This stage allowed for immersion in 
the data, whereby transcripts and field notes were read and re-read and memos noting 
possible themes or new avenues of exploration that emerged (Creswell 2013). This initial 
strategy was especially important when analysing the initial interviews and documents 
that formed the pilot period of data collection as it acted to prompt re-focusing of the 
research questions prior to further data collection taking place. It proved to be an 
important stage in considering how groups were organised, for example, initially 
interviewees were placed in groups depending on their position as a householder or within 
an organisation (third sector, governance etc). However, after initial exploration of the 
data, it became clear that this grouping was not beneficial to analysis, for example, the 
third sector group was initially comprised of fuel poverty charities, RSLs and community 
energy membership groups, all of which have different organisational aims and thus, 
different interview focus. Therefore, interview groups were re-configured to represent the 
focus of the interviews: Households; Domestic Perspectives; Community Group 
Perspectives; Businesses (remained the same); Governance Perspectives; and Other 
Experts. The Third Sector interview group was removed as all interviewees fit within 
other groups. 
The second data analysis stage involved coding and theming the all the interview data. 
This was carried out manually using Excel. NVivo was explored as an option for 
managing the data and coding, however, due to researcher unfamiliarity it proved time 
consuming and more difficult than Excel. Initially the data was kept within its new 
interview group. Text extracts from each interview were cut into smaller sections and 
attributed codes (Creswell 2013). The codes themselves were those that emerged from 
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the data and reflected their content and context, and the names were a mix of in vivo and 
researcher interpretation based on the data (see Table 5.12).  
Table 5.12. Example of codes applied to a Community Perspective text extract. 
Text Extract: So, without the hall the life of the village would change quite a lot. I mean everybody would 
be much more remote and people tend to get in their cars and drive off anyway because the bus service 
is so shockingly bad. So, I don’t know where else they would meet. 
CODE 1 CODE 2 CODE 3 CODE 4 CODE 5 
Material 
peripherality 
Community hall - 
essential 
Community hall - 
social inclusion 
Transport poor Personal transport 
essential 
 
Following this, the interview codes were “categorically analysed” within their groups and 
aggregated to themes (Stake 1995). The themes were made up of several codes that 
generally represented experiences or perceptions of peripherality, energy vulnerability 
and transition as these topics were the main discussions within the interviews. This helped 
order the codes for each group within similar themes, which enabled cross-group analysis 
to be carried out with limited confusion and retaining an audit trail from text extracts 
through to codes and themes so that backtracking can occur at later stages. However, 
while this step was helpful in retaining clarity over codes, themes and interview groups, 
and in a way, further emergence in the data, it was difficult as many codes that fit under 
the peripherality/area theme, could also fit under governance themes, likewise, 
discussions around energy vulnerability for example, poor infrastructure, also fit under 
the peripherality theme.  
The main issue with this initial analysis attempt was that the codes and themes were too 
descriptive and were too heavily influenced by the theoretical frame. This was indictive 
of the need for more thematic themes to be developed using a heavier input of researcher 
interpretation, and a move away from too heavily describing or summarizing the text. 
Therefore, data was re-coded using the steps adopted in the first instance of coding but 
with a looser theoretical frame and more researcher interpretation. After this second 
analysis attempt codes emerged that were both descriptive and inductive which were then 
amalgamated into themes based on the codes themselves (as opposed to the theoretical 
frames). As per Table 5.13, the “themes and issues were then analysed across the 
embedded cases for similarities and differences” (Creswell 2013, p. 98-99) from this, the 
following themes emerged:  
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• Multi-scalar Political Peripheralization - perspectives on political representation 
of either themselves/social group (in the case of households or community groups) 
or organisation. Perspectives on other organisations, relationships between them 
and where interviewee may fit in this. Perspectives on political representation of 
their locale or the locale within an organisations’ remit. Implications of non-
political representation for various interviewees at various scales. 
• Peripheral Economy and Income - perspectives of socio-economies (at various 
scales) including industry sectors, employment opportunities, incomes and living 
costs.  
• Peripheral Infrastructure - perspectives of energy and transport infrastructures at 
multiple scales and the implications for households, businesses, public sector 
activities and energy investments. 
• Peripheral Housing Stock & Tenure - implications of different building structures 
and tenures on daily lives experiences and efforts to reduce energy vulnerabilities 
and transition to lower-carbon lifestyles.  
 
At the end of the process, despite being protracted due to rigid and descriptive codes being 
initially developed, each final theme represents the views and experiences of the research 
participants of peripherality, energy vulnerability and low-carbon transition. The 
consideration of each of the themes together creates a clear perspective on the wider 
political, economic and social contexts and processes at play in addition to the 
positionality and role of the interviewees within such processes and in relation to each 
other. Thus, overall, perspective is gained on the impacts of energy transitions on 
vulnerable peripheral communities within this case study context, as well as the impacts 
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5.9 Evaluating the research: A critique of qualitative inquiry 
There are of course drawbacks to a qualitative approach. First, qualitative research can be 
regarded as too subjective, whereby the results and conclusions made about the data are 
interpretations of the researcher and are sometimes reached in open ended and illogical 
ways. This impacts upon two other critiques of qualitative enquiry which is that it is 
difficult to replicate and that the positionality of the researcher within the context of the 
research itself will influence the areas they feel are important and therefore the direction 
of the research. Finally, it can be difficult to generalise from a qualitative research 
enquiry. This is because the research is so context specific and detailed, also sample sizes 
are usually small and purposefully selected. However, Bryman (2016) argues that this is 
why qualitative findings are more useful for generalising to theory instead of populations. 
Additionally, “moderatum generalisations” can be made between similar groups of 
people within similar contexts (Williams 2000, p. 215). 
This research, while taking a qualitative approach and the five preoccupations also takes 
on board its critique and approached the data collection process in a way that made the 
most of qualitative enquiry while attempting to minimise some of the negative impacts. 
Much of this was done by evaluating the research as it progresses in line with how 
“trustworthy and authentic” it was (Bryman 2016, p. 384). This approach to research 
evaluation is specific to qualitative research and although different to more quantitative 
approaches concerned with “reliability and validity” they are also parallel. For example, 
to ensure the research is trustworthy it has to be credible, transferable, dependable and 
confirmable, these are directly parallel with more traditional concepts of internal validity, 
external validity, reliability and objectivity. Additionally, attempts were made to reduce 
researcher bias and retain a balance of power between the participants and the researcher.  
When gathering data from the social world there are multiple influences on what that data 
will be, or what people choose to impart. For example, participants can exaggerate stories 
or simply lie. Within different data collection contexts such as group interviews, people 
may be reluctant to say certain things or may feel social pressure to say things they don’t 
really want to. Also, within documents, especially from un-validated sources such as 
social media, or even within official state documents, data will be positioned and imparted 
in different ways, sometimes making opposing claims. In order to give the data collected 
within the research ‘credibility’ a number of measures can be taken. Data should be 
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collected following principles of good practice (as outlined in ethical approval) whereby 
coercion, bribery and bias are avoided. Respondent validation can be sought, whereby 
data collected and analysed is then shown to the participants or new participants to 
authenticate that the inferences made by the researcher are true to them. Finally, a 
triangulation technique can be adopted whereby similar data is sought from multiple 
sources. This allows for “converging lines of inquiry” (Yin 2014, p. 120) to be compared 
with each other to check that similar perspectives are being given. Within this research 
all three credibility, or internal validity checks were adopted throughout the research 
process. 
As the aim of case study research, along with most other qualitative research is to gain 
in-depth understanding of a particular individual, group, community or organisation, the 
findings are often “orientated towards contextual uniqueness” (Bryman 2016, p. 384). 
This means that transferability of results in comparison of other studies or wider 
generalisations can be more difficult. However, by detailing a thick description that holds 
rich accounts of the context judgements can be more easily made as to whether the 
research can be transferred. 
This research has adopted the four principles of data collection as proposed by Yin 
(2014); use multiple sources of data, create a case study database, maintain a chain of 
evidence and exercising care over electronic data sources. This provides evidence and 
reassurance that dependability or reliability has been achieved and the results are reliable 
(Yin 2014). This is similar to what Bryman (2016, p. 384) describes as an “audit trail”. 
Therefore, this research maintained a case study data base, which was a separate 
collection of all the data collected for the duration of the research project. The database 
included all document evidence collected from the field, such as field notes, relevant 
documents, tabular material and narratives (Yin 2014).  
As the data was both electronic (emailed documents, documents from web searches) and 
hard copy (field notes, memos or documents handed to the researcher from data sources), 
the database was made up of both electronically stored data and data kept in secure hard-
file storage. All the data was organised by theme and then date making it easily accessible 
for data analysis and also for external verification. Compiling a case study database also 
assisted with the maintenance of a chain of evidence or audit trail, which is an easily 
followed trail of data, documents and notes leading from the research questions, to 
interview protocols, to the final analysis and conclusions. As such, adaptions to the lines 
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of enquiry and development of the data collection process and where evidence was sought 
from is easily explained and justified. 
Finally, taking care with data sources involved two processes. First was setting 
boundaries for data searches so that the data collected was always relevant and not 
unnecessarily unwieldy. This included considering the actual places or websites that were 
being accessed and how much time was spent cross-checking the information’s validity. 
Second, was remaining aware of possible bias in data collected from social media sources, 
such as Facebook and Twitter, as these are often considered informal settings, the same 
attention to authenticity and accuracy in the claims made on them is considerably less 
than those on professional organisation or state websites. Therefore, some caution was 
taken when utilising such data sources.  
Qualitative approaches acknowledge there will always be some subjectivity in the 
research process and that just by being involved in the research, a researcher will bring at 
some level, their own values and assumptions. For example, an interpretivist worldview, 
as was taken with this research, assumes that all “knowledge depends on who its makers 
are” (Rose 1997, p. 307) and that knowledge and realities are only ever partial and 
mutually created between researcher and participants. Thus, as positionality can act to 
influence the knowledge gained, such knowledge has to be situated, meaning, researcher 
and participant positionality had to be a consideration for the whole research process, but 
most notably during data collection and interpretation stages. Conformability is 
concerned with ensuring that the researcher does not allow personal values, political 
views or theoretical inclinations to unduly or overtly affect the direction of the research. 
This concern is taken up by others as researcher positionality and is debated as to whether 
it is possible for social researchers to assume a completely objective position when 
carrying out research. 
Therefore, while it is a somewhat impossible to know fully how researcher positionality 
would play out at any given encounter or even perhaps after or how objective a researcher 
can be, attempts were made to address these issues. First, researcher positionality is 
acknowledged: affiliated institutions (Cardiff University), gender, age, welsh nationality 
and distinct south-west Wales valleys accent. All these characteristics bore some 
influence on access to information, and interviewee and gate holder perceptions of the 
researcher, whether they felt empowered or disempowered during research encounters. 
Again, how these characteristics were viewed, whether positively or negatively would 
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have differed between individual people. Additionally, researcher background - of 
growing up in a post-industrial village in rural Wales, researcher social norms and culture 
- could have acted to influence assumptions of what energy justice should mean and what 
vulnerability may look like. Indeed, conscious effort was made to in some ways ignore 
these assumptions, to be as objective as possible and instead listen to the data. 
In order to remain aware of personal assumptions and beliefs a reflexivity strategy was 
adopted which involved being reflective after data collection exercises by keeping a 
research diary and also through taking memos during transcription. Power distribution 
between participants and researcher were probably somewhat mitigated once the 
participant heard my accent, however, other steps were also taken to ensure that 
participants felt empowered. This included giving them power to turn off the audio 
recorder during interviews and leave the research process completely, without 
repercussions or explanation, should they so wish. 
 
5.10  Conclusion 
This research is aiming to understand the impacts of energy transitions on vulnerable 
peripheral communities, with the understanding that peripheralization, energy 
vulnerability and energy transition are all socially produced processes. As such, their 
existence is dependent upon social, economic and political structures and their impacts 
are likely to vary depending on the formation of such structures at a particular space and 
time, and the position of the affected individual, community, organisation, business or 
region within such structures and relative to each other. Therefore, to understand the 
impacts of the processes on one another and to communities within the structures and 
partaking in some form of the processes, the processes must be understood and the 
experiences of the ‘impacted’ communities must be illuminated.  
In order to accomplish this a qualitative approach was adopted as this incorporates a broad 
view of social, political and economic contexts at any scale along with more narrow and 
defined personal experiences of set phenomena and processes within such contexts 
(which are all at once the wider landscapes individuals live in and their personal 
perspective on such landscapes, and their own and other positions within it).  A case study 
methodology fit within the same remit and allowed for diverse and multi-scale 
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experiences to be uncovered, bound within a set space and time. Encompassing the three 
main theoretical concerns of the research: peripherality, vulnerability and transition, the 
case study location was selected to represent instances and deviances of these. Therefore, 
the case study was selected as the area in and around the BBNP in mid-south Wales. Here 
preliminary investigation evidenced that it could be considered a periphery in many 
aspects, that its peripherality coupled with poor energy infrastructures indicated energy 
vulnerabilities and Local Authority renewable energy rankings, take up of FIT and RHI 
along with knowledge that all energy consumers are subsiding transition indicated 
transition was occurring in different ways. Incorporating a national park within the case 
boundary also allowed for exploratory investigation into other spatialization processes 
and governance mechanisms on peripherality, vulnerability and transition. 
 
After completion of a pilot study, data collection in the form of interviews, focus groups, 
observation and secondary data analysis took place between 2016 and 2017. The methods 
chosen fit well within the theoretical framework, research questions and overall 
qualitative approach. The multi-method approach also increased the rigor of data 
collection as it allowed data triangulation to occur, increasing credibility. Interviewees 
were recruited via purposeful maximum sampling with purposeful, snowball and 
contingent methods adopted that allowed instances of interviewees that fit well within 
research assumptions and those that deviated from them, allowing multiple perspectives 
on the same processes to be gained. Recruitment in a large part depended on participant 
recommendations, however, effort was made to gain a wider sample of participants, using 
direct emails, posters, RSL newsletter and using social media such as Linked in and a 
Facebook page.  
 
Interview data was transcribed and then thematically analysed. While the analytical 
process was protracted due to rigid and descriptive codes being initially developed and 
starting out on NVivo before moving to Excel, at the end each theme represents the views 
and experiences of the research participants of peripherality, energy vulnerability and 
low-carbon transition. The consideration of each of the themes together creates a clear 
perspective on the wider political, economic and social contexts and processes at play in 
addition to the positionality and role of the interviewees within such processes and in 
relation to each other. Thus, overall, perspective is gained on the impacts of energy 
transitions on vulnerable peripheral communities within this case study context, as well 
as the impacts of peripherality and vulnerability on transition processes. 
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Chapter 6. Peripheral energy and spatial injustice: Representation, 
recognition, energy vulnerabilities and transition 
6.1 Introduction 
Political representation is a key element of a democratic political system, allowing the 
perspectives and opinions of constituent populations to be advocated during decision 
making processes that affect their lives. This safeguards to a certain degree that such 
constituents are not penalised or disenfranchised by decisions taken. However, for this to 
work effectively, political systems must recognise advocates, whether individuals or in 
this instance devolved governance authorities. In addition, advocates must recognise 
constituent needs. This research demonstrates that this is not always the case. 
Interviewees perceived their political representation to be peripherally regarded by core 
UK Government, resulting in fragmented devolution of powers and decisions taken that 
do not represent their best interests. This was evident in core-periphery relationship 
perceived between the UK and Welsh Government, regionally within Wales between 
rural and urban areas and then within the Brecon Beacons National Park (BBNP or the 
Park), between Park core purposes and Park communities. At sub-regional and regional 
scales, allocation of public spending and its strategic application, combine with and 
worsen declining public services to add to agglomeration effects, making visible to 
communities their relative peripheralization.  
The context of this research, in and around the BBNP, adds another dimension to 
experiences of political peripheralization. Here, an additional layer of spatialization and 
the values it upholds via alternative governance, create altered, but nonetheless still 
present, political peripheralization. Such political peripheralization interplays with 
experiences of marginalization. Both of which are experienced in part due to governance 
institutions’ priorities of environmental protection and tourism. This is felt by some to be 
to the detriment of community needs. Energy vulnerability and low-carbon transition 
within this space are also altered, whereby the type and scale of low-carbon interventions, 





This chapter explores perceptions of political peripheralization informed by interviews. 
It starts by setting energy policy context, providing a foundation to explore political 
peripheralization, first in the core-periphery relationship perceived between the UK 
Government and Welsh Government, sub-nationally within Wales between peripheries 
and urban centres and then within the BBNP, between the Park purposes and Park 
communities. Building upon this, misrecognition of rural peripheries due to area-based 
measurement tools tailored towards measuring urban deprivation, result in mis-aligned 
public spending with need, this is to the detriment of those places.  
These various experiences of political peripheralization have impacts on peripheral 
energy vulnerabilities and energy transition. Energy vulnerabilities can be recognised but 
are often politically ignored due to assumptions of population wealth and therefore ability 
to counteract vulnerabilities independently. Energy transition cost and benefits at multiple 
scales are unevenly distributed with peripheries unable to benefit from larger scale 
transition, but still bearing the costs of hosting developments. Additionally, peripheries 
can be discounted for assistance with domestic scale transition interventions, with the 
result that only individual households with financial means are able to transition. This 
situation is altered in the BBNP where environmental and conservation planning 
protections shield communities from the cost of large-scale energy development, 
however, the same protections can inhibit some smaller scale energy transitions. As 
energy transition holds opportunity for peripheries, both within and outside of the BBNP 
to counteract aspects of peripherality and some energy vulnerabilities, any barriers 
preventing transition occurring are detriment to this. 
 
6.2  National political peripheralization 
As highlighted in Chapter 3, the fragmented devolution of policy areas linked to Wales’s 
potential economic development and continued peripheralization has been a source of 
continuing tensions between the UK and Welsh governments. However, policy 
devolution to Wales has gradually increased, most notably with the Wales Act (2017) 
(active from April 2019). Within the Act, Wales’s energy policy remit was extended to 
include the licencing and granting of consent for onshore oil and gas projects; all onshore 
wind projects; renewable energy projects under 350 MW that are developed in the Wales 
inshore and offshore regions; and the promotion of energy efficiency. However, despite 
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enjoying greater power over its energy policy, limitations remain.  As one interviewee 
pointed out, even with enhanced powers, there are limits to what the Welsh Government 
can approve and how much it can afford to fund itself without UK Government assistance: 
We didn’t have much control at all, but with the new Act now its 350MW and 
below we will have some control over, but above that will still go to the UK 
government so they can decide things. We can put our thoughts forward, but 
in the end, they decide. So again, it’s a bit restrictive. So, in a lot of things that 
people want to do, we will not do it unless UK government helps (Welsh 
Government interview 3). 
This is reflected in the reliance on economic incentives for renewable energy production 
in Wales being governed by UK government. For example, the Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) and 
Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) are UK-wide renewable energy subsidies aimed at 
encouraging the development of low-carbon energy production. The subsidies make 
payments to renewable energy producers (domestic, public or commercial) for energy 
exported to the National Grid (FIT only) in addition to payments for energy produced 
even if consumed by the producer (FIT and RHI)26. Since 2015 the UK Government has 
substantially reduced FIT due to unexpected high level of take-up. Critique of this 
decision in the media and by low-carbon advocates and link to the recent decline in new 
renewable energy production developments in the UK (see Figure 6.1) was reflected by 
interviewees:  
Feed-in-tariffs were designed to produce stability and certainness in the 
market, and they never did, they just changed and changed and changed, cut, 
cut, cut, so actually the one thing they were supposed to produce, which was 
certainty in long-term decision making, didn’t happen (Expert interview 8). 
 
 




Figure 6.1. Renewable electricity production in the UK (2000-2017) 
27
 
Source: DUKES (2018, p.160) 
 
Eighteen months ago George Osborne, Amber Rudd cut the subsidies to the 
renewable sector, which has devastated that sector in Wales, well in the UK. 
Which means there’s far more risk[..]. Without that subsidy now, a lot of them 
are just no longer viable. A lot of would have been pumping money by now 
out of the rivers and off the hills into those communities, they just haven’t 
happened. And what’s happened as well alongside that is the zillions of small 
jobs, across Wales, like PV installers, they’ve just been hit. I think the figure 
is something like 18,000 jobs have gone across the UK, local electricians and 
builders and installation companies as a result (Business interview 2). 
However, Wales retains a focus on renewable low-carbon energy and views transition as 
a means of diversifying and growing its economy. There is the ambition “to create a 
sustainable, low-carbon economy for Wales” and to be a world leader in low-carbon 
renewable energy production (Welsh Government 2017c). These misaligned priorities 
between the UK and Wales can cause further friction in energy policy. Welsh ambitions 
for the Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon (SBTL) in contrast with UK ambition for Wylfa 
Newydd nuclear development28, may be such examples of this. While this represents a 
conflict between the UK and Welsh Governments, others relate to it at a sub-regional 
 
27 Note the increase in onshore wind in 2017, this spike has largely been attributed to a ‘rush’ to complete 
renewable energy developments before the FIT decrease in 2015. 
28 See Chapter 4 for further discussion of Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon and Wylfa Newydd 
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scale, where other more controversial renewable energy projects are proposed in 
peripheries within Wales by the Welsh Government: 
I think the Welsh Government has certainly got much more of a green growth 
agenda than Westminster, I think Westminster has got an appalling record 
over the past five years and I can only see it getting worse. I think the big 
issue is the fact that Westminster still controls major energy projects, so 
things like the Tidal Lagoon being in the hands of Westminster, I can’t really 
see any justification for that now, I think there’s a big issue there (Expert 
interview 1). 
  
[The Tidal Lagoon is] such an obvious winner, both from the point of 
development of industry and being at the forefront of technology and from the 
energy point of view. I just can’t understand why we can’t get a go-ahead on 
things like that, instead we have a suggestion that Powys has got to have these 
wind turbines (Community group interview 6). 
 
While there is acknowledgement that Wales can only do so much with limited powers, 
there was a level of disappointment felt that Wales missed opportunities when they arose. 
This was raised mainly in expert interviews discussing renewable energy production, 
where planning processes had until recently created a barrier for larger scale 
developments (for example 1 Megawatt (MW) and above), and that Welsh institutions 
had not embraced the FIT while it was still available. As per Section 3.2, aside from 
Northern Ireland, Wales has the lowest number of renewable energy sites, installed 
capacity and production (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy [BEIS] 
2018e). This was attributed by interviewees to a lack of ambition, foresight and leadership 
in addition to risk aversion: 
 
We’re the worst statistically, we’re the worst of the four home-nations of the 
UK on per-capita basis and that’s given the fact that we have a very good 
resource. We should be second behind Scotland because their resource is 
better. A lot of the reason for that is legacy, we [had] a crap planning system, 
that was a problem dealt with in the Planning Act… so the planning side in 
Wales is now more streamlined and has a clearer purpose, and that happened 
at exactly the same time as all the subsidies vanished. So, you’ve got a position 
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where it’s easier to develop projects in Wales than any other part of the UK, 
but there’s no money there (Expert interview 6). 
 
They didn’t see the opportunity when the FIT was there. Scotland saw the 
opportunity, that’s why they’re way ahead. They knew they could get loads of 
money in investment into Scotland. Wales for whatever reason is far behind 
and just didn’t see that vision to take that opportunity, and I think they still 
don’t see that opportunity. That actually, if a significant portion was locally 
owned it could have a significant impact on local economies in Wales. They 
just don’t see it (Expert interview 3). 
 
Risk aversion was attributed by one expert interviewee as “branch office mentality”, 
where the Welsh Government are perceived to lack confidence due to Wales’s centuries 
of being politically dominated from England:  
 
[Welsh Government have] not got that flexibility, it’s all a bit risk adverse. 
It’s all still a bit of a problem, although things have changed a bit. Maybe 
that’s the way in Wales as well – post-colonialism takes a while to shake off, 
doesn’t it? (Expert interview 9). 
Overall, energy ambition in Wales is at odds with UK-national scale plans. At the time of 
this research, contemporary examples provided by interviewees were of Welsh plans for 
SBTL and the perceived purposeful delay in decision making by UK Government, finally 
ending in disapproval. However, Wales’s subsidiary energy policy position is evident also 
in its reliance on UK level low-carbon subsidies. Additionally, Wales’s energy market 
and network are regulated and managed by UK-wide organisations, Ofgem and National 
Grid, this national-centric governance also poses issues for peripheries. For example, as 
will be discussed in further detail in Section 7.4 rural areas of Wales have sparser mains 
energy networks than urban and pay more for mains electricity. 
Frustration of low-carbon energy ambition was also noted to occur due to Welsh 
Government itself, whereby fast and widespread uptake of FIT was not carried out. Nor 
was it enabled via Welsh Government leadership or changes to planning policy for other 
actors in Wales to take advantage of. This slow response and perceived lack of initiative 
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by Welsh Government was attributed to risk aversion that prevented action being taken 
in Wales before UK Government initiation. 
 
6.3 Regional and sub-regional political peripheralization 
Political peripheralization was also discussed at regional and sub-regional scale. Being 
physically distal from the Welsh Government in Cardiff, or even from intra-regional 
governance offices was considered a significant contributor to being politically 
unrepresented. As such, political peripheralization was expressed at multiple levels, by 
17 household, 5 business and 2 Local Authority interviewees (out of 34, 7 and 5 
interviews respectively). At sub-regional and community scales, it was experienced due 
to limited understanding of the constrains of peripheral geographies, population 
disbursement or housing characteristics: 
I had to laugh, I went to seminar in Cardiff and there were two guys there 
from DECC and I don't think they'd ever been anywhere near Wales. They 
stood there and said that there were no solid wall properties in Wales. We 
looked at each other and said, ‘okay well you've not been to Ponty then have 
you? Been to Rhiwfawr?’ So that was a farce (Local Authority interview 2). 
Additionally, it appeared to some that Welsh Government focused policy and public 
spend on urban areas to the detriment of other non-urban areas (See Table 6.1 and Figure 
6.2 for breakdown of rural and urban Local Authorities in Wales): 
We do feel that, the further North you go, the more you’re forgotten about 
in Cardiff […] Because there’s no investment around here, none at all. It’s 
very poor, very poor. But we’re very good for cuts, if there’s going to be cuts 
then we’ll get the cuts (Mark, social tenant, aged 45-64). 
  
[The Welsh Government] concentrate on places where they've got industry 
and towns and they forget about the backwaters they do […] So they want 




It is easy to see why interviewees working or living within the periphery feel that national 
resources in the form of public spend are unevenly allocated. Such uneven allocation is 
made visible by the decline of public services. Of the household interviewees, 72% and 
81% outside and within the Park (respectively) felt that the public services within their 
area were declining and limited. Services deprivation leads to an increased need to travel 
to access such services, increasing households’ dependence on personal transport and 
possibly leading to “car-related economic stress” (Mattioli et al. 2017, p. 95). Services 
deprivation is a recognised issue in rural areas of Wales where there has been a continuous 
decline in “shops, post offices, leisure centres, police stations and health services” (Public 
Policy Institute for Wales 2016, p. 17).  
 
The post office went, then the shops then the school and finally the pub. By 
1996 all facilities had gone except for the hall (Community group interview 
2). 
 
The school is closed, we haven't got a village shop, our chapel's been sold off 
and has been made into a house and we get a post van up here twice a week, 
on a Monday and a Thursday for an hour a day. The man that's running it 
now has offered to bring if we need anything […] which is making us feel not 
easy about it but more of an outcast really (Megan, social tenant, aged 75+). 
 
Some communities have no local access to private or public services at all. Access to 
services deprivation is a recognised form of social exclusion and measured as a domain 
of the Welsh Index of Multiple Deprivation (WIMD) (Welsh Government 2015b). 
Despite its importance and impact on rural life, the Access to Services domain, which 
accounts for public and private travel times to grocery shops, GP surgeries, schools, post 
offices, libraries, pharmacies, leisure centres and petrol stations is only weighted 10%. 
As per Table 6.1, and Figures 6.2 and 6.3, rural areas in Wales experience the highest 
levels of access to services deprivation. In considering the data at Lower Super Output 
Area (LSOA) - which is based on postcodes and population size, containing an average 
of 1,500 people per area - of the 47 LSOA’s within the Park boundary, 22 are the top 10-






Table 6.1. Breakdown of urban and rural Local Authorities in Wales. 
  Context Settlement type Number of 
areas (LSOAs) 
% population 
Urban Sparse  <=10000 people 37 2 
Less Sparse >10000 people 1201 62.9 
Rural Sparse Town & fringe 72 3.7 
Village & dispersed 167 9 
Less Sparse Town & fringe 265 14.1 
Village & dispersed 154 8.3 




Figure 6.2. Local Authority urban and rural 
classifications and population density. 
Source: Statistics Wales (2018), Consumer Data 









Figure 6.3. Access to service deprivation in Wales. 
Source: Welsh Government (2015c) 
Public spending on local services in Wales is largely carried out by Local Authorities, for 
example, many are responsible for social housing stock, social services and public 
facilities such as libraries, community centres and leisure centres. Such funding is 
distributed by the Welsh Government from a sum of money consisting of the Block Grant 
(as per Section 4.3) from the UK Government (and Welsh Tax revenues as of April 2019) 
via the Revenue Support Grant (RSG). The RSG accounts for 80% of Local Authority 
funding. The actual amount each of the 22 Local Authorities receives annually is 
determined by a needs-based formula that considers several factors that would possibly 
mean urban Local Authorities receive more than rural. Such factors include population 
(size, age, health), settlement size, number of benefit claimants, number of homelessness, 
urban road lengths, street lighting and number of businesses. However, the formula also 
considers the dispersal of settlement, which is meant to make allowance for increased 
costs and staff time associated with servicing widely dispersed settlements most common 
in rural Local Authorities. 
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It is understandable that rural Local Authorities may not appreciate this allowance as their 
settlement is nearly always lower than those of urban Local Authorities (Stats Wales 
2018e; Stats Wales 2018f). In 2018/17 all Local Authorities except Cardiff experienced 
cuts to their settlement, with rural Local Authorities experiencing highest cut levels (BBC 
2017). This year (2019/20) the provisional settlement follows the same pattern with urban 
Local Authorities of Cardiff, Neath Port Talbot, Merthyr Tydfil, Newport and Rhondda 
Cynon Taf receiving increased settlements while all others except Swansea (urban with 
unchanged settlement) are reduced (BBC 2018c). Additionally, even though allowances 
are made for settlement dispersal this doesn’t necessarily translate into staff numbers, for 
example Powys, (the Local Authority with largest area and population within the Park 
boundary29) is also the largest Local Authority in Wales, but employs the lowest 
percentage of staff (18%) (see Table 6.2).  
Local Authority interviewees acknowledged the decline of services in their areas and their 
particular service needs, for example, in housing and energy for their populations. 
However, interviewees felt constrained by the limited numbers of staff compared to the 
geographic area they had to cover. Additionally, it was noted that procurement processes 
also did not reflect the context of geographically dispersed locations. Examples were 
given where non-local contractors are selected via a bidding process for contracts to 
upgrade housing or install energy measures. However, a lack of knowledge of place-
specific geographies led to some contractors underestimating travel times between jobs. 
This led to rushed work so that contractors could make all appointments within their set 
time, resulting in work being incomplete or completed below standard. The Local 
Authority is then left with the cost of repair, while affected households are left with poor 

















Table 6.2. Local Authority staff size and area covered. 
 
Source: Consumer Data Research Centre (2016) and Stats Wales (2018a; 2018b)  
Sub-par work involving the installation of cavity wall insulation and Air-Source Heat 
Pumps (ASHP) was noted by Local Authority and social tenant interviewees, holding 
implications for energy vulnerability. Indeed, issues of incorrectly installed insulation 
have been a parliamentary concern for several years, debated in the House of Commons 
(c.f. House of Commons Hansard 2017) and having a support group created to assist those 
affected (c.f. Cavity Insulation Victims Alliance 2019). The non-recognition of rural area 
requirements was also noted by other interviews, for example third sector and expert 
interviews. 
Look at the logistics of it, I lived in Powys for thirty years, it shouldn’t be one 
county, and everybody that works in the Local Authority there says ‘you can’t 
do Powys in one go’. So, whenever they have a council event they have to do 
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north and south… and they get less funding. So, the biggest county in Wales 
gets the least funding. So they get toilets closing, libraries closing, leisure 
centres in trust now, the estate is shrinking, for Powys, really more than 
anywhere, the geography is a big thing (Expert interview 2). 
Other interviewees noted pressures to demonstrate efficiency and strategy in the direction 
of their work efforts and spending. This is becoming more pronounced as all public 
funding becomes scarcer. Continuing UK-wide austerity measures in place since 2010 
has meant that all Block Grants have been reduced (Gray & Barford 2018). Thus, 
interviewees noted that when implementing work, for example, in upgrading housing 
insulation or energy services, it is in the organisations’ best interest to ensure that the most 
people are reached for the least amount of funding. This ‘strategic’ application means 
most often it is areas considered the most deprived, or with the greatest amount of 
deprived homes that are targeted for assistance: 
I suppose I think we're afraid of failure. […] So yeah, I would always try to 
hit an area where it looks as if we're likely to get a good return if possible. 
However, it's not as easy as that when you're working for an authority which 
has to be seen to be fair and above board […] We've done a lot of work in 
Llanelli and we're doing more work in Llanelli but the council from 
Carmarthen comes on the phone and say, ‘when are you going to do 
Carmarthen?’ But it is unfortunate to a certain degree that the LSOA areas 
that we've been looking at, the highest scoring tend to be in Llanelli (Local 
Authority interview 2). 
The comment above raises a further issue with regards to public spending in rural areas. 
In order to make ‘strategic’ decisions regarding where to implement public spend or 
particular projects, the public sector is increasingly reliant on area-based economic 
indices such as the WIMD in addition to population levels. However, WIMD is not fool-
proof and contains some inbuilt bias towards understanding deprivation from urban 
perspectives (Fecht et al. 2018). For example, the index is made up of 8 domains; Income, 
Employment; Health, Education, Access to Services, Community Safety, Physical 
Environment and Housing, each is weighted according to their perceived impact on 
deprivation. Income and Employment are the highest weighted domains at 23.5% each. 
As per Figure 6.4, using these two domains, rural areas are the least economically 
deprived in Wales.  
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However, this is misleading as urban and rural deprivation are geographically different 
with rural deprivation being dispersed much wider than that of urban areas where 
deprivation tends to be clustered. Due to smaller levels of deprivation that register within 
area measurements of rural areas, they can be hidden in the overall count (Statistics for 
Wales 2015a; Gillard et al. 2016). Additionally (as will be explored further in Chapter 7) 
employment and income deprivation is based on benefit claims, in rural areas populations 
are known to under-claim for welfare benefits. Finally, while rural area statistics can 
appear to show high levels of employment, thus low employment deprivation, it does not 
indicate the quality of such employment, i.e. how many hours are worked, how secure or 
regular the employment is and what the wage-level is, all of which are likely to be poor 
in rural places.  
 
 
Figure 6.4. Income deprivation (left image) and employment deprivation (right image) in Wales. 
Source: Welsh Government (2014) 
 
For many public sector interviewees, despite recognising that there are people living 
within least deprived areas, but are living in deprivation and require assistance, the need 
to gain maximum benefit from public spend and use of WIMD which characterises rural 
places as homogeneously less deprived limits their activities there. Thus, this has real 
impacts for rural populations and all public services (c.f. Fecht et al. 2018). Subsequently, 
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this application of public spend adds to agglomeration effects, further centralising public 
assets and services and “hollowing out” peripheral areas (Marsden 2018, p. 2). 
 
The application of the Welsh Government Arbed scheme is an example of how rural areas 
are overlooked for public spend if area-based indexes are adopted. Arbed is area-based 
and assists Registered Social Landlords30 in providing energy efficiency measures, 
including in some cases, installation of renewable energy to social tenants. The scheme 
started in 2009 and has impacted over 12,000 households in its first two phases (Eco 
Energy Centre Wales 2012; Ricardo Energy and Environment 2017). Being area-based, 
the scheme aimed at highly deprived areas, thus homes in non-deprived areas are often 
overlooked. As Figure 6.5 demonstrates even though there have been some Arbed 
interventions in rural Local Authority areas (Isle of Anglesey, Gwynedd, Ceredigion and 
Carmarthen) the majority has been actioned in deprived urban Local Authorities. Powys 
and Pembrokeshire, two rural Local Authority areas have received no assistance, likewise 
no households in the BBNP have been targeted. This urban-centric application of fuel 
poverty/low-carbon interventions is reflected at a UK scale via the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) criticised for focusing on easy-win urban areas over harder to treat rural 
homes31.  
 
Figure 6.5. Areas in receipt of Arbed Years 1, 2 and 3. 
Source: Welsh Government (email) 
 
 
30 Registered Social Landlords include Local Authorities with housing stock and Housing Associations. 
31 See Section 2.2 
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In addition to Arbed, the Welsh Government has funded Nest since 2011. This scheme is 
aimed at improving energy efficiency and offering advice to owned homes and privately 
rented households that are extremely energy inefficient, where one resident is in receipt 
of a means-tested benefit. This scheme has aided over 61,000 households (Welsh 
Government 2015a). While households can access the service via telephone, there is also 
a small team of Nest Advisers who visit areas in Wales to promote the scheme, the large 
geographic areas they cover means that they focus their activities to places where it seems 
assistance will benefit the most households. This leads to visits being focused again by 
deprivation levels, therefore, targeting similar areas to Arbed and possibly missing 
deprived households in apparently less deprived areas.  Research by Walker et al. (2014) 
found similar issues with geographically based fuel poverty schemes, they estimate that 
such schemes can miss between 40-60% of households who need assistance. Both Arbed 
and Nest schemes offer perhaps the only means for low-income, benefit recipient, and in 
the case of Arbed - socially rented homes - to reduce energy vulnerabilities and participate 
in low-carbon transition. However, it should be noted that the aims of such schemes are 
to mitigate fuel poverty, thus, transition outcomes are not guaranteed, for example, in 
some non-gas areas oil-based central heating systems are still installed as oppose to low-
carbon alternatives.  
Political inattention felt by some in peripheral locations contrasts with attention given to 
the same areas for renewable energy projects. The Welsh Government’s Technical Advice 
Note 8: Renewable Energy (2005) which identifies seven Strategic Search Areas (SSAs) 
for renewable energy production. SSA’s have been critiqued for encouraging large-scale 
developments to locations, politically convenient, but that disenfranchise local 
population. As Figure 6.6 demonstrates many large scale (over 1 MW capacity) 
renewable energy projects are indeed within rural areas and some are close to area-based 
deprivation. However, the positioning of such developments, aside from wind turbines, 
more strongly correlates with grid access points32.  
 
 




Figure 6.6. Location of renewable energy developments (1 MW and above), areas of deprivation and 
Strategic Search Areas (SSAs). 
Source: Google Maps (2018), Trimble (undated) and Welsh Government (2018a) 
 
Two SSA’s were within or close to the study location and had commercial wind farm 
developments established (Maes Gwyn windfarm and Pen y Cymoedd). The households 
interviewed living closest to the windfarms developed there talked about them being 
‘undemocratic’ and feeling powerless to influence what decisions either over the type of 
development itself, the end-use of the energy generated or if and how monetary benefits 
arise:  
We look over at the wind farm over there. When we first came here I took a 
picture looking out, there are only four in the picture. Now we can see 
thirteen […] Maybe they’re paying too much for the people whose land it’s 
going on, because one of the farmers over there, he’s stopped farming 
because he’s making enough money from having the wind turbines on his 
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property […] Well, maybe they want to cut down a bit what they pay him 
and pay other people who are trying to do things because a lot of people 
could do more [about renewable energy], but it’s the cost [that prevents 
them doing so] (Robert, homeowner, aged 45-64). 
 
I don’t know if you know about the controversy in Powys? But they’re doing 
their local development plan and at the last minute the Welsh Government 
has insisted on them putting in these search areas for renewable energy, in 
other words solar panels and wind turbines. And this is really undemocratic 
the way it has been thrust on Powys at the last minute without proper 
consultation (Community group interview 6). 
 
In other interviews it was noted that such forms (scale and business model) of low-carbon 
energy production may not be the most beneficial either for Wales as a country or for the 
local areas the developments are sited within. Instead, other forms of energy production 
ownership, such as partnerships between public sector or third sector organisations with 
commercial developers or smaller scale developments with increased local ownership 
were discussed. Such options increase the level of power for communities or 
organisations with social ethos, which was felt to increase the connection between places, 
energy produced and include a wider range of local actors. This was felt to be indictive 
of the retention of economic benefits (whether community funds, or profits) closer to the 
site of production, growing local economies or used for local benefit. These perceptions 
are supported by some research (c.f. Hanley & Nevin 1999; Okkonen & Lehtonen 2016; 
Benedek et al. 2018), however, other research suggests more limited benefits (Bere et al. 
2017) or point to the need for development of wider economic supportive industry which 
adds value along with local ownership (c.f. Bryan et al. 2017; Institute of Welsh Affairs 
2018). However, Welsh Government energy policy is supportive of positive perceptions, 
and now stipulate that new renewable energy developments in Wales must have “an 
element of local ownership” (Welsh Government 2017b). 
Going forward, if another Pen y Cymoedd [was developed], that’s great but 
actually, should we be looking for most of that to be owned by people in 
Wales? So, should we set a minimum level of ownership of new energy 
developments so that people in Wales? The money goes where the ownership 
is, so how do we actually make more of that stay in Wales? Those are the sorts 
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of questions that we’re asking at the moment (Welsh Government interview 
1). 
 
You’ve got a foreign owned energy company - power or coal or whatever … 
if you can keep some of that energy in the local economy, have ownership and 
responsibility for generating it, then the cash. You can have more say about 
where your energy is sourced from, so local sources. But we can also keep 
more of our money within the [local] economy and that’s better for everyone 
in that economy (Expert interview 8). 
The interviews illuminated that not only communities close to commercial developments 
felt unjustly treated, during transportation of very large component parts (for example 
wind-farm blades) other communities are inconvenienced by road closures. Also, other 
and the same communities may need to have new energy infrastructure erected (i.e. 
pylons) to distribute the new energy production. However, interviewees from such 
communities were unaware of any benefits gained: 
We’ve had up all the hassle with the wind turbine farms, with the transport, 
but that all gets piped away, were not even getting the electric out of it. You 
wouldn’t mind if you had the benefits, because I’m a supporter of windfarms. 
But you would like some of the benefits of it as well. Why it all has to go to 
England I don’t know. Hundreds of pylons we’re going to have, to carry the 
electricity and that spoils our quality of life (Mark, social tenant, aged 45-64). 
Undemocratic decision making, and perceived unfairness was not confined to large scale 
energy developments. Community energy schemes, whilst being promoted as more 
inclusive ways of developing renewable energy and also a means of enhancing 
community cohesion can in some instances have the opposite effect. Two of the seven 
community projects interviewed spoke of some opposition to their plans from some of 
the local community: 
There’s been quite a divide between the community council and the not-for-
profit energy companies. You know, the people on this group are not members 
of this, and not over there, and there’s been a lot of antagonism between the 
two. It gets all personal and nothing to do with the facts and it becomes 
164 
 
another expression of community fractionalism and in-fighting (Expert 
interview 8). 
 
There was very little backing, there was a lot of contention at the time, 
because that’s what happens in communities, there was a bit of um friction, 
or fraction actually, there was friction in the community with the local county 
councillor[…]The community council as well is another thing, you know 
because we fell out big time with the community council as an organisation, 
there was a group of people on there that were very, very against what we 
were doing (Community group interview 4). 
Unfortunately, during the fieldwork, perspective from those against the developments 
was not ascertained. However, in both instances the community groups felt that 
eventually any antagonisms had passed and generally most people in the wider 
community were accepting of the developments.  
Sub-regional political peripheralization was expressed within Wales due to distance from 
governance centres and relatively weaker economies. These two factors complement each 
other where areas proximately distal from governance centres are the same areas with 
weaker economies. Larger scale low-carbon energy production appears to embody and 
reinforce such perceptions. New energy production developments, whether commercial 
or in some cases community led, can to some appear imposed and in the case of 
windfarms in particular, harming the local landscapes, with benefits that come, including 
the energy produced, holding little meaning for affected communities. As spatial justice 
calls for the “fair and equitable distribution in space of socially valued resources and the 
opportunity to use them” (Soja 2009, p. 3) this is a sign of injustice. Peripheries can have 
little influence over what technologies are pursued, in what locations, and what impacts 
there may be on local landscapes and economies. The next section continues the 
exploration of peripheralization and the influence this has on energy vulnerability and 
low-carbon transition, narrowing the focus to experiences within the Brecon Beacons 





6.4 The Brecon Beacons National Park: Further political 
peripheralization? 
The BBNP is managed by the Brecon Beacons National Park Authority (BBNPA), which 
is a local planning authority and holds the same statutory planning functions of other 
planning authorities in Wales (see Planning (Wales) Act 2015).  The BBNPA, as a public 
body has obligations within UK legislative framework of the Environment Act (1995). As 
a Welsh national park authority, the BBNPA also has a responsibility to consider the 
Environment (Wales) Act (2016) when making strategic plans and planning decisions. 
Additionally, the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act (Wales) (2015) places a statutory 
duty on all public bodies in Wales to work in a way that upholds the sustainable 
development principle which is comprised of five main elements: Long term, Prevention, 
Integration, Collaboration and Involvement. This includes creating and working towards 
wellbeing objectives designed to maximise its contribution to the seven well-being goals 
(a prosperous Wales, a resilient Wales, a healthier Wales, a more equal Wales, a Wales 
of cohesive communities, a vibrant culture and thriving Welsh language, a globally 
responsible Wales). It also includes participation as a partner in Public Service Boards 
which consult, create and monitor wellbeing objectives and plans for Local Authority 
areas. In doing so public bodies in Wales will improve “the economic, social, 
environmental and cultural well-being of Wales” (Future Generations Commissioner for 
Wales 2018).  
The BBNPA is predominantly funded by the Welsh Government and levies obtained from 
the seven Local Authorities the Park overlays. 75% of Park funding is from Welsh 
Government via the National Park Grant, the remaining 25% is raised via the levy. For 
2016/17 the BBNPA received £3,936,000 from the National Park Grant and £942,000 
from the levy (BBNPA 2017b). In addition to this the BBNPA generates income from 
other “grants and contributions” and “Fees, Charges and Other Service Income” which 
together for year 2016/17 generated £2,238,000 (BBNPA 2017b, p 4). This money goes 
towards running the BBNPA including the direct employment of 98 (fulltime equivalent) 
staff, in addition to indirectly supporting sub-contractors, suppliers and café franchise 
operators involved in other activities involved with managing the park (Parsons 2019). 
However, as a planning authority the BBNPA has no remit for housing, health and social 
services or public services, these remain with Local Authorities. Thus, in many ways the 
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BBNP is subject to the same issues around public services deprivation and being 
identified as least deprived as non-Park areas.  
However, recognition as being least deprived is perhaps more pronounced within the 
BBNP than outside due in-migration of retirees and number of second homes both of 
which influence house prices and can disperse lower-income groups more widely within 
surrounding areas (c.f. Gallent et al. 2003). Within the park, house prices are on average 
£28,279 higher than those in the same Local Authorities outside the Park boundary (see 
Table 6.3). High house prices, whilst being an indicator of economic prosperity, hold 
issues for people on incomes below the amount required to be able to afford 
accommodation, this is “a particularly difficult problem for young, local people wishing 
to remain living and working in the National parks” (BBNPA 2010, p. 46). The ratio of 
house price to wage is now 8.3 within the BBNP (Lloyds Bank PLC 2017) but Banks and 
Building societies typically only lend to a 4.5 ratio. This indicates that income for people 
living in the Park, even for those on above average income, are not high enough for them 
to afford to purchase a home.  


























222,631 194,355 15 28,276 204,925 9 8.3 
Source: Lloyds Bank PLC (2017) 
Within its planning authority role, the BBNPA holds authority to grant or decline 
permission for building or environmental developments within the BBNP boundary. This 
is different to areas outside of the Park where planning permission is sought from Local 
Authorities. The planning authority function of the BBNPA is meant to ensure that any 
developments support the Park’s core purposes and duty. These represent its overall goals 
and are outlined within the Environment Act (1995). The two core purposes are: To 
conserve and enhance the natural beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of the national 
parks; and to promote opportunities for the understanding and enjoyment of the special 
qualities of national parks by the public. The BBNPA duty is to "seek to foster the 
economic and social well-being of local communities within the national park, but 
without incurring significant expenditure in doing so, and [to] co-operate with local 
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authorities and public bodies whose functions include the promotion of economic or 
social development within the area of the national park" (Law Wales 2016, n.p.). The core 
purposes hold greater weight than the duty, additionally, the first core purpose retains 
priority over the second core purpose. Should conflict arise between the two purposes a 
‘Sandford Principle’ is applied, placing “greater weight to the purpose of conserving and 
enhancing the natural beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of the area comprised in the 
national park" (BNPA 2018; Law Wales 2016, n.p.).  
The core purposes of national parks act to conserve landscapes, biodiversity and cultural 
heritage, inadvertently, they also conservation the landscape as it was at the point in time 
national park designation took place. For the BBNP its conservation was initiated in 1957 
and represents the “slice in time” (Foucault 1984, p. 6) that it is required to maintain. 
Conservation in time as well as space also conserves idealised visions of rural life, a 
mythical “golden age” where life was simpler, and society conformed to an “idyllic…old 
order” (Moore-Colyer & Scott 2005, p. 506). This idealization of rural life is strengthened 
by the links made between national park landscapes and national identities which together 
create sacred spaces increasing their social importance and also their attractiveness to 
tourists. But this idealization can be problematic for populations of people living within 
the parks in current times, whereby modern needs can conflict with the traditional 
ideology.  
The core purposes of the Park can mean that gaining planning permission for any 
developments (including energy) within the Park involves the satisfaction of more 
nuanced criteria. These criteria centre around environmental protection and visual 
impacts that developments may hold, impacting type and size. It also can increase the 
cost and timeframes involved with compiling planning proposals. Of the 71 (non 
BBNPA) interviews, 24 had direct interactions with the BBNPA (15 from the business, 
community groups and policy governance interviewees; and 9 households), these 
interactions centred around developing existing buildings and developing independent 
energy developments. There was acknowledgment amongst interviewees that as a 
conservation area, the Park required environmental protection. However, in attempting to 
carry out developments 16 expressed that the BBNPA appeared over-zealous in its 
application of planning criteria. This resulted in extended planning processes and 
planning decisions that to the applicants appeared unfair: 
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There were so many hoops to jump through, the amount of surveys you had to 
do, you had to do visual impact surveys, bat surveys, you know? It was all put 
there I think just so we’d give up (Business interview 1). 
 
It also affects the reputation of the BBNPA, whereby to some developing in the Park is 
not worth the effort of trying to gain planning permission. The perception of the BBNPA, 
in terms of its planning remit as difficult, reflective of meeting its core purpose at the 
possible cost of socio-economic benefits that developments could hold for its 
communities. This includes low-carbon energy developments around energy production 
and increasing domestic energy efficiency: 
 
They [the BBNPA] need to be more open to developments as the people in the 
area are the ones looking after it. You can see why people get frustrated by 
them. We are just trying to improve properties for the people who live in them 
(Local Authority interview 5). 
The aesthetics associated with low-carbon energy production and buildings energy 
efficiency interventions do not marry with the primary purpose of the BBNPA. Low-
carbon developments whether energy production or efficiency are permitted as long as 
their presence is visually discrete and doesn’t adversely affect wildlife habitats. This 
results in low-carbon interventions being restricted in scale and technology type. In some 
instances, for example in the case of listed buildings, interventions may not be permitted 
at all. The need for installations to be visually discrete can also increase their cost, for 
example, should external wall insulation not be permitted, installation of internal wall 
insulation may be sought as an alternative, however, this costs on average £6,500 more 
in addition to being highly disruptive to the building’s occupants (see Table 6.4 for home 
insulation costs). Thus, conforming to Park planning can increase the cost of low-carbon 
transition. As low-carbon transition costs can already be prohibitive to some, further 
increases limits further the range of domestic actors able to take it forward.  
Further, low-carbon transition is driven in part by the need to conserve existing 
environments by limiting the effects of climate change. This is a key concern for the 
BBNPA, indeed all national parks, where conserving landscape and habitats is their main 
priority. The effects of climate change are likely to see summer temperatures increasing, 
summer precipitation decreasing and winter precipitation increasing (BBNPA 2009). The 
169 
 
effects of climate change are already present within the BBNP. Coupled with factors such 
as; air pollution and acid rain, nitrate deposition, declines in upland cattle grazing and 
aging of farming populations, climate change has led to 55% of the Parks biological Sites 
of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs) suffering unfavourable condition (BBNPA 2009). 
Biological SSSI’s include areas of peatland, considered highly important for their global 
rarity (and decline), ability to store carbon, filter water and aid river management. 
However, the environment needed to sustain peatland is especially vulnerable to climate 
changes, posing wider impacts on carbon emissions and water supply to South Wales.  
Table 6.4. Domestic insulation types, economic cost and savings. 
Insulation Type Detached   Semi-
Detached 
Terrace Flat 
Cavity Cost (£) 725 475 370 330 
Annual saving (£) 245 145 90 70 




13,000 13,000 No estimates 
available 




7,400 7,400 No estimates 
available 
Annual Saving (£) 
(either internal or 
external wall) 
415 250 155 155 
*Cost and savings for internal and external wall insulation vary on size of building and amount of 
insulation installed (in the case of internal insulation single rooms can be completed at a time and in the 
case of external insulation part of buildings can be completed at a time). 
Source: Energy Saving Trust (2018a; 2018b); Which? (2019) 
 
Additionally, increased instances of flooding have been predicted in some areas of the 
Park, affected by summer droughts and heavy winter precipitation (BBNPA 2019). 
Indeed, these predictions may already be evident as the effects of Storm Callum in 2018 
demonstrated, flooding many areas including parts of Brecon and the village Crickhowell, 
and causing landslides in other parts of the Park (BBC 2018b; Edwards 2018). As 
sourcing energy from low-carbon sources and reducing energy consumption via increased 
energy efficiencies form part of wider measures to address climate change, through 
limiting where and who can take up low-carbon transition within the Park, the BBNPA is 
inadvertently hindering the uptake of such interventions. Thus, is also inadvertently 
working against its core purpose of conserving and enhancing the natural beauty and 
wildlife in the Park. While some low-carbon interventions may not blend with the current 
aesthetic of the Park environment, in the longer term they will actually contribute to wider 
efforts that help to conserve the same environment.  
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A second perception of political peripheralization for interviewees was identified as the 
BBNPA’s second purpose - promote opportunities for the understanding and enjoyment 
of the Park – which is interpreted as encouraging tourism. This perception was most 
pronounced in interviews with businesses, but also with some households where 
discontent with the BBNPA was noted. Interviewees noted that the priority given to the 
Parks tourism economy by the BBNPA took president over their wellbeing, and in some 
instances to their detriment, whereby “the countryside is becoming a place for living, not 
for making a living” (Lowenthal 1997 cited by Antrop 2005, p. 30).  
They are all for tourists, they are not for the local people, I think they see 
local people as a nuisance. We are neglected. They are supposed to support 
the social and economics of the local communities, and they don’t…. 
[tourists] are more of a drain on the local area than an asset (Business 
interview 5). 
This is in alignment with views that “landscape and rural life are becoming ominously 
disjoined” (Lowenthal 1997 cited by Antrop 2005, p. 30) whereby rural life, as the means 
of creating and managing the landscape are not recognised as such. In the BBNP, 
agriculture utilises 85% land area and is recognised as an “important influence upon the 
national parks’ landscape and wildlife”, occupying “a vital social and economic role 
within the local area” (Nathan Litchfield & Partners 2012, p.107). Many argue that 
without the land management provided as an outcome of agricultural activities the BBNP 
would not have the same visual appearance or levels of biodiversity which would likely 
have negative impacts on both its first core purpose and the tourism industry (BBNPA 
2010). Indeed, the agriculture sector is regarded as playing a vital role within Wales as a 
whole:  
With 83% of Wales’ land surface being managed for farming and 14% for 
forestry, a separation between the management regimes for ‘environment’ 
and ‘agriculture’ is at best artificial. A crisis in Welsh farming would pose 
huge risks for maintaining the environmental resources of Wales. The 
countryside and coastline are essential to the heart of Wales and an asset for 
all our people. (Welsh Government 2017d, p. 21) 
Thus, national parks’ core purposes; first to conserve the landscape (and associated 
habitats and culture) and second to encourage its public use, result in the well-being of 
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people living and working within them, is assigned to a subordinate ‘duty’, placed below 
the first two ‘purposes’ in priority. Here lays a conflict between the wants and rights of 
the wider nation and visitors to national parks with lived experiences of the rural 
communities who inhabit them. Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly some inhabitants feel 
marginalised by the BBNPA. 
This conflict was recognised in a recent Review of Designated Landscapes in Wales 
(Marsden et al. 2015) where, amongst other recommendations, it was recommended that 
national park’s duty was promoted to a purpose. That purpose would focus on sustainable 
resource management and “promote sustainable forms of economic and community 
development based on the management of natural resources and the cultural heritage of 
the area” (Marsden et al. 2015, p. 11). However, after consideration the Welsh 
Government decided against this as National Park Authorities “have a particular 
opportunity to help realise the economic potential of their communities and to exemplify 
and promote green growth. There is no barrier to them doing so within the remit of their 
existing purpose” (Welsh Government 2018b). As such, community needs within the 
BBNP will remain a secondary priority. 
Political peripheralization for communities within the park has very different 
manifestations of energy justice and energy vulnerability than areas outside of it. Strict 
planning controls means that communities are somewhat protected from the negative 
impacts of larger scale commercial developments that are purposely positioned 
elsewhere. However, the same planning controls mean that community needs, including 
the need to mitigate energy vulnerabilities via energy production or increased energy 
efficiency can be obtrusive. Considering the perspectives of both communities within and 
outside of the Park, both are limited in what low-carbon developments they can pursue 
themselves, at all scales, including some energy efficiency interventions. These 
limitations create energy vulnerabilities and are a form of energy injustice. 
Within and without the BBNP, low-carbon transition has provided the means for some 
public services and community assets to increase their economic viability by reducing 
running costs on public buildings and/or producing an income. This offers some 
protection against area decline and ongoing public spending reductions for services and 
local amenities. Community assets, such as community centres, are important for 
community cohesion and social inclusion, perhaps especially so in peripheral places that 
have little alternative for social activities. In some instances, these public assets can be 
172 
 
transferred to the communities, whereby, the community will take over ownership and 
maintenance of the asset. The Local Authorities assist communities where possible, but 
the process can still be difficult for communities to navigate. Communities within the 
BBNP may be better positioned to counteract some aspects of peripherality as the BBNPA 
employs a Sustainable Communities Team who as well as managing a Sustainable 
Development Funding (SDF), also assist communities within the Park with the Asset 
Transfer process. Part of the process involves the creation of management plans and 
demonstration of economic viability of the asset for the community. One way of making 
an asset, economically viable is to limit where possible its running costs (see Figure 6.7). 
Figure 6.7. Community based low-carbon transition 
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The BBNPA SDF is available for a variety of uses and can be applied for by communities 
and organisations in the Park for development and demonstrator projects that contribute 
towards more sustainable ways of living. For 2018/19 five main project areas have been 
identified as Energy, Business, Natural and Built Heritage, Rural Transport Solutions and 
Health and Wellbeing (BBNP 2018). The funds are made available in grant form to 
groups and projects that can demonstrate social, economic, environmental benefit to the 
Park. Projects supported by the fund counteract peripherality in the park in various ways, 
either through sustaining community assets, resources and services; making community 
buildings more efficient to run and therefore more likely to remain open; providing 
alternative training and employment for people. 
We always emphasise the added value of the sustainable development fund, 
we emphasise that it’s not just spending £200,000, it’s about levering in 
funding, so typically we’ll lever in 4 or 5 times that. So, although you’re 
spending £200,000, the benefit to the area is £1 million (BBNPA interview 
4). 
 
While these outcomes can indirectly reduce situations of energy vulnerability, some do 
so more directly. Possibly one of the most impactful projects on energy vulnerability that 
the SDF and BBNPA have supported is the creation of The Green Valleys (TGV). TGV 
was established in 2009 as a community support organisation, assisting communities in 
organising themselves, finding funding and planning and delivering projects that 
benefited the environment. After two BBNPA employees successfully won the NESTA 
(National Endowment for Science Technology and the Arts) Big Green Challenge 
competition, the prize money awarded funded an initial demonstrator project focusing on 
social, economic and environmental aspects of climate change. This took the form of 
TGV, which was further supported by the BBNPA with £20,000 SDF grant and the 
allocation of one BBNPA staff member for a year.  
We emphasise the seed corn funding idea so there are a lot of projects we have 
funded, £20-30,000 as a first phase pilot whatever, but then they go on to get 
something much bigger, more substantial external funding. So, it’s a sort of small 
investment to start with (BBNPA interview 4). 
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The organisation is a good example of the ‘seed corn funding’ approach the BBNPA 
adopts where it has grown to branch into a business TGV Hydro which also assisted 
private projects and businesses in developing micro-hydro projects. Both organisations 
are still running today and have assisted other communities and landowners in increasing 
energy efficiency and/or developing energy production. Additionally, as a CIC all profits 
from TGV go back to its member communities to further assist in environmental projects. 
Thus, income generated from low-carbon energy production offers community groups, 
within and without the Park, an opportunity to direct spend on areas that meets specific 
local needs, whether that is further low-carbon measures, social inclusion or transport 
poverty. 
 
6.5  Conclusion 
At national scale, interviewees identified a lack of synergy in energy policies of Welsh 
and UK Governments which appeared problematic for Welsh ambition as it can require 
approval and/or assistance from the UK Government. This relationship epitomises key 
core-periphery dynamics, whereby Welsh (or peripheral) autonomy is limited as key 
policy levers are retained by UK Government (distant core authority). As with core-
periphery dynamics, decisions taken by the UK core may not have the best interests of 
the Welsh periphery in mind (Schneider & Ingram 1993; Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013). 
Political peripheralization and misrecognition can directly impact energy vulnerabilities. 
At a regional scale, political peripheralization restricts ability of the periphery to harness 
indigenous energy resources - in ways that is most acceptable to the periphery and to the 
benefit of the periphery. The lack of Welsh Government influence over SBTL and Wylfa 
Newydd Nuclear development decisions epitomise this dynamic. Additionally, despite 
being a net exporter of electricity in the UK (Welsh Government 2017a; 2018a) Welsh 
regions experiences higher domestic electricity and gas costs compared to most other UK 
regions (The House of Commons Library 2017). This resonates with the three tenants of 
energy injustice whereby Wales is unrecognised in decision making processes, so 
decisions are made in others’ best interests and the costs of such decisions are experienced 
in Wales while the benefits are experienced elsewhere. This holds implications for 
national-scale energy vulnerability as without autonomy to control its energy sources, 
Wales’ security of supply or access to energy, and energy affordability is precarious.  
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Political peripherality was also experienced within Wales, indicating that even though 
occupying a peripheral position at a national scale, similar core-periphery dynamics 
regarding political decision making are maintained at a lower regional scales. The effects 
of peripheralization were felt most readily by interviewees in terms of public spending or 
more accurately where spending cuts may occur. Consequently, perceptions from the 
periphery are that Welsh Government priorities are centrally focused, as opposed to 
equally spread across core and peripheral regions. Further intensifying this perception is 
that peripheral-rural budgets must stretch across large geographic areas, increasing staff 
travel times and constraining actual work time, limiting budget effectiveness. 
Furthermore, strategic application of funding and staffing resource using area-based 
measures can result in peripheries being miss-recognised as less-disadvantaged and thus, 
in less need of assistance. This is exacerbated by continued decreasing funding levels 
which force strategic decisions to be made that benefits the most people as opposed to 
those who need it most. Accordingly, sparsely populated peripheries are less likely to be 
chosen for such measures. In terms of energy vulnerability this can have direct outcomes 
as fuel poverty interventions are directed at the same, mostly urban areas, to the detriment 
of peripheral rural areas that are frequently overlooked. Peripheral households are left 
without assistance in increasing energy efficiency, changing energy source and increasing 
energy affordability, ultimately more easily meeting energy needs. 
While all the above issues were identified both within and outside of the BBNP, additional 
governance arrangements in place to manage the Park add a further dimension to political 
peripheralization and misrecognition. Political peripheralization within the park was 
evident by perceptions of communities, businesses and non-BBNPA governance 
organisations that community needs were marginalised first due to environmental 
protections and second through emphasis placed on tourism activities. This manifest in 
difficult to navigate, stricter and more expensive planning processes. In terms of energy 
vulnerabilities, increased complexity and costs mean that low-carbon energy transition 
within the Park will be limited to those able to navigate the planning process and afford 
additional expenses. Misrecognition was experienced in the park very similarly to areas 
outside of the Park, especially when area-based tools are used to allocate spending. 
However, the prestige associated with the Park in addition to the focus on tourism can 
exacerbate this issue by increasing living costs, abilities to afford to buy homes and 
altering demographics so that lower-income households are further dispersed and thus 
harder to recognise and benefit from low-carbon interventions. 
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Chapter 7. Peripheral economies, infrastructures and living costs: 
Embedded energy vulnerabilities and disparate 
transition opportunities 
7.1 Introduction  
A key element of peripheral disadvantage is an absence of agglomerative advantage 
relative to cores (Copus 2001). Businesses tend to be smaller, consisting mostly of self-
employed/sole-traders or Small Medium Enterprises (SME’s). Additionally, dominant 
employment sectors within the sparsest of settings, such as tourism and agriculture 
typically hold irregular and low-paid opportunities - contradicting impressions of rural 
areas as being broadly affluent, or at the very least, not economically deprived. High 
levels of employment in unsecure, seasonal or low-paid work implies that energy 
affordability may be compromised all or part of the time and that energy needs may not 
be met. Within the context of the BBNP, the influence of governance can encourage the 
development of these employment sectors.  
To gain more-skilled employment or higher wages some commute out of the periphery. 
Additionally, distance between peripheral settlements means even those who are not 
employed, still require vehicular transportation. Poor peripheral public transport networks 
necessitate a heavy reliance on personal vehicles or ‘forced car ownership’. As such, 
commuting incurs a penalty in the form of travelling time and costs, reducing what may 
already be a small household disposable income. Adding to the financial cost of 
peripheral living is the high cost of energy. In peripheries this is attributed to higher 
administrative and distribution costs for mains sources and higher fuel and distribution 
costs for traditional non-mains sources. Traditional non-mains energy sources such as oil 
and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) which are more expensive than mains supplies are 
utilised where there is no access to gas mains. This is a particular historical problematic 
of peripheries which persists as they do not have population levels to make mains 
extension economically viable. Traditional non-mains sources hold additional 
vulnerabilities due to the need for manual monitoring of energy supply and ordering, with 
vehicular delivery that is vulnerability to adverse weather conditions.  
Such precarious access to energy supplies has encouraged some homes to adopt energy 
practices, such as the installation of solid fuel heating equipment which offer more secure 
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energy supplies but can often incur a high financial cost. Combined with this, high 
numbers of traditional solid stone buildings, which are hard to heat, hard to keep warm 
and hard to insulate means that many households are required to consume more energy 
to attain a comfortable heat. These characteristics hold direct impacts on energy 
vulnerability drivers such as, access, affordability, flexibility, energy efficiency and 
needs.  
So peripheral households can experience lower incomes combined with a greater strain 
on their incomes due to travel costs, high energy costs and the need to consume excessive 
energy to warm inefficient homes. These additional peripheral living costs are rarely 
considered in analysis of income or deprivation. Such costs and priorities interplay with 
energy needs, impacting energy consumption. However, combined with these peripheral 
specific issues are more general influences of payment type and housing tenure, both of 
which impact energy price and ability to choose energy sources or modify energy 
efficiencies. Such additional influences can further compound peripheral energy 
vulnerabilities. 
Low-carbon transition has been harnessed by some businesses to stabilize and increase 
reliability of income, allowing for re-investment or increased working hours for 
employees. Likewise, for households, it has been harnessed to directly counter elements 
of energy vulnerability, where production can secure income, secure access to energy and 
make it more affordable. However, there are some risks involved in transition if carried 
out incorrectly for businesses, households and the public sector whereby additional costs 
can be incurred. Additionally, low-carbon transition is inaccessible for some, the high 
cost of peripheral living combined with high cost of transition placing it out of reach 
despite ambition.  
This chapter unpacks these interwoven aspects of peripherality, energy vulnerability and 
transition. Focus is first placed in peripheral economies and incomes followed by 
explanations for the necessity of personal transport. Following this peripheral energy 
infrastructures are explored, highlighting restrictive access, weak structure and additional 
costs associated with it. Finally, the influence of peripheral housing stock type and energy 
efficiency on energy vulnerabilities is highlighted, linking the combined influence of this 
with energy consumption and high energy prices. This last section also briefly explores 
the influence of housing tenure on abilities to alter such living conditions and thus energy 
vulnerabilities. Within each section links are made with low-carbon energy transition and 
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how this is utilised to counteract energy vulnerabilities, but also where it is unobtainable 
for some.  
 
7.2 Peripheral economy and income: Unaffordable energy and 
transition?  
As detailed in Chapter 4, Wales’s economic outputs are the lowest per capita out of all 
UK countries. This economic peripherality is also evident at an EU scale where Wales is 
also one of its weakest economies (Eurostat 2017). Within Wales the highest levels of 
GVA are in the South-East, urban Local Authority areas of Cardiff and the Vale of 
Glamorgan, while the lowest are in the rural West, mid-Wales, and post-industrial 
southern Valleys (Figure 7.1). This pattern of GVA distribution has remained stable for 
decades (National Assembly for Wales 2018a). Areas with higher levels of GVA are 
predominantly larger urban agglomerations, which concentrate employment, capital and 
value production.  
 
Figure 7.1. Welsh gross value added (GVA) per head for NUTS3 local areas, 1998 to 2016. 




Narrowing focus further, while GVA data is unavailable at Park level, considering GVA 
per capita with population levels within the Park a rough estimate of the GVA per capita 
at Park level can be gained. The seven33 Local Authority areas overlaid by the Park hold 
a mix between some of the highest and lowest levels of total GVA and GVA per capita 
in Wales, and a mix of rural and urban areas (although in terms of land area and park 
population are predominantly rural). As Table 7.1 indicates GVA within the Park 
boundary is higher relative to the Local Authorities it overlays and BBNPA GVA per 
capita is mid-range compared to all Welsh Local Authorities. 
This may be in part attributed to national park designations as all national parks are 
credited with having economic benefits for their local areas (Annett et al. 2006) attributed 
to four main areas: tourism economy, increased employment for Park management and 
tourist services, government funding and increased ability to draw on more funding and 
increased property prices (Annett et al. 2006). In 2013 the three Welsh national parks 
contributed “£557m of GVA, representing 1.2% of the Welsh Economy” (BBNPA 2014, 
p. 76). The tourism economy is broadly regarded as a key industry for rural areas where 
GVA is below those of urban areas (The House of Commons Library 2017). In the BBNP, 
the tourism economy is worth around £206m and includes around 4.1 million visitors per 
year (BBNPA 2014). While an important industry for the economy of the Park, it also 
directly links to the BBNPA core purposes and is one of the ways that the economic 
impact of national parks is measured.  
Table 7.1. Local Authorities within the BBNP boundary GVA and relative rank in Wales. 
Local Authority GVA in 2015 
(Million £) 
Total GVA 
Rank in Wales*  
GVA £ per 
capita (2016) 
Per Capita Rank 
in Wales* 
Blaenau Gwent 764 22 11640 22 
Carmarthenshire 2806 6 15774 19 
Merthyr Tydfil 915 21 16672 15 
Monmouthshire 1888 15 20861 4 
Powys 2251 11 17296 10 
Rhondda Cynon Taf 3663 3 16667 16 
Torfaen 1492 18 16875 13 
BBNPA - - 17933 9 
Adapted from: Office for National Statistics (2015 & 2017a) and BBNPA (2012) 
*Overall Local Authority Rank does not include BBNPA. Scores of 1 = highest GVA and 22 = lowest GVA.  
 
33 The Park also overlays the most northerly points of Caerphilly and Neath Port Talbot Local Authority 
areas, these are usually disregarded as combined they only cover 4 hectares of land and 0% of population 
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While such economic benefits are evident in the BBNP, they only form part of the picture 
of the Parks economy and taken at face value can be misleading. Some of the economic 
benefits associated with a ‘Park economy’ can manifest into disadvantage for residents 
by lowering incomes while increasing the cost of living. This in turn impacts upon 
economic resources available to purchase energy, creating situations of energy 
vulnerability.  
The ratio of employment across all industrial sectors in rural and urban areas is fairly 
similar, with Retail, Health, Manufacturing and Education employing the most people 
(Statistics for Wales 2015b). There are exceptions to this when considering the most 
sparsely populated areas, such as those within the Park. In such areas, Construction and 
Agriculture (10% and 9.8% of employment respectively) are larger employment sectors 
than Manufacturing (7.1%) (Statistics for Wales 2015b). Additionally, Construction, 
Agriculture and Hotel and Catering employ a higher percentage of people within the most 
sparsely populated areas than all other areas in Wales, however, even within these areas, 
they employ fewer than Retail, Health and Education (14%, 12.7% and 10.8% 
respectively) (Statistics for Wales 2015b). This suggests that in the most peripheral areas 
the dominant industries are Retail, Health, Education, Agriculture, Construction, 
Manufacturing and Hotel and Catering; with Agriculture, Construction and Hotel and 
Catering being more significant employers here than in more populated settings.  
The significance of these employers may explain in part the lower GVA in sparsely 
populated peripheral areas compared to more populated areas. The tourism sector, where 
the Hotel and Catering and perhaps to a lesser extent Retail industrial sector are key 
employers, is regarded as “commonly seasonal, part-time, low skilled and highly 
feminized, with limited opportunities for promotions or pay rises” (Zampoukos and 
Ioannides 2011, p. 27). The construction industry in the UK has the highest levels of self-
employment than any other industry sectors (Office for National Statistics 2017b). While 
usually an “indicator of enterprise”, self-employment can offer precarious income 
revenue and inadequate pensions (Public Policy Institute for Wales 2016, p. 16; in the 
UK as a whole around half of self-employed jobs are low-paid (Lloyd undated). Finally, 
wages in the agricultural industry can be low and as with tourism can also be seasonal. In 
Wales net farm income is on average around £17,000 per year (Allen et al. 2014 cited in 
National Institute for Economic and Social Research 2017, p. 6) with many farms relying 
on subsidies for up to 100% of their income.  
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Rural economic structures can create employment in casual or seasonal, lower skilled and 
lower paid roles (Public Policy Institute for Wales 2016). Poverty rates for part-time rural 
workers are above national averages (Public Policy Institute for Wales 2016) with part-
time employment generally being lower paid than full-time employment. In addition, 
overall employment rates can exceed GVA produced due to increased levels of labour 
working fewer hours within such jobs (Office for National Statistics 2018b) and/or due 
to industries in the area being primary producers in the supply chain and thus generating 
less value for produce. This research found that the limitations of a peripheral economy 
were noted or experienced by many of the interviewees from all interview groups, who 
commented on limited employment opportunities and a propensity of low waged and low 
skilled employment within rural peripheries; 
The average wage in rural areas around here is £17-18,000.00 if that, if 
the youngsters get their degree… not everyone does (Business interview 
7).  
 
There’re no opportunities for people […] You could get a high-skilled job 
if you got one in Neath or Swansea but the travel time, it would cost [...] I 
feel people who were born up here and have lived up here their whole life 
are not skilled: they don’t have the money to invest in a car. And even if 
they did, what job would they get? I feel like they are just stuck in a rut 
(Rachel, private tenant, aged 20-29). 
Other research in Wales has demonstrated that in-work poverty, whereby part or all the 
adults in a household are working but are still achieving less than 60% of the national 
median income, is most prevalent in rural areas (Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2013; 
National Assembly for Wales 2018b). Those in work may be suffering from in-work 
poverty due to the low wages associated with many rural jobs (Public Policy Institute for 
Wales 2016), these are typically in retail and hospitality sectors (46%) and education, 
health and social work (20%) (Lloyd undated). As Figure 7.2 demonstrates rural areas 
hold some of the highest proportion of jobs that are lower than the Real Living Wage34.  
 
34 The Real Living Wage is based on the cost of a basket of goods and services needed by people in the 
UK. It is created by The Living Wage Foundation. Currently the National Living Wage is £7.83 while the 




Figure 7.2. Percentage of jobs lower than the applicable Living Wage Foundation living wage.  
Source: National Assembly for Wales (2018b)  
Rural areas of Wales also have low levels of income deprivation, this appears to contradict 
the dominant industry types and the wages offered. Other research has demonstrated that 
within rural Wales there are high numbers of people who are self-employed or who are 
employed and work from home, additionally there are high proportions of employed 
people in higher managerial and professional jobs (Office for National Statistics 2012). 
Taking employment and income data together suggests that within rural peripheries there 
is an income or wealth gap between those in lower paid, unreliable, part time roles and 
those in higher paid professional jobs. This corresponds with commuting data that 
suggests rural Local Authorities in Wales have lowest levels of in and out commutes for 
work - the highest percentage of out-commuting is 29% in rural Local Authorities and in-
commuting is 22% (Stats Wales 2017c). This compares lower than non-rural Local 
Authorities where the in-commuting is 52% and out-commuting is 51% (Stats Wales 
2017c). This suggests that household income and GVA for rural Local Authorities is a 
more accurate reflection of incomes and value added within the area. Finally, income 
deprivation measures themselves can be misleading as they do not account for the true 
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cost of rural living, thus while incomes may appear high, after the cost of living are 
deducted, they may become much lower.  
Low-carbon transition can offer a means of supplementing peripheral income via 
reducing outgoing energy costs by reducing energy consumption and/or generating an 
income.  
I genuinely feel since having the solar panels we don’t spend as much on oil…. 
We both work from home. I’ve got two computers on all the time. I’ve got the 
telly on; the lights are on. In the summer, we’ll get back per month about £200 
on top of our free electricity (Lydia, homeowner, aged 45-64). 
Domestic energy production offers households opportunity to reduce their energy bills 
indefinitely and a secure income for at least 20 years. Thus low-carbon transition was 
viewed by many of the household interviewees as a long-term investment. This 
investment was mostly taken up by households who planned to remain in their current 
property long term and who were generally in an older age group currently retired or with 
plans to retire in the near future. Income from energy production could then supplement 
a fixed pension income (whether private/public or both) in addition to reducing outgoings. 
We wanted to make sure we can manage […] because you never know when 
you’re going to die you don’t know quite how long you’ve got to plan for. You 
also don’t know how decrepit you’re going to become […] it’s a tricky 
balancing act (Leon, homeowner, aged 65 – 74). 
The economic benefit of low-carbon transition was recognised in all interview groups. 
However, of those who had installed low-carbon measures, their motivations were 
multiple: around environmental concerns; an opportunity to reduce bills; income 
generation; financial investment; and security of energy supply. In terms of energy 
vulnerability, these outcomes counteract certain drivers, for example, by increasing 
affordability, increasing access and security of supply and reducing consumption via 
increased energy efficiency. For many of the interviews these multiple outcomes were 
highly interlinked: 
Our priority is definitely triple bottom line. It’s equally environmental, social 




If you can reduce your bills, you use less energy so that’s better for the 
environment. So, it’s a win-win situation. But it’s not consciously, I didn’t do 
it for the planet, it was a consequence afterwards of me saving money (Kalvin, 
homeowner, aged 45-64). 
There were slight differences in the importance placed on each of these between interview 
group. Households, business and local governance institutions were more focused on the 
economic benefits, while community groups and experts related to this field had an overall 
stronger environmental focus but still needed to ensure that their costs were covered. 
Our main purpose has always been to deliver renewable energy and that’s 
what we’re going to end up doing… because the people who invested in our 
cooperatives, invested on the basis that they were investing in an ethical 
project, which I think for the most of them is the most important thing 
(Community group interview 4). 
 
Low-carbon transition can offer increased economic viability for small-scale businesses 
(Small, Medium Enterprises [SMEs] including farms and/or self-employed) which are 
more common in rural areas. It can secure an income that is reliable for 20-25 years, 
perhaps evening-out seasonal income troughs experienced in some agricultural and 
tourism businesses. It can also offer reductions in energy bills, as some of the energy 
produced can be utilised by the business itself. Additional income and bill reduction allow 
investment in other business opportunities, increased employment or increase staff hours, 
re-investment in further renewables or overall an increased chance to take financial risks 






Figure 7.3. Low-carbon measures as a means of securing supply and increasing business viability 
For small businesses run by just one or two people, taking time off due to ill-health or 
just for annual leave can be problematic as it can mean a break in income supply. Low-
carbon energy production has been used by some to ensure that in these instances there is 
still some income being generated (Figure 7.4). Additionally, some industrial sectors are 
high energy consumers, thus, producing their own energy instead of purchasing it can be 
a substantial economic saving: 
If you look at our dairy sector, it’s really struggling. Their biggest cost is 
electricity, for heating and cooling water […] If you talk to our neighbours, 
they’ve got a dairy farm up the road and their electricity bill is about £1000 
a month, and they’re really efficient. A lot of places would spend a lot more 
than that. Through investment in renewables, if they weren’t paying for that 
electric, they suddenly become more viable. It means they can actually sustain 
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a living there on a smaller unit. The whole rural economy could be really 
helped out by that I think (Expert interview 1). 
 
 
Figure 7.4. Farm based micro-hydro offering security of supply and security of income. 
However, low-carbon transition can also represent a risk, this is due to difficulties in 
gaining advice and information regarding different renewable technologies and reliance 
on non-local and therefore relatively unknown and dubious contractors combined with 




Figure 7.5. Low-carbon installation financial risk and cost for an SME. 
There can also be risks when it comes to gaining planning permission for some production 
technologies, as feasibility studies must be conducted prior to planning consent being 
gained. If consent is not given then the cost of the feasibility studies would have been 
incurred for no reason. While this is predominantly a risk for businesses, public sector 
and third sector who are more likely to develop larger scale energy production, the risk 
can remain for some households.  
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A hydro scheme might cost £100,000 to build, then yes up to £10,000 or more 
can be spent […] I mean people can’t afford it, so you go to a farmer and say 
‘it will probably take you twenty years to get your money back, oh and by the 
way it’s going to cost you £10-12,000 to find whether it’s feasible […] And 
the answer to that [planning] question might be ‘no’ and then you can’t get 
your £12,000 back, do you want to go ahead?’ (Expert interview 8). 
At a domestic scale, the relative high cost of transition, combined with an already high 
cost of living, due in large part to ‘car-related economic stress’ and the cost of domestic 
energy35, meant for some it was not possible. It is interesting that of the homes who didn’t 
have renewable energy production but that aspired to do so, as they appreciated that it 
could be cost saving, were in lower age ranges and had commutes to employment. This 
suggests that while low-carbon transition can offer economic benefits to households, it is 
also economically unobtainable for some: 
If I had money, I would change [the oil heating system]. But again, we are 
still limited to what we can heat our house with. Like you can get those 
biomass burners and we looked into that as well, because you can get a bit of 
income with that. But, again, the initial layout would have been thousands to 
get the return (Joan, homeowner, aged 45-54). 
 
7.3 The necessity of personal transport: A periphery-specific 
energy need  
Scarcity of employment and services in addition to population sparsity and spread means 
vehicular transportation is perceived as a necessity for living in a periphery (Public Policy 
Institute for Wales 2016). However, this can be challenging in peripheries where travel 
networks are poor and travel by any mode can take longer and cost more (Moles & 
Radcliffe 2011). In Wales, road and rail transport networks are poorer than in other parts 
of the UK, for example, Figure 7.6 demonstrates that many areas of Wales have travel 
times of 1 hour or more to reach main settlements compared to that of England and to a 
lesser extent Scotland. The Welsh Government has limited ability in altering this36. 
 
35 See sections 7.3 and 7.4 for further transport-cost discussion 
36 See Chapter 4 for outline of Welsh Government transport devolution. 
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Additionally, public transport costs within Wales are higher than UK averages (see Figure 
7.7), with equivalent travel distances via bus costing three times more than via car (The 
TAS Partnership Limited 2015). 
 
Figure 7.6. UK & Wales travel distances achievable within 1 hour (by car). 
Source: Cooper et al. (2016) 
 
 
Figure 7.7. Index of UK retail prices and cost of transport in Wales. 
Source: Welsh Assembly Government (2008) 
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Within Wales transport infrastructure is also unevenly spread, the most numerous and 
well-connected transport links are those of the urban areas mostly in the South, which is 
the only part of Wales with a motorway. Even if just considering transport using personal 
vehicles by road, rural road networks create longer travel times than those in urban areas 
(Figure 7.6). 
Bus services in the UK have been de-regulated since the passing of the Transport Act 
1985. As many bus routes in rural areas are economically unviable, Local Authorities 
have subsidised such routes (Disney 2016). In 2017/18, 82% of Welsh Local Authorities 
reduced or spent nothing on bus service provision, of the four who increased their 
spending, three were rural Authorities (Ceredigion, Pembrokeshire and Powys) 
(Campaign for Better Transport 2018). While this is perhaps an indication of the 
recognition of the importance of bus services to rural areas, it comes after seven years of 
reduced bus funding by all Local Authorities, resulting in 259 Welsh bus services being 
reduced, altered or withdrawn (Campaign for Better Transport 2018). For approximately 
5 of the households interviewed, there was no public transport available in their area at 
all. Of the interviewed households, 92% noted local public transport was infrequent and 
not at times suitable for access to work. All bar 3 households cited personal transport as 
an essential part of peripheral living. This is in line with wider research that suggests lack 
of public transport services can lead to “forced car ownership” (Currie & Senbergs 2007, 
p. 1). This can result in ‘car-related economic stress’ and “transport poverty” (Mattioli et 
al. 2017, p. 95) especially for households that may already be socio-economically 
disadvantaged: 
There aren’t even any buses, not a single one. I would say really the biggest 
energy issue for rural communities is transport, it’s an energy issue and a 
social issue. It’s the same in any rural community if your children want any 
kind of social life which of course is essential, not to mention education and 
everything else. There is no public transport at all (Jill, homeowner, aged 45-
64). 
 
They are just having to pay for transport to get to ordinary facilities that 
for [urban areas] are accessible on foot or on relatively inexpensive 
travel. They’re having to keep a car on the road to access schools, after 
school activities, leisure facilities and of course work, which, sometimes 
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it’s to access reasonably well-paid work, but sometimes it’s just to access 
poorly paid work, a car is essential for a lot of people (BBNPA interview 
4). 
The BBNPA recognises that transport is a major issue for its communities, but it has no 
authority over public transport provision, as such it is limited in addressing this issue 
within its purposes. While some efforts have been made to provide public transport 
services such as bus services, these often prioritise tourism activities and times of use 
(weekends), and therefore may be limited in benefit to communities and usual commuting 
times. 
It was also noted that juggling multiple personal responsibilities such as caring 
responsibilities or hospital appointments singularly or in combination with employment 
commitments meant public transport was not a viable option. Additionally, public 
transport seems especially hard to negotiate if in ill health, disabled or with dependents 
such as children: 
The most negative thing about living here is the lack of transport. I haven’t 
been on the buses for a long time, I don’t know if they would take the 
wheelchair, I’m a bit afraid of falling to be honest (Olive, social tenant, aged 
75+). 
 
If you’ve got a family, two or three children, your husband was out working 
and you needed things, you know, shopping, obviously you would shop more 
with families, it must be difficult then for them […] some people have to get 
back home for children or whatever, you can’t always depend then that the 
public transport is convenient. I think if they’re a carer or things like that 
there’s only a certain amount of time you can spend out of the house. Things 
like that could be awkward (Marie, homeowner, aged 65-74). 
Poor public transport networks increase the time taken to travel and can also have limited 
operational hours; this means that quite often they did not operate at times suitable for 
employment. Other research has demonstrated people who cannot drive or do not have 
personal transport may opt for low paid or unskilled jobs that are local in order to avoid 
trying to use public transport (Public Policy Institute for Wales 2016): 
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We have got a bus service at present that’s coming through but it’s not 
sufficiently regular for people really to use it for going to work, it’s difficult 
to work a full day’s work and get back and forth using the bus (Eliza, 
homeowner, aged 75+). 
 
How would I work if I didn’t have a car? There are no buses early enough for 
me to get there for 9 o’clock. There are no buses, I’d have to start walking, 
I’d have to walk there! (Rachel, private tenant, aged 15-29). 
Personal transport can be costly as households have to purchase a vehicle, pay annually 
for road tax, maintain the vehicle and buy fuel for it. These costs contribute to a higher 
cost of living in the periphery. While this is not unusual per say as recent surveys have 
found that in the UK a whole households spend the highest percentage of their disposable 
income on transport (Office for National Statistics 2019). Other studies have 
demonstrated that for rural areas this expense is notably higher (c.f. Smith et al. 2013) 
and that as many of the costs associated with vehicle ownership are fixed this expense 
disproportionately affects low-income households (Currie & Senbergs 2007; Chatterton 
et al. 2018) (see also Figure 7.8).  
 
Figure 7.8. Household vehicle expenditure to income. 
Source: Chatterton et al. (2018) 
One of the households interviewed was able to explain their vehicle fuel (for one of their 
cars) and their energy (mains electricity, solar thermal and LPG) expenditure per year, 
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with both costs averaging £1,200. However, this amount does not include vehicle 
maintenance costs or tax, which would increase the overall vehicle running costs in total 
higher than the domestic energy costs. While this is only a single measurable instance, 
and doesn’t account for lifestyle or commute, it is indicative of the relative costs between 
rural household energy and transport.  
The remoteness from core-urban areas also plays a role in creating situations of fuel 
vulnerability, as more constrained incomes, combined with vehicle running costs, 
contribute to a precarious ability to afford energy. Self-rationing of energy consumption 
is, for example, one of the consequences of the need to retain mobility (cf. Mattioli et al. 
2017 and Figure 7.14).  
 
7.4 Peripheral energy infrastructure: Precarious energy access, 
affordability and security of supply 
Energy infrastructure in the UK has traditionally developed as a centralised structure, thus 
as a physical periphery the energy infrastructure in Wales does not have the same network 
coverage as England (see Figure 7.9).  
 
Figure 7.9. Main gas and electricity network structure of the UK. 
Source: National Grid (2018)  
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Within Wales, the energy network and main power stations are usually located close to 
densely populated urban areas so that they may be used to their maximum potential and 
therefore maximum profit (Soja 2010). As per Figure 7.10, within Wales electricity grid 
access points and those points with existing capacity to take additional production are 
predominantly clustered in the south, with a large expanse of mid-Wales having few 
points. Not only do sparse networks indicate limited access to ‘mains’ energy supplies, 
but they also incur additional costs attributed gas and electricity accessed via the mains. 
In these instances, while not applicable to peripheries within Wales, Wales overall 
experiences some of the highest energy prices in the UK (see Figure 7.10) where most 
notably mains electricity costs are only higher in Northern Scotland and London (House 
of Commons Library 2017a; Ofgem 2015: 2019d). This is in the most part attributed to 
the distance of distribution along networks which requires more energy to be completed 
and is less efficient due to losses of energy as it travels (USwitch undated). In addition, 
economies of scale mean that areas of smaller populations incur higher costs as energy 
companies cannot buy in large quantities from generators and therefore negotiate overall 
lower prices (USwitch undated). Finally, costs are associated with consumption, so in 
places where there are high consumption levels, there are higher distribution costs 
(USwitch undated).  
 
Figure 7.10. Annual domestic bill for gas and electricity in 2018 across UK regions. 




Non-mains connection also impacts the price of energy, as alternative energy choices are 
limited and less competitively priced (Office of Fair Trading 2011). Approximately 46% 
of rural homes in Wales are still off-gas (compared to 34% in England and 32% in 
Scotland) (see Figure 7.11), most of these homes are heated using oil or LPG, which are 
priced higher than mains supplies (Citizens Advice 2017). Within the BBNP the number 
of off-gas homes rises further to 52% (BEIS 2015). Oil and LPG rely on households 
monitoring their own supply which is stored in an oil or gas tank (Figure 7.12) and 
ordering more prior to depleting the supply. While most (but not all) homes have access 
to electricity networks, electricity traditionally has not been widely used for heating due 




Figure 7.11. Welsh Electricity sub-station location 
and capacity. Adapted from: Western Power 
Distribution (2017) and Scottish Power Energy 
Networks (2017) 
Figure 7.12. Off-gas areas in Wales. 





Figure 7.13. Outdoor tank used for oil storage 
Source: Author 
Overall, many peripheral households are confined to the most expensive energy sources. 
54% of interviewed households highlighted their lack of choice over their heating source 
due to the undeveloped local infrastructure, resulting in higher cost for their energy: 
One of the additional costs of living in the countryside is that there is no gas, 
so that’s one less option we have. You can have a tank in the garden but you’re 
restricted with your supplier and the price (Business interview 5). 
 
We sort of were forced into LPG or oil because clearly were never going to 
get gas up here, so we were forced into that, but we minimise the use of that 
as much as we can (Melvin, homeowner, aged 65-74). 
This domestic perspective was supported by interviews with third sector, expert and local 
governance interview groups who also spoke not only of how limited choice of energy 
supply can ‘trap’ households in more expensive energy sources, but how that compounds 
vulnerabilities in rural areas by coinciding with poor energy efficient housing stock and 
low incomes: 
[If a home doesn’t] have access to mains gas so there’s two big problems 
with fuel poverty, one is obviously you’ve got to buy a different form of fuel, 
then your choices are limited. So, for example an oil system, you can’t 
change suppliers so readily, you might have one or two suppliers in your 
area. Or with LPG, I think there’s two suppliers in West Wales, Calor or 
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Flowgas. You’re getting tied to what the Monopolies Commission would say 
“oh, hang on, this is a sort of a cartel” you know that can fix prices and 
there’s no competition. But then the other thing is that you have to buy your 
fuel before you use it and you’ve got to buy it in bulk. We meet a lot of people 
who can’t get that £300 together to fill the tank. […] So, the budgeting is a 
big deal […] your choices are limited, you have to buy in bulk in any 
circumstances, then you’ve also got the sort of perfect storm of poor housing 
stock… And then you’ve got the wages. So those three things, it’s the low 
income, poor energy efficiency in the home and price of fuel (Expert 
interview 2). 
Combined high energy costs and high transport costs create a higher cost of living in 
peripheral places. This has also been recognised in other research such as that carried out 
by Smith et al. (2010b) (Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2. Additional weekly rural costs for 4 illustrative household types, compared with UK urban 


































Represents rural cost cash difference and % increase on corresponding urban budget (excluding housing 
costs and childcare) 
Source: Smith et al. (2010b, p. 8) 
Smith et al. (2010b) research, furthered by Smith et al. (2012) compared findings of the 
cost of living in rural homes with living in urban homes. They found, as the table 
demonstrates, that the financial costs of living in a rural home are higher than urban 
homes in all three of the different rural homes categorise they researched. Finding that 
the more remote the house, the higher the cost of living. So, a working age couple, with 
2 children would need to spend 12% more per week living in a rural town or 18% more 
per week living in a hamlet than urban counterparts. But when this is translated to income, 
in order to get the £72.20 needed living in a hamlet, they would have to earn an extra 
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£241 per week to account for income tax, national insurance and loss of tax credits. To 
reflect the difference in urban and rural living costs it is argued that an ‘Rural Minimum 
Income Standard’ should be set between 80-90% of the UK’s median household income, 
a difference of between 20-30%. 
Cost of living can be further increased for some, due to the use of ‘pre-payment meters’ 
which only allow energy in-flows to the homes once advance payment has been made. 
Prepayment meters are considered the most expensive method of paying for energy in the 
UK, costing a household on average between £260 to £320 per year more than other 
payment methods (Competition and Markets Authority 2016). This is because energy 
companies claim that the administrative costs for the service are more than alternative 
payment methods, while prepayment customers have a restricted choice of energy tariffs. 
Paying for energy they use in advance is done by applying credit to the meter either with 
coins or a top-up card/key; if the credit is depleted, the energy supply is switched off.  
There needs to be more regulation of the energy companies because they seem 
to play on those that can't afford particularly when you look at the cost of a 
top up card to what we can pay on direct debit. I think that's just absolute 
madness. In effect they're paying for their energy up front, the companies have 
got their money before they've even given it to them (Third Sector interview 
1). 
Wales has the highest numbers of prepayment meter customers in the UK, excluding 
Scotland (Ofgem 2017). While not a specific periphery issue, as pre-payment meters are 
installed in both rural and urban areas, their occurrence within peripheral places, where 
energy is already more expensive than other areas can make energy affordability 
precarious. 
Even though prepayment meters are more expensive, for some households they are a 
preferred option to keep control over their energy bill, i.e. as “a budgeting or lifestyle 
tool” (Citizens Advice 2014). However, they may be also forcefully installed by ‘warrant’ 
in households where energy debt has been accrued (Ofgem 2017). A warrant often incurs 
a further charge, on average £400 in the past (although it was capped at £150 in January 
2018). Combined with higher tariffs, this further indebts those households (Ofgem 2017). 
While prepayment meters are installed in both peripheral and non-peripheral homes, the 
high proportion of them in Wales indicates that there is a high proportion of homes over-
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paying for their energy and as such are in precarious affordability situations. Given the 
high numbers of households using expensive energy, either due to their energy source or 
payment method, combined with less energy efficient homes, personal energy needs and 
specific energy practices leading to increased energy consumption, accessing the energy 
needed can be very difficult. Households experiencing one or more of these situations are 
already energy vulnerable.  
Non-mains connection means security of supply can be problematic for a number of 
reasons. For example, it relies on households monitoring their consumption and ordering 
replenishment in good time and in some instances is highly dependent on the weather 
conditions and whether fuel deliveries can even reach the buildings: 
It is a real risk because we do prepare to be snowed in, because it could very 
easily happen. It’s a one-track road so I can’t imagine anyone is getting in 
whatsoever. So we do make sure we’ve got stuff in for the dogs and we’ve got 
a little gas burner so we won’t be relying on electricity […] In the winter you 
have to think of [oil deliveries] in advance because there’s no point letting 
your fuel run down and then they can’t get to you (Michael, homeowner, aged 
45-64). 
Poor electricity infrastructure in rural peripheries also means that those networks are also 
more likely to be adversely affected by extreme weather conditions such as snow. As 
Michaels comment highlights, for households in these places without mains gas supply 
consideration has to be given to alternative sources of both heat and electricity at these 
times. During February and March 2018, the UK experienced severe weather conditions 
due to “the Beast from the East” (National Energy Action 2018, p. 5). Red and Amber 
weather warnings were issues by the MET Office for snow and ice, with the highest levels 
of snow occurring in South Wales. Daytime temperatures fell as low as -4 °C and “some 
rural communities were entirely cut-off and had to receive supplies by helicopter” 
(National Energy Action 2018, p. 5).  
To counteract precarious energy supplies, some households adopt alternative practices, 
such as the installation of Rayburns, Agas and wood-burners. Rayburns and Agas are 
types of traditional cooking and heating systems that are more common to rural Wales 
and are also often seen as part of the character of rural living. They work on the principles 
of heat storage whereby they are run continuously by slow-burning fuel. Traditionally 
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they comprised ovens and hot plates and burned coal and wood, but later they were 
developed to use kerosene, diesel, biofuel, gas or electricity. While also adapted to heat 
household water, the Rayburn was later developed with central heating capabilities. Their 
use of solid fuels meant they were considered appropriate and efficient for homes without 
electricity and /or mains gas connection. However, the energy efficiency of such 
traditional range cookers is poor, using as much as 30 times the UK annual average for 
cooking (Lightfoot Energy Service 2018). Nevertheless, the high cost of changing to a 
new modern range cooker or alternative cooker and heating system can be prohibitive.  
 
Figure 7.14. Solid fuel Rayburn 
Source: Author 
Cultural practices also have impacts on energy consumption, reflected in how and why 
energy is used, or in the lack of knowledge how to use energy efficiently (Simcock & 
Petrova, 2017). Interviewees noted the energy practices specific to peripheral places that 
increase their energy demand. The use of range cookers continuously generates heat; 
householders typically reduce excessive temperatures by opening windows and doors. 
While this is not energy efficient, this is part of households’ larger strategies to cope with 
limited energy options and demonstrates how the “materiality of a home”, including the 
physiological contributions energy makes to such materiality, “shapes the lifestyles (and 
consequent energy consumption) of those who dwell within them” (Roberts & Henwood 
2019, p. 3):  
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I have oil for heating, a Rayburn, it’s the old type. It was put in about 
25 years ago, before that it was a coal one. We changed it as we were 
starting to struggle with coal, plus we often get power cuts in the winter, 
so I wanted it to work should we not have electricity. It’s probably not 
as efficient as the new ones it’s a two-burner and it’s either on or off. 
It’s not cheap to run, but it is warm all the time (Business interview 5). 
Choosing an energy source that would not be affected by power cuts is familiar to many 
households who sometimes have three or four sources of energy (see Figure 7.14). Most 
common is having electricity with either mains gas, oil or liquified petroleum gas (LPG) 
in addition to a wood-burner. This is the same even for households with domestic 
renewable energy production, whereby a wood-burner is retained either for comfort and 
ambiance or as a safety device should the main energy system fail. Wood-burners are also 
considered cost-efficient; many households have their own wood-supply or feel that 
purchasing extra wood is relatively low-cost. Of the households interviewed 24.3% had 
a wood-burner in addition to other energy sources. 
Access to mains networks or the lack of the same can have varying impacts on the 
economic viability of low-carbon transition. For example, lack of access to mains-gas 
network makes low-carbon heating more attractive. As low-carbon heat production is 
typically expensive to install, the Domestic Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) was initiated 
by the UK Government in 2014 to mitigate some of these costs37. While not limited to 
non-gas network homes, the scheme is particularly aimed at them, and is unlikely to be 
economical for homes with access to the gas mains. However, on comparison of RHI take 
up in Wales and the BBNP, only 1% of households in either had accessed the scheme 
(Ofgem 2019b). This could indicate low popularity overall either of the scheme itself or 
of renewable heat technologies which aside from solar thermal, require large space to 
house the equipment and high levels of building energy efficiency (Figure 7.15). Thus, 
there is little variation between Wales overall and rural Wales in RHI take up. 
 










Figure 7.16. Domestic Ground Source Heat Pump (GSHP) Condenser (left) 
and necessary plumbing (right) 
Source: Author 
Alternatively, households with access to the mains electricity grid can participate in the 
UK Government Feed-in-Tariff scheme (FIT)38 whereby payment is made to the producer 
for energy exported to the National Grid in addition to payments for energy generated 
even if consumed by the household itself. In this case, having access to mains electricity 
networks and producing electricity, as opposed to, or in addition to heat production, is of 
greater benefit. In comparing FIT take up in Wales and the BBNP, 20% of households in 
Wales and only 6% of household in BBNP had accessed the scheme (Ofgem 2019a). 
Compared to RHI, the FIT scheme has proven more popular overall. The difference in 
FIT up-take between BBNP and Wales is interesting and could be attributed to a number 
of factors.  In some instances electricity production is limited due to grid capacity so that 
even households with the ability to generate renewable energy can have the benefit of the 
export tariff restricted. In peripheral places, grid capacity can be restricted due to the 
limited numbers of grid sub-station or access points compared to numbers of consumers 
each access point serves. The socio-economic context of households in the Park may also 
influence abilities to afford low-carbon technology in the first instance. Additionally, 
there may be issues within the BBNP as to whether technologies are suitable within the 
conservation setting.  
Accessing the electricity grid can perhaps be more of an issue for larger scale 
developments such as those over 1 MW most typically taken on singularly or jointly by 
non-domestic actors such as communities, third sector, governance institutions and 
 
38 See Chapter 3, page 47 for details of FIT 
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commercial organisations. As highlighted in Figure 7.10 electricity grid access is most 
restricted in rural peripheries in Wales due to the weak coverage of the electricity 
network. To install new production in an area without grid connection, or with grid 
connection but no capacity to accommodate new production, incurs cost of installing 
network between the production and the grid.  
Part of the problem is the grid in mid-Wales is not great, certainly some parts 
of it. In south Powys, there were some [community] schemes that basically 
needed to upgrade the whole [electricity] line to enable any more 
connections, even for a very small hydro. It just meant that the project 
couldn’t happen […] It was just ridiculous, this 15 KW hydro had to develop 
£2,000,000,000 for the grid connection (Expert interview 3). 
The cost is levied to the proposed development, regardless of the development size or 
organisation (i.e. commercial or community). The grid up-grade will then benefit all 
developments that follow without having contributed to the cost. A number of expert 
interviewees discussed how these seemed unfair to small scale developments, such as 
those planned by communities, whereby the cost of any upgrades are beyond such groups 
and their small production size (MW) means that even if they could afford the cost, they 
would not generate enough income to re-coup it.  
In summary, poor energy infrastructures associated with rural peripheries are a result of 
continued concentration of investment in energy networks in core urban areas due to the 
demand by and economic benefits of population critical mass. Poor energy infrastructure 
in peripheries creates situations where energy cost, whether accessed from mains or 
alternative sources, are higher. Access to mains networks offers a relatively secure energy 
supply at lower cost, for those without mains network connection, access to energy can 
be more precarious as it depends on household monitoring of energy consumption and 
ordering re-fuel as opposed to being constantly supplied. This along with the higher cost 
associated with non-mains energy supplies means for many in the periphery energy access 
and affordability are more uncertain.  
Additionally, alternative energy supplies offer less competition, creating energy 
vulnerability in terms of energy flexibility. Finally, while mains energy in peripheries 
experiences higher frequencies of cut-off due to a combination of poor infrastructure and 
adverse weather conditions, due to the need to transport non-mains energy via road, it can 
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be at even higher risk of cut-off. In combination with this, older, harder to heat building 
stock, more common in peripheral places also has energy vulnerability implications 
whereby inefficiency can lead to the need to consume more energy to maintain thermal 
comfort, while building fabric can make increasing energy efficiency more difficult and/or 
more costly. 
Mains energy access plays an important role in the viability of low-carbon transition in 
the form of energy production. At smaller scales, poor energy access to the grid can make 
transition more attractive as low-carbon energy production in addition to some subsidies 
still available can be more cost-effective than remaining on traditional non-mains energy. 
However, at a larger scale non-grid access poses difficulties as without such access the 
higher levels of energy produced cannot be distributed and at present cannot be stored. 
Mains access in these instances is still needed, however upgrading the electricity grid to 
take new capacity or to physically meet the new production is very expensive, and so at 
present only the largest energy developments can afford such costs. 
 
7.5 Peripheral housing stock & tenure: Inescapable inefficiencies 
Building structure, size, age and state of repair influence how energy efficient a building 
is affecting the level of energy required to make a home comfortable and meet personal 
energy needs. The households interviewed lived in a range of building structures and 
included detached (40%), semi-detached (37%), terrace (14%) and flats (9%), of these 
57% were solid stone walls, 30% were brick and 19% were non-standard construction. 
Their homes also varied in age, from pre-1900, 1930-40, 1980 and post-1990; however, 
the majority were pre-1900 solid stonewall builds (54%), which are particularly difficult 




Figure 7.17. Row of stone-built terrace cottages (circa 1890s), most with external wall insulation 








Figure 7.19. Semi-detached stone and brick-built houses (circa 1900) with external rendering 
Source: Author 
Solid stone walled homes are also some of the most energy inefficient in the UK, holding 
30% of overall housing stock but responsible for 50% of domestic building carbon 
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emissions (Roberts & Henwood 2019). These types of domestic building are 
characteristic to peripheral areas in Wales; indeed, research has indicated that Wales has 
the lowest levels of energy efficient homes and highest levels of most energy inefficient 
homes in the UK (Staffell et al. 2018). As Figure 7.19 demonstrates within Wales, the 
highest levels of the most energy inefficient homes are within rural Local Authority areas. 
Scaling down further, in the BBNP 43% of homes are detached, 69% of homes were built 
pre-1900 and 34% have EPC ratings of D and below, compared to 38%, 28% and 31% in 
Wales respectively (BEIS 2015). As building structures, size, age and state of repair 
influence energy efficiency and levels of energy required to meet personal energy needs, 
this indicates that a high proportion of houses in rural peripheries, and in the BBNP in 
particular, are harder to heat and insulate than in other areas.  
We have a really high percentage of inefficient properties and a really low 
percentage of efficient properties… we’ve [also] got the highest number of 
off-gas properties in Powys (Local Authority interview 3). 
 
 
Figure 7.20. Percentage domestic EPC Bands F or G.  
Source: Centre for Sustainable Energy (2015) 
 
The house I was in before was a stone house and there was no insulation, just 
in the attic. I was spending a fortune on oil because there was no gas where I 
was living, I used to go to bed about half past seven in the winter because it 
was so cold no matter how many heaters I had on. And because I was on my 
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own, I couldn’t afford to have it running twenty-four hours (June, social 
tenant, aged 65-74). 
Physical building structure can also present an insurmountable obstacle for some 
households, meaning energy efficiency was limited or unachievable, and also making 
renewable energy production at a meaningful scale impossible. For example, the majority 
of owned households interviewed were in pre-1900 solid stone wall houses, in these 
instances loft insulation is the easiest and most cost-effective form of insulation. 
Reflecting this 95% of households interviewed had loft insulation, which is comparative 
to Wales at 91% (Stats Wales 2010). Additional insulation to walls can comprise cavity 
insulation where wall cavities are filled with insulation or internal or external cladding, 
where walls are covered with insulation blocks. For solid stone buildings, only cladding 
insulation is suitable as they do not have cavities. Internal cladding causes great disruption 
to households (Vadodaria et al. 2010) and requires re-decoration. External cladding 
changes the look of the exterior of a home, so restrictions apply as to whether it is 
permitted in national parks and conservation areas (Welsh Government 2013). 
Furthermore, insulation cladding of solid stone walls is controversial as in some instances 
it has worked against the building structure in increase dampness in the home “negatively 
affect[ing] occupant’s health and comfort” (Vadodaria et al. 2010). Again, suitability of 
wall insulation with building structure was reflected in the household interviews where 
approximately 48% had some form of wall insulation, which is also similar to Welsh 
statistics where 56% of homes have wall insulation (Stats Wales 2010)39. However, this 
figure is likely to be higher in reality, as cladding is not included in this statistic. 
It’s the mess that’s involved you know, one room out of use. Because, 
everything, the skirting boards got ripped up…carpet needs re-laying, it is, 
it’s a massive job (Sarah, homeowner, aged 65-74). 
Many domestic scale energy production options have specifications that contradict the 
building structure of people’s homes. For example, solar PV and solar thermal both 
require roof space or land that is not North facing to generate meaningful levels of energy 
(see Figure 7.19 for example of roof-mounted solar-PV) and both ASHPs and Ground-
Source Heat Pumps (GSHP) require space to hold the large condenser units (see Figure 
7.15). Of the nine households interviewed who had changed their energy system to 
 
39 Wales Stats does not include external or internal wall cladding as data unavailable 
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renewables or who had installed internal wall insulation five completed such works 
during other planned renovations or during periods away from the home to avoid lifestyle 
disruption.  
Recently you know, since I’ve been doing renovations it’s been more in the 
fore-front of your mind (Kelvin, homeowner, aged 55-64). 
 
 
Figure 7.21. Roof-mounted solar-PV. 
Source: Author 
Even though building structure can be incompatible with low-carbon measures, all the 
owner-occupied and socially rented homes interviewed had also some form of energy 
efficiency measures. Most frequently this included energy-saving light bulbs, loft 
insulation, and double glazing. Less often, but perhaps most effective, it included internal 
wall insulation, cavity wall insulation or external wall insulation. All households with 
these measures praise them for increasing comfort levels of their homes while at the same 
time reducing energy consumption: 
The year before last they put the external cladding on. It’s the best thing they 
did. I’ve moved the room around since then because I couldn’t put the chair 
by the window before because of the draught, but I can now […] The 
insulation has made a massive difference. Normally by this time, I’d have to 
put more oil in again but I have half a tank left now (Olive, social tenant, aged 
70+). 
 
We’ve had insulated from the inside, the main house, because its solid wall, 
so we had insulation put on the inside and oh, that’s wonderful! Yeah, not 
only in retaining the heat, but on the cold walls, we used to get big black 
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patches of mildew, condensation that was on the walls, so, yeah, that’s made 
a big difference (Sarah, homeowner, aged 65-74). 
Energy efficiency measures are not accessible to all. First there is a cost implication, even 
the lowest cost low-carbon measures can be more expensive than higher-carbon 
counterparts (for example energy efficient lightbulbs cost more than traditional 
lightbulbs). There is also a question of compatibility of more intrusive and larger scale 
measures with building structures; cavity wall insulation obviously requires cavities 
which are absent in solid stone buildings, leaving external or internal insulation as the 
only viable option for such buildings. However, these come at a higher cost, external 
insulation cladding can completely alter the appearance of homes, making it undesirable 
and in some areas prohibited by planning authorities. Internal insulation cladding is very 
disruptive to households and involves complete re-decoration of affected rooms. With the 
majority of peripheral homes being solid stone wall, it appears that only the two most 
intrusive and expensive insulation measures are compatible. 
Finally, household tenure can influence autonomy in choosing energy source and altering 
building energy efficiencies, therefore, tenure holds implications for energy vulnerability: 
Because we’re renting the properties we do as were told, we’ve got no choice 
over it. If you don’t like it, you can get out (Catherine, social tenant, aged 45-
64). 
Lack of control over such aspects can increase vulnerability in several ways; first tenants’ 
living conditions and elements of energy efficiency are subject to their landlords’ choices 
and obligations. For social tenants, they are protected to a certain degree from having 
inadequate and inefficient homes in policy (Welsh Housing Quality Standard (WHQS) 
2002). With regards to energy, the standard requires that all properties must be “capable 
of heating the whole of the dwelling to a comfortable level in normal weather conditions” 
and “reasonably economical to run” (Welsh Assembly Government 2002, p.15). This is 
reinforced in the Revised Guidance for Social Landlords on Interpretation and 
Achievement of the WHQS (2008, pp.18), where it is specified that properties must be 
“adequately heated, fuel efficient and well insulated”. However, private tenants are not 
protected in the same way and there is only a requirement for private landlords to ensure 
their properties are energy efficient to at least an EPC level E (Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy [BEIS] 2017a). This is arguably still very cold and from 
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the perspective of the private tenants interviewed meant they were currently or had past 
experience of living in unhealthy conditions: 
It was just damp throughout the whole place. And it’s not even sometimes in 
the walls and stuff, it’s in the air. It’s the moisture in the air, so it gets on all 
your things, and the bedding smells crap… Where I’m living now, you get 
damp mites (Noel, private tenant, aged 30-44). 
Second, a lack of autonomy in choosing energy source or internal technologies can mean 
households have to use perhaps more expensive energy sources or technologies that do 
not meet their personal needs. Again, social tenants are offered slightly more autonomy 
in this regard where they have the right to decline certain measures and during upgrades 
to their energy systems, are given some choice, even though it is constrained, over energy 
source.  
We have a lot of properties in off-gas areas, they are on oil or solid fuel. When 
their system goes down, we will offer them the choice of an ASHP or to remain 
on oil […] With all our planned works they have the right to refuse people 
entry into their home, because it is their home first and foremost (Local 
Authority interview 5). 
Factors such as a household tenure also play a determining role in inclusion in transition. 
Social and privately rented homes can install domestic production or energy efficiency 
measures and benefit from lower energy bills, but this is at the discretion of their landlord. 
Socially rented homes have greater opportunity of participating in low-carbon transition 
thanks to policy protections in the Welsh Housing Quality Standard (WHQS) (2002) and 
the Arbed area-based energy efficiency scheme40. However, such participation is not the 
choice of the household and while lessening some aspects of energy vulnerability, most 
often focus is on increasing energy efficiency alone as opposed to decarbonising the 
household. Privately rented households, while having an option to take up the Nest energy 
efficiency scheme41 (subject to meeting certain criteria) have much less policy protection. 
Additionally, participation in such schemes, or alterations of any kind to their rented 
property are at the landlord’s discretion and outside tenant control:  
 
40 See Chapter 5 for outline of the Arbed scheme 
41 See Chapter 5 for outline of the Nest scheme 
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I’d love to have solar panels or what else can you have? I’d love to be 
completely renewable; I’d love it. But because we rent, it’s not really 
our decision, we can’t make the decision (Rachel, private renter, aged 
15-29). 
Homeowners with higher incomes or wealth are best positioned to participate and benefit 
from low-carbon transition. Of this group, homeowners with access to mains electricity 
grid benefit most by accessing FIT. Following this group are social tenants, who due to 
policy protections experience low-carbon transition mostly through increased energy 
efficiency with a smaller number via renewable energy production (any FIT would be 
attributed to the landlord). These two groups also highlight how policy interventions are 
still likely to favour households either with access to electricity networks (FIT), or with 
critical mass of certain criteria (Arbed and Nest). Thus, households without access to 
mains electricity, in non-deprived areas or with sparse populations, are less likely to be 
able to take advantage of such schemes. Furthermore, homeowners on lower incomes or 
with higher living expenses and privately rented households are least able to either 
generate renewable energy or increase their homes’ energy efficiency. For owned homes 
this is mostly due to the financial cost of such measures and for private tenants this is due 
to their lack of ownership over their home. 
 
7.6 Conclusion  
Many instances of energy vulnerability found in the periphery, while being compounded 
by more widespread factors such as housing tenure, can stem from elements of peripheral 
disadvantage. These include, low incomes, the tyranny of distance, poor energy 
infrastructure and energy inefficient housing stock. Either directly or indirectly such 
elements can impact upon energy affordability, access, energy efficiency, flexibility, 
practices and needs. Together, these peripheral-specific energy vulnerabilities can, in 
some instances, lead to the adoption of peripheral energy practices to mitigate energy 
insecurity or in reaction to other peripheral pressures, such as maintaining personal 
vehicles. However, mitigation practices themselves can create further energy 
vulnerabilities, for example, accessing alternative energy sources can be more expensive 
increasing the risk of unaffordability.   
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Rural peripheries have the highest levels of service deprivation within Wales, with a trend 
of ever decreasing services, both public and private, vehicular travel is a necessity for all 
peripheral households whether economically active or not. Public transport is more 
expensive in Wales than other non-Welsh regions of the UK. Additionally, as highlighted 
by interviewees, public transport can be incompatible with employment times or in some 
instances non-existent. Together these issues feed into an ever-growing need for 
peripheral households to run their own vehicles, effectively being forced into car-
ownership (Currie & Senbergs 2007). Even though not routinely considered as part of 
domestic energy requirements or costs, for peripheral households, personal transport 
provision is high on household budgeting list. Peripheral households spend 
proportionately more on running vehicles than other areas, indicating less income to spend 
on household energy, possibly resulting in trade-off’s between transport and heat. 
Adding to the financial cost of peripheral living is the high cost of energy. In peripheries 
this is in the most part attributed to higher fuel and distribution costs for both mains and 
non-mains sources. With regards to mains energy (gas and electricity), additional costs 
are incurred when the energy must be transported further, during which additional losses 
occur (USwitch undated). In addition, smaller populations incur higher costs as energy 
companies cannot “bulk buy” from generators whereby lower prices can be agreed 
(USwitch undated, para. 1). Finally, costs are associated with consumption, so in places 
where there are high consumption levels, there are higher distribution costs (USwitch 
undated). In these instances, while not applicable to peripheries within Wales, Wales 
overall experiences some of the highest energy prices in the UK, most notably mains 
electricity whereby costs are only higher in Northern Scotland and London (House of 
Commons Library 2017a; Ofgem 2019d).  
However, the starkest differences in energy price are when mains connection is not present 
and traditional non-mains energy sources such as oil and LPG are utilised. This is a 
historic problematic of Welsh peripheries, which persists, due to low population levels, 
making mains extension economically unviable for energy distribution networks. 
Traditional non-mains sources hold other vulnerabilities, this is due to the need for 
household manual monitoring of supply and ordering, and physical vehicular delivery, 
made more tenuous in adverse weather conditions. Precarious energy access has 
encouraged some homes to adopt energy practices, such as the installation of wood-
burning stoves which use a locally sourced and cheap energy source, or the installation of 
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solid fuel stoves which are very energy inefficient.  Combined with this, high numbers of 
traditional solid stone buildings, which are hard to heat, hard to keep warm and hard to 
insulate means that many households are required to consume more energy to attain 
thermal comfort.  
Compounding high living costs is the prevalence of low incomes. This is due to relatively 
fewer employment opportunities and/or insecure casual or seasonal work are indicative of 
rural areas and may be more pronounced where tourism and agriculture represent large 
proportions of the employment sector. For more secure, higher paid work people travel to 
core areas. For some, there is a choice between working locally for lower income or 
obtaining higher incomes elsewhere but incurring higher expenditure on transport - 
reducing their overall residual income once transport costs are removed. For communities 
in the periphery, low income is just one factor affecting energy affordability, high living 
cost due to transport, energy (and in tourism areas such as the BBNP - housing costs) are 
also in affect. Subsequently, even those in relatively well-paid jobs experience precarious 
energy affordability.  
The above elements of peripheral deprivation also hold implications for low-carbon 
transition. High living costs place additional restrictions on household budgets, 
restrictions that in turn may limit low-carbon transition due it its advancement in any form 
(production or energy saving) requiring finance. Transition is also subject to building 
structures, whereby solid stone walls, the dominant style of building in peripheral Wales, 
makes energy efficiency harder and more expensive to achieve. Likewise, physical space 
and in the case of solar, non-North facing rooves are needed for energy production, this 
again can impact on the viability of energy production. While these implications for low-
carbon transition are similar for communities in and outside of the BBNP, for those inside 
they can be rigidified by planning systems that restrict or increase the cost of low-carbon 
interventions. Additionally, as autonomy over transition is highly influenced by housing 
tenure – i.e. owner-occupiers are most able to transition - the particular housing market 
within the BBNP may restrict this more acutely than elsewhere to those most wealthy. 
Mains energy access plays an important role in the viability of low-carbon transition in 
the form of energy production. At smaller scales, poor energy access to the mains heating 
networks can make transition more attractive as low-carbon energy production, in 
addition to some subsidies (such as RHI) can in the longer-term be more cost-effective 
than remaining on traditional non-mains energy (such as oil). Poor access to electricity 
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grids is less common, however does mean that subsidies such as FIT are not accessible. 
At a larger scale, non-electricity grid access presents economic challenges, as without it, 
any electricity produced cannot be sold or distributed. In these instances, mains electricity 
access is still needed. As areas of available grid capacity are scarce in the periphery, in 
most instances the grid requires extending or upgrading to enable the distribution of new 
electricity production. Costs associated with this are prohibitive and restrict new 
developments to the largest energy developments capable of absorbing such costs.  
Within the BBNP, planning requirements do not permit large scale energy developments. 
This can protect Park communities from bearing the cost of low-carbon transition at a 
large scale. However, planning restrictions due to conservation rules, can also make 
small-scale developments more difficult by increasing the costs or limiting the type and 
scale of technology. For example, for a household wanting to install an ASHP, a high 
level of building energy efficiency must be attained first. If living in a stone-built home 
they are restricted to the most expensive wall-cladding insulation, and if it was viewed 
that external cladding would not suit the aesthetic of the Park, only internal cladding 
would be allowed (internal cladding is also dependent on the listed status of the house). 
Internal cladding is the most disruptive form of insulation as it requires the redecoration 
of all rooms affected. However, transition experiences within the BBNP were not 
uniform, some interviewees experienced the same issues and benefits as those outside of 
the Park, while others experienced more difficulties as a result of living in the Park.  Thus, 
while the overall picture is mixed, communities within the BBNP, while protected from 
energy injustices faced by communities outside of the park when large scale commercial 
developments take place, can experience injustice through being limited in the type and 









Chapter 8. Discussion & Conclusions: Energy Periphery, place-
based energy injustices and transitions 
8.1 Introduction 
This research sought to understand the tripartite interplay between energy vulnerability, 
peripherality and energy transition. Each can hold separate concerns for energy 
deprivation, spatial disadvantage and energy regime change. Often considered in silo, 
there is a gap in understanding how energy vulnerability, peripherality and low-carbon 
energy transition interplay in different ways, and how this interplay impacts the mode, 
distribution and affect of each. Without exploration of these interplays energy 
vulnerability and transition literature are incomplete. Further, there is a gap in the 
exploration of energy transitions from not just a spatial perspective, but a peripheral 
perspective, consequently how transition is progressing around and within peripheries 
and to what affect is little known. Finally, as energy transition may hold some 
opportunities to alleviate energy vulnerabilities, there is opportunity to achieve policy 
goals - reducing fuel poverty and achieving carbon reduction targets simultaneously. 
Without enhanced understanding of the interplay between peripheralization, energy 
vulnerability and low-carbon transition, policy measures will remain only partially 
successful. 
To address these research gaps, a case-study was carried out in mid-south Wales 
exploring variegated reasons for, and experiences of, energy vulnerability, peripherality 
and low-carbon energy transition. An energy justice and spatial justice framework was 
adopted and mixed research methods were used, including interviews, focus groups, 
observation, document analysis and quantitative statistical analysis. Primary data 
collection was carried out with a range of different groups including households and 
community groups, public, private and third sector organisations through to energy 
experts and the Welsh Government. This provided insight into multiscale, 
multidimensional and interconnected experiences of energy vulnerability, peripherality 
and energy transition. 
To bound the case study, much consideration was given as to how periphery is 
theoretically understood and how this materialises. This research understands peripheries 
as socially constructed places of relative low value, experiencing socio-cultural, 
economic and political disadvantage. These disadvantages perpetuate circular processes 
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of social, economic and political marginalization, realised spatially. They also create and 
continuously reinforce a dependence on the core. As a relative place, periphery 
development is symbiotic with core development and peripheries are often on the edge or 
fringe of core spaces. As a socio-spatial construct, peripheries are subject to scale, thus 
peripheries can be different places within a neighbourhood, sub-region, region, country 
or the globe. Thus, core places can hold within them lower scale peripheries and 
peripheries can hold within them lower-scale cores. For the purpose of this research, this 
theoretic was simplified using Copus’s (2001) peripheralization model to select places of 
relative peripherality. Thus, the research is based within Wales which relative to other 
UK nations can be considered a national periphery. Narrowing the scope further the same 
considerations for periphery were applied within Wales. Thus, the case study is located 
in and around the Brecon Beacons National Park (BBNP), Mid-South Wales. As observed 
by Fischer-Tahir & Nauman (2013), often (but not exclusively) peripherality coincides 
with rurality, this is the case here where the study area is predominantly rural, but also 
includes exurban and post-industrial areas. 
This research illuminates how in Wales energy has and continues to play a fundamental 
role in spatialization processes at all scales, interplaying with and reinforcing economic 
processes that distinguish places as core or periphery. The multiple disadvantages that 
have developed within Welsh peripheries represent both spatial injustices and energy 
injustices. The circular and self-perpetuating process of peripheralization creates 
interplay between spatial injustice and energy injustice, and their subsequent reification. 
As elements of peripherality can vary over in space and time, so too does the 
manifestations of spatial injustice and energy injustice and their impacts. Energy 
vulnerability, as a form of energy injustice, likewise holds spatial contingency, thus 
energy vulnerability experiences in Wales are influenced by elements of peripheral 
disadvantage. Processes of spatialization and energy vulnerability together influence 
transition mode, trajectory and outcome. Furthermore, low-carbon transition itself holds 
influence over drivers of energy vulnerability and elements of peripheral disadvantage. 
These findings hold important knowledge contributions towards the advancement of 
energy vulnerability and transition literature, addressing research gaps in each.  
This chapter presents the final discussion of research findings which inform these 
research conclusions. The first three sections are dedicated to answering the research 
questions; Section 8.2 explores How is peripherality experienced within and around the 
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Brecon Beacons National Park, Wales? Section 8.3 explores the connection between 
peripherality and energy vulnerability, demonstrating how elements of peripheral energy 
vulnerability in Wales are place-based answering the second research question; How does 
energy vulnerability manifest within and around the Brecon Beacons National Park, 
Wales? Then, by building on the prior sections, Section 8.4 answers the final research 
question How is low-carbon energy transition experienced within and around the Brecon 
Beacons National Park, Wales? It demonstrates how place-based energy vulnerabilities, 
present in part due to spatialization processes, impact how and where low-carbon 
transition in Wales takes place. It also explores how low-carbon transition has influenced 
elements of energy vulnerability and peripherality. Following this, Section 8.5 highlights 
and summarises contributions to theoretical discussions.  In Section 8.6 policy and other 
recommendations are made as to how low-carbon transitions can be taken forward in 
ways to maximise benefits to peripheries. Finally, in Section 8.7 research limitations and 
suggestions for further research are discussed. 
 
8.2  Experiences of peripherality: Interplaying spatial and energy 
injustices  
Peripherality was experienced in a number of different ways by research interviewees, as 
political marginalisation, as decline in public services, as weak economy and in poor 
transport infrastructures42. These experiences of peripherality are individual interviewee 
perceptions, and are subject to individual histories, contexts and biases and are influenced 
by the research process itself. However, when triangulated with other sources of cultural, 
economic and political data, such as media representations, official statistics, 
parliamentary proceedings and other research, it is apparent that these experiences are 
reflective of peripherality in Wales. 
Politically, peripheralization of Wales and within Wales’ regions results in the 
marginalization and non-recognition of periphery needs by decision-makers at relative 
scale (i.e. nationally or regionally). Interviewees at different scales gave various examples 
of political peripheralization via a range of experiences at different scales. Nationally, 
this was evident in weaker policy powers held in Wales comparative to other devolved 
 
42 For initial discussion see Chapters 6 and 7 
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UK countries, in particular over transport and energy policy. Limitations in energy policy 
powers43 was raised by interviewees in Chapter 6 as limiting the ability of Wales to 
achieve its low-carbon ambitions. Similarly, restrictions over policy responsibility also 
means limited financial autonomy in these areas, so in the case of major infrastructural 
developments, Wales is still considered together with England for public spending 
decisions44. However, other research has demonstrated that in the case of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland where greatest policy powers have been granted towards supporting the 
renewable energy market, this has not been fully utilised, instead both countries have 
chosen to be a part of UK-wide market levers, such as the Renewable Obligation45 and 
Feed-in-Tariff46 (Cowell et al. 2017). This is in part attributed to the ability to draw on 
subsidisation for such policy levers via electricity bills paid by all electricity consumers 
in the UK, whereas in implementing their own policies such widespread economic 
support could not be drawn upon  (Cowell et al. 2015; Cowell et al. 2017).  While this 
puts into question whether a higher level of energy policy devolution would actually 
enable Wales to achieve its low-carbon ambitions, the arrangement can still lead to the 
marginalization of Wales’ needs to satisfy those of the centre. 
This unbalanced arrangement was experienced at lower scales, between core and 
peripheral regions of Wales where public spending was an area that many interviewees 
felt embodied their marginalisation politically. Thus, experiences of political 
marginalization in Section 6.3 were associated with declining public services. This 
decline links to localised spending cuts and reduced budgets over-all for rural Local 
Authorities in Wales (Stats Wales 2018e; Stats Wales 2018f). Local Authority, other 
public sector and third sector interviews recognised that in decision making at local levels, 
rural communities were often overlooked. This was perceived to be driven by small rural 
budgets, constrained staff time, large geographic areas with sparse populations and the 
use of area-based measurements to inform locations of spend. Together these elements 
contribute to the selection of more populated urban areas comparative to rural. This, 
strategic spending by Local Authorities and other public and third sector organisations is 
reflective of market logics (allocating spend to where the highest return will be 
 
43 Initial discussion in Section 4.4 
44 See also Sections 3.3 and 7.3 
45 See Appendix 2 




generated), further centralising public services and compounding other peripheralization 
effects (Marsden 2018).  
Communities within the BBNP experienced political peripheralization similarly to those 
outside of it. One difference however is that the BBNP is differentially designated as a 
national park, consequently its governance by the Brecon Beacons National Park 
Authority (BBNPA) must follow two core purposes and a duty. This is dissimilar from 
other local governance authorities such as Local Authorities. In some instances, the core 
purposes can be misaligned with community needs, for example, permitting limited visual 
changes on property or landscapes during developments. This can be problematic during 
the installation of low-carbon interventions such as wall insulation, where planning 
advice needs to be sought (different to areas outside of a national park or conservation 
area). As most buildings are solid stone construction, without wall cavities, insulation is 
limited to wall cladding. Thus, in the Park, limiting the visual impact of insulation can 
necessitate the use of internal wall cladding, overall, this increases the cost of this process 
within the Park compared out areas outside of it. Some processes, such as the need to 
obtain environmental surveys during planning processes, were perceived by some 
interviewees as unfair and only in place due to being located within the BBNP. However, 
these requirements were found to be similar to those of other Local Authorities. The 
BBNPA has taken steps to raise awareness of this via issuing planning advice notes for 
low-carbon technologies and holding weekly planning advice surgeries of what is or is 
not permitted within the Park. As transition interventions can reduce energy 
vulnerabilities, any mechanisms preventing this occurring are sustaining energy 
vulnerabilities, even if some are perceptions of barriers as opposed to actual barriers. 
Thus, while there were additional perceptions of political peripheralization within the 
BBNP experienced through planning procedures, some perceptions were worsened by the 
misconception of extra planning requirements within the Park.  
Another way peripheralization was experienced or made visible to interviewees was 
through the perceived lack of secure and high-quality work within their local areas47. This 
was also linked by some to declining public services. Within the BBNP in particular, 
interviewees connected declining services essential to living in the periphery with a focus 
by businesses and the BBNPA on tourist needs as opposed to community needs. Lack of 
higher-value work meant that for some interviewees, commuting out of the periphery was 
 
47 See Section 7.2 
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essential, others spoke of their friends or family members making the same choice, or 
moving out of the periphery altogether48. These experiences are supported by official 
statistics and other research (c.f. Currie & Senbergs 2007; Public Policy Institute for 
Wales 2016; Mattitioli et al. 2017; Chatterton et al. 2018). In addition, dominant 
employment sectors within the sparsest of settings, such as tourism and agriculture, 
typically hold irregular and low-paid opportunities (Statistics for Wales 2015b). Indeed, 
as the National Assembly for Wales (2018b) demonstrates within the areas of this 
research in-work poverty rates are some of the highest in Wales. However, this picture is 
not exclusive as within the periphery there are some opportunities for employment in 
higher managerial and professional jobs (Office for National Statistics 2012). 
Additionally, there are growing numbers of retirees moving into the periphery, altering 
this economy further. Considering employment and income data together suggests that 
within rural peripheries there is an income or wealth gap between those in lower paid, 
unreliable, part time roles and those in higher paid professional jobs.  
As Section 7.3 highlighted, the need to travel outside of the periphery further constrained 
household budgets as poor transport networks meant that personal vehicles were deemed 
by over 90% of interviewees as essential. These experiences are reflective of other 
research in Wales that has demonstrated the more remote a setting, the more likely 
personal vehicle ownership is (Chatterton et al. 2018). The same research highlights the 
additional costs associated with vehicle ownership. The expense of private vehicle 
ownership reduces the overall household budget, consequently impacting abilities to 
afford and consume energy. As Mattioli et al. (2017) note, households are more likely to 
restrict their domestic energy consumption to maintain personal transport, than vice versa. 
This research also found that in official statistics regarding household living costs, 
location of household combined with vehicle ownership costs are not included, as such, 
vehicle ownership remains a hidden budget constraint making official assumptions 
regarding the cost of living in rural areas underestimated. 
Poor energy infrastructure is a particular problematic of Welsh peripheries49. The spatial 
concentration of mains energy infrastructure in more populated and urbanised areas is 
reflective of its development during the Industrial Revolution and privatised, market 
driven system (Hammond 2000; Fouquet 2010; Foxon 2013). As such, mains energy 
 
48 See Section 7.3 
49 See Section 7.4 
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networks in Wales favour settlements with larger customer bases over smaller, sparsely 
populated places distal from the existing networks. It is no coincidence that the peripheral, 
village of Ystradfellte (within this case study area) was the last village connected to the 
national electricity grid in England and Wales; connection only taking place in 2005 
(Morris 2005) some 77 years after the first grid tower was erected (National Grid 2019). 
This spatial arrangement impacted energy access, affordability and consumption for 
many interviewees. In the first instance, if unconnected to a distribution network then 
energy consumption (from that source) cannot occur. Second, poor quality distribution 
networks are more likely to fail, for example in periods of severe winter weather. Both 
factors hold influence perceptions of security of supply and the inevitability of adopting 
alternative energy sources, regardless of inconvenience or additional costs that may be 
incurred.  
Whilst building stock is not necessarily an outcome of peripherality as understood by 
core-periphery models, Wales, and in particular, rural Local Authority areas of Wales 
have the highest levels of energy inefficient building stock in the UK (Staffell et al. 2018; 
Roberts & Henwood 2019). These types of buildings are more difficult and costly to heat. 
It is their dominance in peripheral places in addition to their energy inefficiency and lack 
of adaptability (increasing the cost of living for those who reside within them), that links 
household building structure in Wales with peripherality. As per Section 7.5, the majority 
of households interviewed lived within such buildings and thus are more likely to 
experience higher energy consumption and overall higher energy costs than those who 
live in alternatively built homes. This can compound economic disadvantages of 
peripheral living if combined with possible low-income and/or high transport costs.  
Overall, experiences of periphery were made visible through combinations of social, 
political and economic disadvantage and marginalisation at multiple scales. The same 
experiences are also indicative of spatial injustice and energy injustice. Spatial justice 
highlights wider forms of social injustice, which due to the materiality of human existence 
and the dialect between society and space, have spatial consequences. It accounts for 
locational discrimination, political organization of space, geographical development, and 
the ability to use and benefit from socially valued resources. Thus, experiences of political 
marginalization and lower levels of funding for public services, poorer local economies 
and employment opportunities as well as poor infrastructural resources are all indicative 
of spatial injustice. Energy injustice, manifest as unfair and equitable allocation of costs 
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and benefits within the energy system, which is visible here as poor energy 
infrastructures, lack of access to such structures and higher energy prices.   
However, spatial and energy injustices are interconnected and complementary to each 
other. For example, the spatial configuration of the energy network in Wales is both a 
spatial injustice and an energy injustice. Physical poor access to the network is based on 
location, resulting in lack of access to the energy resource and subsequently the services 
fuelled by that resource. These interplays are visible in other way - experiences of political 
peripheralization included lack of ability to utilise local natural resources and as having 
local social and economic needs ignored. This aligns with both aspects of spatial injustice 
and the recognition tenet of energy justice, whereby “cultural and political domination, 
insults, degradation and devaluation” result in ‘non-recognition’, and ‘misrecognition and 
disrespect’ (Jenkins et al. 2016, p. 177). The next section unpacks the connection between 
peripheral disadvantage and energy injustice further, exploring experiences of spatially 
contingent energy vulnerabilities within the periphery. 
 
8.3 Energy Peripheries: Energy vulnerable places 
Energy plays a key role in spatialization processes contributing to the creation of places 
through processes of natural resource extraction, energy production, distribution and 
consumption50. This includes how such processes and their cost and benefits are 
distributed in space but also how such processes and their costs and benefits influence the 
same spaces. In this way “energy is bound up with the reproduction of uneven patterns of 
development and access to flows of capital” (Castan Broto & Baker 2018, p.3). Energy 
interplays with other elements of spatialization to fuelling economic growth in some areas 
and affect decline in others. The intertwined relationship between spatialization processes 
and energy implies that experiences of spatial injustice and energy injustice will be 
similarly intertwined (as unpacked in Section 8.2). Subsequently spatially implicated is 
energy vulnerability. Energy vulnerability51 has been conceptualised as consisting of six 
drivers: Access, Affordability, Flexibility, Energy Efficiency, Needs and Practices 
 
50 See Chapter 4 
51 See Chapter 1 
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(Simcock & Petrova 2017). In this research, all energy vulnerability drivers were variably 
influenced by elements of peripheralization52.  
Access to energy was affected by the spatial distribution of the mains energy networks in 
the research area which is more sparse and older than other areas of the UK. This is 
informed by historic processes associated with the Industrial Revolution and persists due 
to privatised energy suppliers and network operators working to market logics and 
marginalisation of periphery energy needs due to central regulation. As a result, some 
communities experience a lack of access to mains energy sources or more frequent 
electricity ‘cut-off’.  
This in turn affects Affordability of energy due to the need for alternative energy sources 
to be sourced. These typical traditional alternatives included Oil, LPG and often coincided 
with the use of solid-fuel burners such as wood-burning stoves or Aga and Rayburn 
stoves53. Such energy sources (with the exception of coal and wood) are higher cost than 
mains energy. Additionally, Agas and Rayburns are energy inefficient and so use more 
energy to run exacerbating household energy costs. However, energy affordability is also 
more generally experienced in Wales due to overall higher costs of mains energy 
comparative to other UK regions.  
Flexibility was affected by the lack of access to mains networks which meant some 
interviewees felt ‘trapped’ into accessing alternative energy sources54. Living in solid 
stone homes also created some experiences of inflexibility due to difficulties in installing 
insulation55. Finally, lack of Flexibility was also experienced as a result of the effects of 
Affordability where changing energy source or a domestic energy system was financially 
prohibitive to some.  
Energy efficiency is affected by the electricity network, which due to its age and distance 
in the periphery from central power stations leads to more energy losses during 
transmission, increasing energy costs (Ofgem 2015). It was also affected by the use of 
alternative energy technologies such as Agas and Rayburns which are less energy 
efficient than more common gas central heating and radiators or cooking with gas or 
electric ovens. Additionally, it was affected by living in solid stone buildings are one of 
 
52 See also Table 4.2 
53 See Section 7.3 
54 See Section 7.4 
55 See Section 7.5 
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the least energy efficient forms of building and which also make difficult and more costly 
the installation of energy efficiency measures such as wall insulation.  
Needs affected by personal circumstances such as age, health and lifestyle. Of these, age 
may hold some spatial contingency due to the higher percentage of older people living 
within the periphery and the trend of increasing numbers of older people predicted. In 
addition, as a personal vehicle was viewed by most interviewees as an essential 
component of peripheral life, this is due to poor public transport networks combined with 
the need to travel longer distances to access essential services, employment and 
education. This was a common energy ‘Need’, experienced by most interviewees50. Not 
only did personal vehicle ownership increase overall energy consumption, but also 
impacts on household budgets which indirectly affecting ‘Affordability’ of energy. 
However, ability to meet energy needs was variably impacted by all other energy 
vulnerability drivers. 
Practices were affected by a number of factors. First, as an energy ‘Need’, dependence 
on personal vehicles to participate in many aspects of daily life in the periphery is also an 
energy ‘Practice’ that increases energy vulnerability. Second, several interviewees used 
wood-burning stoves as a means of securing their energy supply due to past instances of 
being cut off from other sources. This along with some interviewees use of range-stoves 
created practices of predominantly using the room in the home with the stove or wood-
burner over winter months to keep warm as opposed to heating the whole home. 
Alternatively, one interviewee financially trapped in expensive and less ‘Energy 
Efficient’ oil central heating and cooking system, had no choice but to keep the system 
on during summer months to cook food. Subsequently they experienced over-heating, and 
opened windows to cool the house. This energy practice was caused by other spatially 
contingent energy vulnerabilities (‘Access’, ‘Affordability’, ‘Flexibility’ and ‘Energy 
Efficiency’).  
It should be noted that the energy vulnerabilities outlined are specific to peripheries and 
are created as part of peripheralization processes. However, there are also energy 
vulnerabilities that are more generic, such as health-related conditions and/or related to 
tenure and occupier autonomy56. These were evident in the research and while not 
necessarily spatially contingent (although there may be further research establishing links 
 
56 See Chapter 7 
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between spatial interplay of economics, health and energy vulnerabilities), the occurrence 
of these more generic vulnerabilities in a peripheral context accumulates with other 
peripherally created vulnerabilities, so that their effect is compounded and creates energy 
vulnerabilities particular to peripheral places.  
Energy vulnerabilities experienced by interviewees inside and outside of the BBNP were 
generally the same as either those within or without of the Park. The only differences 
were those experienced as a results of differences in peripherality as discussed in Section 
8.2. A higher level of concern in BBNPA planning processes for visual impact 
(comparative to non-national park planning authorities) means that it can be more difficult 
to gain approval for some development, that includes development that could off-set 
energy vulnerabilities (i.e. external wall insulation). Or the same processes can increase 
the cost of such developments. Additionally, the additional emphasis within the Park on 
tourism development (comparative to areas outside of the Park) could be reinforcing 
situations of low-paid, insecure income thus heightening risk of energy unaffordability. 
Connection between peripheralization and energy vulnerability are multiple and as Figure 
8.1 demonstrates, interplay in messy ways. Energy vulnerabilities can produce other 
connected vulnerabilities, which mean households can experience more than one energy 
vulnerability simultaneously. For example, lack of access to energy networks necessitates 
the sourcing of alternative forms of energy. These alternatives are usually higher cost, 
and in some cases are used in conjunction with less energy efficient equipment (Agas or 
Rayburns). This in turn impacts upon how well household energy needs are met and also 
whether alternative energy practices are adopted. Thus, lack of ‘Access’ to energy, due 
to peripheral disadvantage holds further consequences for all other energy vulnerability 
drivers; ‘Affordability’, ‘Efficiency’, ‘Flexibility’, ‘Needs’ and ‘Practices’. 
Subsequently, each new vulnerability driver that is affected, creates further connections 
with vulnerability drivers. 
Energy vulnerability, as with peripheralization, can be circular in effect. For example, 
energy ‘Affordability’ can be problematic due to lower incomes and/or high cost of 
peripheral living, lack of access to energy means more expensive energy sources are used 
increasing living costs, this is compounded by living in an energy inefficient home, 
increasing energy consumption to meet thermal comfort needs. A stretched household 
budget means changing energy system or energy source or increasing the energy 
efficiency of the home is not possible. So, the cycle continues. This example also 
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demonstrates that elements of peripheral disadvantage interplay with energy vulnerability 
to reinforcing the presence of each other.   
 
Figure 8.1. Interplay of peripheralization elements and energy vulnerability. 
Source: Author 
 
Therefore, elements of peripheral disadvantage and drivers of energy vulnerability are 
interlinked in numerous ways, the presence of each, either singularly or in combination, 
holds impacts for other elements and drivers, including the reinforcement of their 
presence. Such interplay of spatial injustice and energy injustice results in the formation 
of place-specific energy vulnerabilities, observed from a peripheral perspective, energy 
vulnerability is interlinked with elements of peripheral disadvantage (see Figures 4.5 and 
8.1).  
However, to fully grasp the interplay between peripheral disadvantage, energy injustice 
and their consequence, consideration has to be extended further than at the point of end 
use, or energy vulnerability experienced at a household scale. Spatial justice attempts to 
elucidate and make visible how dynamics of power and social fairness manifest spatially 
leading to uneven access to certain spaces and resources or ability to make good use of 
them. Energy justice, considered more broadly than energy vulnerability, offers a 
framework to explore equity and fairness at any or all stages of an energy system. Both 
are derived from social and environmental justice, and together they illuminate how 
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socio-cultural, economic and political forces work to create different places, the relative 
position of which influences the distribution of costs and benefits within the whole energy 
system. Considering the whole energy system allows a more comprehensive inclusion of 
the perspectives of the interviewees. Many of the households interviewed, when talking 
about the places they live and energy, spoke not only of their end-use energy needs, but 
frequently referred to ‘upstream’ energy processes, of production and distribution. This 
included past resource extraction activities in the form of deep anthracite mining, to newer    
forms close by such as opencast mining and wind farms. Indeed, many households 
sourced some of their own energy resource, either via collecting wood for wood burning 
stoves or solar radiation for solar PV. Thus, to fully understand the impacts of such 
interplay the whole energy system must be considered from a peripheral perspective. 
 
Figure 8.2. Interplay of peripheralization elements and energy vulnerability with ‘upstream’ energy 
processes in the periphery. 
Source: Author 
 
Within this research case study, interplay between energy and spatial injustice was 
experienced throughout the energy system, feeding into the circular processes of 
peripheralization and place-specific energy vulnerabilities. This is conceptualised as 
‘energy periphery’ provides a means of focusing attention on the unique energy injustices 
experienced throughout an energy system by peripheral places. In the first instance, it 
highlights the vulnerability faced by places with availability of natural resources for 
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energy production, but with low populations and limited social, economic and political 
capacity. Such places - exemplified by Wales and its sub-national peripheries in this 
research - while providing the resources for primary energy production, experience 
difficulty in accessing the same energy produced.  In addition, weak social, economic and 
political capacity creates problematics for the recognition of peripheries in energy 
decisions and exclusion from energy processes and procedures. These problematics 
influence how, where, at what scale and by whom energy production takes place, how 
and to whom it is distributed and at what cost, in addition to any of the other benefits that 
may arise. In weaker economic positions and largely dependent on external investment, 
energy peripheries can often view new energy developments that offer some economic 
benefits with favour, especially those which promise employment. This can be the case 
even if employment opportunities are overstated and benefits are only short term. Very 
often, longer term benefits and profits extracted from such project’s slip out of the 
periphery (Yenneti et al. 2016; Bryn et al. 2017; Weller 2018), leaving them very much 
as they were – dependent still on external investment and energy vulnerable. Within 
energy peripheries the circular and self-reinforcing process of peripheralization and its 
disadvantageous outcomes, imbued with energy injustices are illuminated. Such 
injustices propagate vulnerabilities for communities within energy peripheries throughout 
the whole energy system, producing “a whole distinctive and systematic class of energy 
inequities” (O’Sullivan et al. 2020, p. 4). 
However, as others have highlighted, peripheries and peripheral experiences are not 
homogeneous (Hayter et al. 2003) and this was the case here, where within the periphery 
different land designations or hierarchies were assigned differentiating the constellation 
of energy periphery factors. The Brecon Beacons National Park, considered 
internationally significant, while experiencing much of the same peripheral-specific 
energy vulnerabilities as areas outside of the Park, experienced a difference in 
problematics of energy production. Here, the legal protections towards the natural 
environment meant that exploitation from external large-scale energy production was 
negated. However, the same protections in conjunction with its other purpose towards 
encouraging access to the land and other peripheral disadvantages meant that energy 
production at smaller scales was perceived to be more difficult. Thus, there remains 
peripheral-specific energy vulnerability throughout the energy system within the BBNP, 
due to its relative spatial position even though how these some aspects of their formation 
are varied compared to the periphery outside of the Park. 
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In a similar line of thought, while rural Wales has provided the empirical foundation to 
conceptualise energy periphery and focus attention on usually overlooked spaces, energy 
periphery can be applied to other places to exemplify similar disadvantageous contexts. 
This is achievable due to the relativity of ‘periphery’ as a geographic concept, meaning it 
can be considered at multiple scales and within multiple contexts. For example, recent 
studies have demonstrated at a global scale, already economically peripheral countries 
struggle to utilise their energy resources themselves, in ways that benefit their own 
populations, or in ways that alter their economic peripherality (c.f. Baker et al 2014). At 
sub-national scales, other studies have demonstrated that peripheries experience similar 
patterns of resource availability which combined with limited social, economic and 
political power limits their ability to make best use of them but also fosters a vulnerability 
on sometimes exploitive investment and energy development (c.f. Haag et al. 2012; 
Yenneti et al. 2016; Sareen & Haarstad 2018; Weller et al. 2018).  
This research has unpacked spatial and energy injustice through the energy system by 
focusing predominantly on rural peripheries within Wales, in a country that is also 
predominantly rural, to conceptualise energy periphery, this is in line with literature that 
points to the frequent coalescence of rurality with periphery (Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 
2013). However, as energy periphery can be applicable at multiple scales in different 
places it doesn’t necessarily follow that all energy peripheries will be sub-national or 
rural, likewise, it doesn’t follow that all peripheries, whatever the scale, experience 
energy-related disadvantage. That being said, energy periphery raises attention to the 
frequent co-constitution of spatial injustice and energy injustice - how peripheral 
disadvantage can open the door to energy injustice, and that for peripheral places with 
resources for energy production, this injustice endures all along the energy system.  
Overall, many energy vulnerabilities experienced within the periphery have a spatial 
contingency which is derived from the process of peripheralization and subsequent 
peripheral marginalisation and disadvantage. Peripheralization and energy vulnerability 
are mutually-reinforcing creating a vicious circle, or “problem spiral” difficult to break 
(Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013, p. 18). Energy injustices in the periphery are not 
confined to energy vulnerability at the point of consumption, or end use. The uneven 
distribution of social, political and economic power between differential spaces holds 
influence over the risk of energy injustice along all parts of the energy system, from 
resource extraction, energy production, distribution and consumption. In Wales, 
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peripheries, as spaces of marginalisation and disadvantage experience energy injustice 
throughout the energy system and can be conceptualised as energy peripheries. This 
conceptualisation while encapsulating the multiple energy injustices experienced within 
the periphery can also aid illumination of how such spatio-energy injustices interplay with 
processes of low carbon transition. This is explored further in the next section. 
 
8.4 Energy Periphery in transition 
Low-carbon transition is progressing in energy peripheries. New energy processes of 
production, distribution and consumption are altering the physicality of the energy system 
through decentralisation and distributed energy production. For example, low-carbon 
energy production can now occur at the site of resource extraction - different to traditional 
carbon-heavy energy sources such as coal where resources are exported to centralised 
power stations for conversion to energy. Consequently, peripheries with high levels of 
natural assets are becoming combined sites of resource extraction and energy 
production57. This change is occurring in Wales where while resource extraction has 
traditionally taken place in the periphery, energy production took place in central urban 
areas (with the exception of Pembrokeshire58). Now, rural areas produce more electricity 
than previously, and from different resources (low-carbon sources such as wind, solar and 
biomass) (Welsh Government 2018a). In 2016, rural areas such as Powys and Ceredigion 
produced more low-carbon electricity (MW per capita) than other urban or valley areas 
(Welsh Government 2018a). 
The number of different energy productions and the variance in scale of energy producers 
is also increasing, creating transition opportunities for individuals and communities as 
well as private and public sectors. Energy democratisation as an outcome of transition, in 
some respects, is challenging existing capitalist structures that gravitate towards 
agglomeration, centralisation and maximum profit (Foxon 2013; Szulecki 2018; Benedek 
et al. 2019). Those who do take forward transition can directly counteract peripheral 
energy vulnerabilities, securing ‘Access’ to energy supply, making it more ‘Affordable’, 
increasing ‘Flexibility’ and ‘Energy Efficiency’, altering energy ‘Practices’ and 
 
57 See Chapters 3 and 4 
58 Pembrokeshire holds the port of Milford Haven and Pembroke Dock both of which are of strategic 
importance for oil and gas trading in the UK. Both areas have refined oil for many years. Milford Haven 
refinery closed in 2015 but Pembrokeshire Dock is still operational. 
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ultimately meeting their energy ‘Needs’. The benefits of this are similar between 
interview groups; households; third sector community/community groups; Small 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs); and large-scale commercial developers, differing mainly in 
mode of transition, financial and other capacities which influences scale. Thus, as 
transition can simultaneously reduce carbon emissions and climate change while 
providing social and economic benefits to the places it is located, it is possible to see how 
it is perceived as a moral or “civic good” (Jenkins et al. 2016, p. 177). Low-carbon 
transition holds some opportunities to redress current spatial imbalances and benefit 
peripheral populations.  
However, while low-carbon transition can hold positive effects for elements of peripheral 
disadvantage and energy vulnerability, it is constrained by the same factors. Peripheral 
disadvantages such as political peripheralization, lack of agglomerative advantage, 
limited local employment and poor infrastructures, with the energy vulnerabilities they 
contribute to converge with other spatially contingent energy vulnerabilities such as 
energy inefficient housing stock, high energy cost and peripheral energy practices that 
influence and sometimes prevent transition taking place (as per Figure 8.1). This section 
explores experiences of transition in the energy periphery, highlighting how peripherality 
and energy vulnerability inter-connect with variegated low-carbon transition experiences. 
A key driver of energy transition and influence on spatialization processes are political 
ideologies and policy implementation. Political governance institutions hold the ability to 
influence their constituent populations in addition to the private and wider public sectors. 
Therefore, much of the ability to drive and shape a just energy transition lies with political 
governance institutions. In the UK, the power to shape transition is complicated by the 
devolution of its component countries. Each country holding a unique composition of 
physical geographies, industrial and energy sectors, energy networks, and internal or 
lower scale governance actors with differing energy ambitions and ideologies (Cowell et 
al. 2017). In addition, policy power to shape transition is unequally devolved, with Wales 
being granted the least powers of all, which while it is arguable as to whether Wales’ 
transition would be different if more powers were available (Cowell et al. 2017) it has 
held some influence (Georgakaki et al. 2015; Llewellyn et al. 2017), limiting direct Welsh 
influence to lower-scale transitions and being representative of Wales’ political 
peripheralization in the UK. 
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The economic peripheralization of Wales has fostered a dependence on external 
economic investment for economic development (Jones 2015). This includes large-scale 
low-carbon energy production developments which are perceived as holding dual 
purpose, of contributing to the economy of Wales and contributing to Wales’ low-carbon 
targets59. This is supported by other research that highlights how ownership of low-carbon 
energy production at a regional and national scale holds multiple benefits for economic 
development (Benedek et al. 2018). It can create employment opportunities in addition to 
economic profits and avenues for profit re-investment that could enable profit retention 
within the host place. Peripheral disadvantage also means that Wales has a small voice 
during decision-making regarding technology type and scale. Combined, these elements 
of peripheralization limit capacity to own and operationalize large-scale resources within 
Wales or to realise long-term benefits from such developments. Thus, energy production 
in Wales, is predominantly externally owned offering only limited employment 
opportunities (Bryan et al. 2017). In order to maximise economic benefits, value-adding 
economic processes in addition to energy production also need to be ‘locally owned’, 
processes including those within R&D sectors and supply chains (Jones 2015; Institute 
of Welsh Affairs 2018).  
This research focused predominantly on small-scale or micro-scale energy production. 
However, as many interviewees discussed large-scale developments generally when 
thinking of transition, and also specifically relating to large-scale developments close to 
where they lived or worked, large-scale energy production is included in discussion. At 
present in Wales, large-scale energy development is dominated by external commercial 
ownership. This was noted by many interviewees who while supportive of large-scale 
low carbon energy development, were unhappy that they could not directly access the 
energy produced and that profits were gained elsewhere60. These perceptions are further 
fostered by the lack of awareness of most interviewees of community benefit funds or 
how they are invested. Thus, despite such large-scale commercial developments within 
the study area providing some community benefit fund, the benefit was not experienced 
by interviewees. However, this is not a universal experience as other communities in 
Wales have more widely invested their funds in ‘civic goods’. For example, The Carno 
Community Trust Fund in Powys has awarded grants for the installation of a wood pellet 
boiler at their community centre, solar panels and charging points for Electric Vehicles 
 
59 See also Chapter 4 
60 See Section 6.3 
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(EVs) (RWE Npower Renewables undated). Funds here have subsequently gone towards 
addressing community centre economic viability and energy vulnerability, as well as 
offering some futureproofing for the wider community in terms of EV charging points. 
Thus, in this instance large-scale developments have helped address energy 
vulnerabilities at lower scales. 
At present there is no official guidance in Wales as to how funds are allocated and who 
manages them, this leaves them open to interpretation resulting in uneven distribution of 
benefit amount, how and where the fund is re-invested, and developer assistance. 
Consequently, some communities fare better and receive more assistance in addressing 
wider energy vulnerabilities using community benefit funds than others. This can have a 
spatial distribution, depending on the indigenous community’s ‘capacity’ (Middlemiss & 
Parish 2010; Bristow et al. 2012) and developer ethos. Thus, some communities are better 
placed to make longer-term strategic investments that counteract energy vulnerabilities 
or wider peripheral disadvantages than others.  
Wales still holds some power and ability to assert its own ideals (Llewellyn et al. 2017). 
New policy levers such as the Wellbeing of Future Generations Act (2015), Planning 
(Wales) Act (2015), Environment (Wales) Act (2016), Wales Act (2017), and Climate 
Change Regulations (2018) as well as political commitments for all new renewable 
energy production to have “an element of local ownership” (Welsh Government 2017b) 
have laid foundations of change. Additionally, in December 2018 a new First Minister 
for Wales was selected, signalling an enhanced socialist political agenda with very clear 
links made between Wales’s economy, environment and social benefits. Further 
commitments for decarbonisation have also been outlined in Prosperity for All: A Low 
Carbon Wales (2019b) to decarbonise Wales “in a way which maximises wider benefits 
for Wales, ensuring a fairer, healthier and more equal society” (p.6). Thus, at the time of 
writing it appears at a national scale in Wales political and policy changes are already 
unfolding, affecting the way political, public and private institutions and businesses 
within Wales work which in turn should alter the way low-carbon transition continues to 
unfold.  
Central operation and regulation of the energy network in the UK by the National Grid 
and Ofgem (respectively) compound spatial and energy injustices in Wales, highlighting 
clearly the interplay between peripheralization, energy vulnerability and transition. The 
spatial distribution of the electricity grid and need to balance UK-wide supply and 
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demand effectively marginalises both energy consumers and prospective energy 
producers in Wales. As per the Electricity Act (2001), the National Grid has to maintain 
supply for all energy consumer in the UK this involves balancing electricity produced 
with electricity consumed. Ofgem regulates this and the whole energy market to protect 
customers from power-shortages and excessive energy costs. However, this centralised 
and regulated system holds in-flexibilities which are disadvantageous for Wales. For 
example, electricity consumed in Wales, even if produced in Wales has to flow through 
the UK-wide system. The cost of this electricity is determined in the UK electricity 
wholesale market, and electricity for consumption is distributed via Distribution Network 
Operators (DNOs) back into the areas of origin, and wider. While this process is in place 
to increase efficiency and competition in the energy market, and ensuring constant supply, 
it increases the cost of mains electricity in Wales comparative to other UK regions. This 
is because factors such as energy consumption, population level and distribution distances 
heavily influence regional energy costs (Ofgem 2015: 2019d; House of Commons Library 
2017a). Wales’ relative position in the UK as a political and economic periphery becomes 
mirrored within the energy system. Thus, there is little influence to alter the existing 
arrangements which see the cost of electricity production experienced in Wales while 
benefits such as lower cost electricity or electricity profits enjoyed elsewhere.  
Low-carbon transition is not altering this asymmetrical dynamic as it is similarly 
constrained by the spatial distribution of the electricity grid in Wales. Indeed, peripheries 
within Wales can be further marginalised comparative to Welsh cores during transition 
processes. For example, connecting new energy developments to the national electricity 
grid in non-urban areas of Wales has become especially problematic and expensive. This 
is due to the poor physical reach of the network in peripheral areas, low capacity on the 
network for new electricity production (Figure 7.10), and pre-existing capacity being 
bought by large-scale commercial developers. The cost of upgrading or expanding the 
grid is usually passed on to the developer, the costs of which are only affordable to large-
scale developments. Consequently, electricity production in peripheral Wales is 
increasingly restricted to either large-scale or micro-scale developments, discriminating 
against those who may fall in between, such as community developments. As per 
Chapters 3 and 4, the spatial distribution of large-scale developments and arising benefits 
hold questions for energy justice. 
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More recently Ofgem has sought to increase flexibility into this to allow smaller-scale 
sellers into the market and concessions are beginning to emerge for non-licenced 
suppliers (Ofgem 2017a) and creation of micro-grids61. In such instances, larger, or non-
domestic scale electricity may be consumed at the point of production, thus, places who 
host electricity production may be able to directly consume the electricity. These 
concessions are restricted at present to Regulatory Sandboxes62 as they are in trial stage. 
However, if such developments were allowed in Wales energy could be sold or shared 
between households, communities or regions potentially reducing the cost of energy, as 
losses along the distribution lines would be reduced and/or alternative power price 
agreements could be agreed. However, currently regulations prevent such innovations to 
be more widely developed, leaving Welsh electricity consumers with the continued 
Affordability energy vulnerability as transition progresses. In this way, and identified by 
interviewees, the current energy system disadvantages energy developments in peripheral 
areas, particularly those that are small-scale and contributes to the spatial contingency of 
energy vulnerabilities. 
Access to mains electricity and gas networks held sway over the type of low-carbon 
energy production technology chosen by interviewees, this was in-part due to the 
financial implications of each. Heat technologies are only eligible for Renewable Heat 
Incentive (RHI), while electricity technologies are eligible for electricity generation 
payment (regardless of grid connection) and Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) (with grid connection). 
In this way, access to mains electricity and gas grids informed decisions as often selling 
surplus electricity to the National Grid via mains connection is the main way that 
interviewees gained back their initial investment. In addition, remaining connected to the 
mains electricity network (as opposed to creating their own micro-grid) ensures 
continuity of supply should their energy production fail. Conversely, existing connection 
to the gas mains makes installation of heat technologies economically unbeneficial (see 
Sections 3.2 and 7.4). Thus, take-up of heat technologies was generally limited to those 
without gas connection. Most interviewees who had installed energy production noted 
continuous Access to their energy, reduced energy cost and consumption, and increased 
income all of which increased Affordability. This in turn meant interviewees could more 
 
61 A micro-grid is a decentralised grid that operates in parallel to or independent of the national grid 
(Ofgem 2017b). 
62 A regulatory sandbox allows the trial of new products, services and business models without some of 
the usual rules applying. This occurs where Ofgem regulation prevents the launch of a product or service 
that could benefit consumers (Ofgem 2018). 
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readily meet their energy Needs. In addition, as the energy produced does not get exported 
or imported for use by the same producer, losses are also minimised thus increasing 
Energy Efficiency.  
However, poor energy infrastructure in the periphery had wider effects, either adding to 
motivations to transition, i.e. in order to gain a more secure energy supply (as discussed 
in Section 8.3), or by creating “lock-in” to old carbon heavy systems (Healy & Barry 
2017, p. 451). Interviewees without mains gas supply typically had oil and LPG, with oil 
in particular necessitating alternative energy systems. Additionally, some had adopted 
alternative energy Practices, installing Agas or Rayburns to use with these energy sources. 
This as per Section 8.3 feeds into ‘Affordability’, ‘Flexibility’, ‘Energy Efficiency’ and 
‘Practice’ energy vulnerability drivers and further highlights how spatially contingent 
energy vulnerabilities can limit low-carbon transition. The combined high cost of running 
these systems along with the high cost of altering them can mean those households are 
‘locked-in’ to these outdated, inefficient, carbon heavy technologies and are in effect 
locked-out of transition (Walker 2008; Healy & Barry 2017). This lock-in is likely to be 
compounded as low-carbon transition progresses as there is a risk that many peripheral 
households and businesses could be left ‘stranded’ (Healy & John 2017) in the form of 
carbon heavy vehicles and energy systems. Socially the inability for many people within 
energy peripheries to participate equally in social life can act singularly and jointly with 
economic impacts to further solidify negative stereotypes of peripheral places as 
regressive and inherently different to core places.  
The mode of transition experienced by interviewees was generally split between two main 
forms – increased energy efficiency and/or energy production. Energy efficiency 
interventions were perceived as simpler, lower cost and ‘common-sense’ as they included 
basic measures such as draught-excluding and energy-saving lightbulbs. However, they 
also included more costly and complex interventions such as wall-insulation. As per 
Section 7.5, most interviewees, across groups had installed basic energy efficiency 
measures. More complex and expensive energy efficiency measures were less common 
and usually installed by those already carrying out some building renovation or installing 
energy production in order that the benefit of the latter was maximised.  
Out of various energy efficiency measures adopted, the installation of insulation produced 
the most noticeable results to interviewees, increasing thermal comfort and reducing 
energy consumption, thus reducing energy bills. It also altered the ways that some 
238 
 
interviewees used what were previously cold spaces, encouraging increased use. For 
those accessing vehicular-delivered oil and LPG, it meant reducing the frequency they 
monitored and ordered supplies. Thus, considering energy vulnerability drivers, increased 
energy efficiency directly counteracts poor Energy Efficiency while also counteracting 
energy Affordability, Flexibility, Needs and Practices. However, some interviewees had 
direct negative experience of increased energy efficiency, where incorrect insulation had 
been installed causing dampness in the building and the need for removal and 
reinstallation with the correct material63. In addition, interviewees in inefficient solid 
stone buildings were limited to basic efficiency measures due to the inflexibility of the 
building structure and the additional cost associated with wall-insulation for that type of 
building64. Thus, building structure not only increased the likelihood of energy 
vulnerability, but also constrained low-carbon transition. 
Energy production included an array of different energy sources and technologies. 
Smaller-scale production (1 Megawatt (MW) or below) included water and micro-hydro, 
sun and solar PV, air-heat conversion and air source heat pumps (ASHP), ground heat 
and ground source heat pumps (GSHP), woodchip and biomass boiler, and wind with 
small single wind turbines. Large-scale developments included wind and wind farm, sun 
and solar farm, and organic waste and anaerobic digestion. Direct experiences of 
interviewees who had installed energy production is concentrated at the smaller scale (1 
MW and below). Of the small-scale energy production, the technology installed was 
highly dependent on the suitability of the building or land area for the technology, the 
ease of installation and the cost. Thus, solar PV was a popular choice as, compared to 
other technologies,  it can be installed on building rooves negating some space issues, it 
is a more common technology, thus installers are more readily available, it works with 
existing energy systems and in combination with other low-carbon energy production and 
it is relatively lower-cost. Other technologies such as GSHP require more space to house 
the technology and suitable external topographies, they are uncommon so sourcing 
installers and maintenance engineers can be problematic (see Figure 7.16) and although 
they can work with old radiator energy systems, they work best with underfloor heating 
and air-conditioning systems, increasing expense. 
 
63 See Section 6.3 
64 See Section 7.5 
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Positive transition experiences were not guaranteed as some interviewees experienced 
problems with installation and/or finding maintenance engineers if faults arose, costing 
more in the longer term (see also Figure 7.5). Additionally, while anecdotally discussed 
with public sector interviewees, some social housing tenants who had received ASHP had 
not been given training on how to use the system. This resulted in some tenants turning 
off the system completely and purchasing alternative small electric heaters. Others did 
not gain thermal comfort from the new system, this was attributed to ASHP working 
constantly to maintain ambient room temperatures, as opposed to radiating heat from a 
central point in the room. Thus, tenants did not feel the heat and turned up the system too 
high. As a consequence, they experienced very high energy bills comparative to what 
they would have previously experienced. In these instances, transition increased energy 
vulnerability by decreasing energy ‘Affordability’, creating ‘Inefficient’ energy 
‘Practices’ and not meeting energy ‘Needs’. 
Motivation to install transition interventions comprised concerns for the environment, 
improved living conditions and energy consumption reduction, and long-term financial 
investment and security65. These motivations were shared across interview groups, 
varying slightly between individuals. Energy efficiency and energy production 
interventions can last for many years depending on their maintenance and wear and tear, 
leading to reduced energy consumption and increased energy affordability for as long as 
they are in place. In addition, energy production can secure an income for seven years 
(RHI) or between 20-25 years (FIT). For households, energy production was taken up by 
owner-occupiers, with plans to remain in their current property long term. Additionally, 
most were in an older age group, currently retired or with plans to retire in the near future, 
income produced acted to supplement a fixed pension income (whether private/public or 
both) in addition to reducing outgoings which may be harder to maintain on retirement 
incomes and as ageing progressed.  
Many of the households involved in this research indicated that they would like to be able 
to take forward transition, for some who had already carried out some transition 
interventions, they would like to do more. However, in-line with other research (c.f. 
Walker 2008) the economic cost of transition to many was a barrier. While the costs may 
vary according to technology and scale, they are present no matter who is initiating the 
transition (household, community, SME or public sector). This was true even if living 
 
65 See Section 7.2 
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outside of the BBNP and thus under less stringent planning conditions and therefore able 
to install lower-cost interventions. This is where the economic disadvantages of 
peripheralization associated with a lack of agglomerative advantage, limited local 
employment that is low-skilled/low wage, higher living costs due to poor infrastructures, 
high energy costs and a reliance on personal transport (see Figure 8.1) are misaligned 
with the economic basis of transition. For many peripheral households the budget 
available to finance low-carbon interventions is already restricted but also the relative risk 
associated with such change should something go wrong is increased. Similar financial 
constraints were experienced across other interview groups. In this way, various 
peripheral disadvantages and spatial contingent energy vulnerabilities prevent low-carbon 
transition.  
Dependence on personal transport due to poor peripheral public transport networks 
combined with the need to travel longer distances to access essential services, 
employment and education are both cause and effect of peripheralization. This can raise 
the cost of living in the periphery. As per Section 8.2, these spatial elements are also 
energy vulnerability drivers, forming energy Needs and Practices specific to the 
periphery. Consequential to this is the impact it has on energy Affordability. Thus, as with 
many other aspects of peripherality, dependence on personal transport impact on 
household budgets makes the cost of low-carbon transition prohibitive to some. Low 
carbon transition could also cause further vehicle-related energy vulnerabilities, poor 
energy infrastructures could make electric vehicle networks limited in the periphery. 
Additionally, the cost of maintaining existing carbon-heavy fuel vehicles can mean that 
transitioning to electric vehicles is not possible anyway. Thus, this particular spatially 
contingent energy vulnerability can hold multiple problematics for low-carbon transition 
and represent lock-in to old carbon heavy technologies. 
Practices were affected by a number of factors. First, as an energy Need, dependence on 
personal vehicles to participate in many aspects of daily life in the periphery is also an 
energy Practice that increases energy vulnerability. Second, several interviewees used 
wood-burning stoves as a means of securing their energy supply due to past instances of 
being cut off from other sources. This along with some interviewees’ use of range-stoves 
created practices of predominantly using the room in the home with the stove or wood-
burner over winter months to keep warm as opposed to heating the whole home. While 
there are existing interventions that can assist households with such costs, for example, 
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Nest and Arbed, each held limited impact in the case-study area. With the exception of 
the BBNPA, area-based measurement tools such as the WIMD have been used by Local 
Authorities and the Third Sector to inform the application of such schemes66. 
Interviewees explained that the use of such measures enabled fast and strategic decisions 
to be made that ensured the highest volume of interventions were implemented for the 
lowest cost. As such tools weight more heavily deprivation in urban areas, it is those areas 
that are most frequently selected for assistance. Thus, in the instance of Arbed, a Welsh 
Government programme to assist households in fuel poverty, non-urban areas are 
overlooked, despite having need for the programme. In addition, programmes such as 
Nest which offer assistance to households based on individual need is only available to 
those claiming a benefit. This works against rural households in many ways, first as 
historically rural populations are less likely to claim benefits (Bramley & Watkins 2013; 
National Assembly for Wales 2008) there will be less households eligible for the 
programme. Second, benefit claims such as Universal Credit which can supplement low 
incomes, do not take into account the additional costs associated with rural living – 
transport and energy – thus, rural households are often identified as better off but may 
actually be living in work poverty67. 
For households of rented accommodation, transition barriers are not only associated with 
transition costs but also non-ownership of their accommodation whereby they usually 
lack the authority to make alterations to the building structure or energy services. This 
not only prevents transition unfolding but also increases energy vulnerability. This is in 
line with other research (c.f. Walker 2008; Bouzarovski 2013; Ambrose 2015) elucidating 
that lack of ownership over the building they live in means that private tenants lack the 
power to alter their energy source or alter the building to increase energy efficiency 
without landlord approval. For some in tenuous lease agreements, requesting such 
changes is out of the question due to fears of eviction; even if not tenants can feel unable 
to raise issues68. Additionally, it is not in either the Landlord’s best interest to invest in 
low-carbon measures as it will cost them money and benefit the tenant. Likewise, for the 
tenant, investing in a property they do not own would not benefit them unless the lease 
was especially long-term. While new UK-wide Landlord Regulations came into force in 
April 2018, they only stipulate that private rented properties should gain an Energy 
Performance Certificate of E rating (Department for Business Energy and Industrial 
 
66 See Section 6.3 
67 See Section 7.2 
68 See Section 7.5 
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Strategy [BEIS] 2018a)69, this is arguably still very poor. In Wales, the Housing Act 
(Wales) (2014) makes no stipulation of housing standards for private landlords. Social 
tenants are protected from some energy vulnerabilities brought on by poor housing 
conditions due to the Welsh Quality Housing Standard (2002). However, they are unable 
to actively participate in transition unless instigated by the landlord. 
Initiating low-carbon transition requires a level of knowledge of transition technologies, 
suitability to the place, transition finances and overall development processes including 
around planning permissions. A lack of knowledge links to the Practices energy 
vulnerability driver, whereby a lack of knowledge or existing socio-cultural norms can 
limit effective use of energy systems or prevent change to alternative systems. Different 
capacity deficits between groups have been shown to counteract each other if low-carbon 
transition was taken forward in partnership (c.f. Institute of Welsh Affairs 2019; Seyfang 
et al. 2013). Partnership working between local authorities and third sector groups, or 
even multiple combinations including businesses and commercial developers can fill 
knowledge, time and economic gaps that each other may hold. Other research has 
demonstrated this can be of benefit to all partners (c.f. Institute of Welsh Affairs 2019; 
Seyfang et al. 2013). Partnership working between local actors can also mean low carbon 
transition ownership is retained by the same actors and the benefits are at their disposal. 
Within the case study area, the BBNPA presents an example of how local governance can 
influence the trajectory of low-carbon transition through partnership working70.  
The BBNPA has capitalised on its unique position of having an environmentally based 
core purpose, understanding of the Park’s natural resources and relationships with 
resident communities and other public bodies. This has resulted in the formation of 
nuanced, place-specific transitions taken on by community groups and the BBNPA 
individually and also in partnership. For example, co-working between the BBNPA and 
community group The Green Valleys enabled the growth of the group into a Community 
Interest Company (CIC) which has since gone on to assist numerous other communities 
and SMEs to install micro-hydro energy production (see also Figure 7.4). This could be 
further expanded on as the environmental focus of the BBNPA core purpose together with 
strong multi-scale local networks means it could further facilitate a nuanced, place-
specific transition and foster partnership between itself and/or between other 
 
69 See also Chapter 1 
70 See Chapter 6 
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organisations, groups and BBNP communities. This can be complementary to its core 
purposes of protecting the natural environment and generating economic outputs by being 
an actor within various transition activities. By building on its existing transition base, 
the BBNP could be “international exemplars for sustainability” by “providing exemplars 
of best practice for wider Wales” (Marsden et al. 2015, p. 27 and p. 41). 
While these examples demonstrate excellent routes of partnership working at smaller 
scales, they are at present uncommon and even within the Local Authorities themselves 
are usually stand-alone projects. Additionally, in some ways the same institutions that 
facilitate partnership working, can work against low-carbon transition progress. In the 
case of the BBNP, the core purpose ‘to conserve and enhance the natural beauty, wildlife 
and cultural heritage of the national parks’ can prevent some low-carbon transition. This 
can be by creating further administrative processes, or higher financial expenditure for 
low-carbon interventions that are publicly visible, for example, in the installation of 
external wall insulation which is a permitted development outside of conservation areas 
but which requires approval within them71. For this reason, some communities in the 
BBNP can experience energy vulnerabilities that are compound by the core purposes of 
the BBNPA. Thus, local governance, with key knowledge of place, vulnerabilities and 
also transition processes are in a key position to progress transition. However, place-
specific factors, such as conservation designations and the constraints of working within 
large geographic areas curtail these abilities and, in some cases, work against peripheral 
populations.  
For community groups, low-carbon transition provided the means for some public 
services and community assets to increase their economic viability by reducing operation 
costs for public buildings and services. This can protect against the ongoing public 
spending reductions for services and local amenities. Additionally, as per Figure 6.7 
income generated from low-carbon energy production offers an opportunity to direct 
spend on areas that meets specific local needs, whether that is further low-carbon 
measures, social inclusion or transport poverty. In the case of community groups and third 
sector, transition was planned and implemented by volunteers; as such the time they can 
devote to such undertakings is limited. Community group interviewees spoke of volunteer 
fatigue and of “burnout” (Haggerty & McBride 2016, p. 217), due to the heavy investment 
of time needed to devote to low-carbon projects for success. In particular working through 
 
71 See Chapter 7 
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the various development processes such as securing the location for development and 
carrying out feasibility studies and gaining planning permission were cited as the most 
difficult and time-consuming processes. To succeed, community capacity must be strong 
(Middlemiss & Parish 2010; Adams & Bell 2015), even then, there was no guarantee of 
success. 
For the Small Medium Enterprises (SME) and Farms interviewed, again, low-carbon 
transition held similar benefits. However, as the scale of these transitions tended to be 
greater, so too were some of the benefits realised. Transition as in case of one farm 
(Figure 7.4) provided an income that was equivalent to that of the farming activity and 
subsidies. This offered long-term financial security providing piece of mind in addition 
to the ability to reinvest in other low-carbon interventions. For the SME in Figure 7.3, 
the financial security and income provided by transition has allowed further reinvestment 
in low-carbon interventions and the ability to extend opening hours and employ other 
staff. These were financial risks that in the past may have been too great to attempt. In 
this way, low-carbon transition offers a means of reducing energy vulnerabilities for 
communities and SMEs and also counteracting some elements of peripheralization. 
However, undertaking low-carbon transition for SME’s can represent a risk as staff taking 
forward low-carbon transition may already have another full-time role, in perhaps an 
unrelated field. As one SME interview demonstrated (see Figure 7.5), embarking on low-
carbon transition without this can be costly. As highlighted by all interviewees in Chapter 
6 this is in part due to the planning and energy regime at all scales being difficult to 
navigate for small-scale developers, where due to their limited knowledge and economic 
capacity transition risks are emphasised.  
As per Chapter 6, industrial sectors in the periphery are characterised by their economic 
vulnerability. This includes the agricultural sector which as highlighted by an interviewee 
(Section 7.2) can be intensive to energy consumers. Producing their own energy instead 
of purchasing it can realise substantial economic savings. The benefits of increased 
income via energy production may be more salient for farmers as the UK leaves the 
European Union (EU) (or Brexit). For example, the agricultural sector in the UK is largely 
subsidised and governed by EU frameworks such as the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), EU structural funds and EU regulations around the environment and agriculture 
(Wales Centre for Public Policy 2018). As the agreement for Brexit as a whole is still 
being ratified, questions remain over what funding will be granted for the sector and how 
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it will be governed and regulated (Wales Centre for Public Policy 2018). The removal of 
other EU funding sources such as Structural Funds, of which Wales receives £680 million 
per year, aimed at addressing poverty and reducing regional disparities will hold impacts 
for areas considered economically deprived, and Wales as a whole. EU Structural Funds 
are to be replaced with a UK Shared Prosperity fund, however, as decisions taken by the 
centre can marginalise the periphery, there are concerns regarding what share for the 
funds Wales will received and what caveats may be placed on spend (National Assembly 
for Wales 2018b). This is worsened by a perceived lack of communication between Wales 
and Westminster leaving “important decisions relating to post-Brexit funding for Wales 
[…] in the hands of the UK Government” (National Assembly for Wales 2018b, p. 9). 
Thus, transition in such instances could offer economic protection from uncertain 
economic changes. 
The spatial contingencies of low-carbon transition are highlighted in Table 8.1. This table 
expands on Table 4.2 which outlined the spatial contingency of energy vulnerability 
drivers. Now, columns are added to outline the opportunities transition can present in the 
periphery to alter energy vulnerabilities and also the ways that peripherality can obstruct 
these causing injustices. 
 
Overall, transition has been taken forward in various ways within the energy periphery. 
When transition is affected, it can positively impact upon energy vulnerabilities, 
increasing energy ‘Access’, ‘Affordability’, ‘Flexibility’, ‘Energy Efficiency’, and 
positively impacting energy ‘Needs’ and ‘Practices’. It also holds some opportunity to 
improve elements of peripheral disadvantage. Economically transition can reduce 
outgoings and secure new income revenues by reducing economic outgoings, this has a 
wider benefit of reducing the cost of peripheral living, retaining the viability of public 
















Table 8.1. Peripheral low-carbon transition energy vulnerability opportunities and injustices 
 
Source: Author 
However, asymmetrical distribution of political, economic and social power between the 
periphery and the centre inform a lack of recognition and marginalisation of peripheral 
energy needs and aspirations, the spatial distribution of energy and other infrastructures 
and peripheral socioeconomics. All of these form elements of peripheral disadvantage 
which also inform spatially contingent energy vulnerabilities including particular energy 
needs and practices.  Low-carbon transition mode, scale and distribution is consequently 
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8.5  Implications for justice 
Drawing on the empirical evidence and analysis of this research along with knowledge 
gained from the wider literature this section summaries the overall theoretical 
contribution of this thesis. This research has explored the nexus of peripherality, energy 
vulnerability and low carbon transition. In order to fully grasp the interplay between 
peripheral disadvantage, energy injustice and transition, an energy justice and spatial 
justice lens was adopted. Energy justice and energy vulnerability offers a framework to 
explore equity and fairness at any or all stages of an energy system. Spatial justice 
attempts to elucidate and make visible how dynamics of power and social fairness 
manifest spatially leading to uneven access to certain spaces and resources or ability to 
make good use of them. Sharing foundations in social and environmental justice, 
combined they illuminate how socio-cultural, economic and political forces work to 
create different places, the relative position of which influences the distribution of costs 
and benefits within the whole energy system.  
A combination of theoretical and pragmatic considerations informed the bounding of the 
case study. Pragmatically, funding arrangements and personal researcher constraints 
limited at least part of the data collection to be based in Wales, and the Brecon Beacons 
National Park.  Theoretically, consideration was given to concepts of fuel poverty 
(Boardman 1991; 2015;  Hills et al. 2013; Middlemiss & Gillard 2015; Snell et al. 2015), 
energy vulnerability (Day & Walker 2013; Hall et al. 2013; Bouzarovski 2013; Simcock 
& Petrova 2017) and energy justice (Hall et al. 2013; Heffron et al. 2015; Sovacool & 
Dworkin 2015; Jenkins et al. 2016) within which, it is understood that energy deprivation 
is unevenly experienced thought society and holding multiple materially harmful 
outcomes for those deprived of energy.  
Second, processes of spatialization and place creation were considered, drawing on core 
and periphery theories which understand that the development of spatial hierarchies 
economical favour core places to the detriment of peripheral places (Myrdal 1957; 
Krugman 1991; Fujita et al. 1999; Copus 2001; Hudson 2015). Such spatial structures 
hold more than economic consequence, influencing political and socio-cultural 
representation and rhetoric (Bourdieu 1984; Lefebvre 1991; Schneider & Ingram 1993; 
Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013) and ultimately influencing the ability of peoples within 
peripheral places to inform decisions about their own economies and resources (Hayter 
et al. 2003; Argent 2013; Fischer-Tahir & Nauman 2013; Calvert 2016; Milbourne & 
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Mason 2017; Bridge et al. 2018). Thus, creating unevenly distributed power through 
space, or spatialized injustice (c.f. Dikeç 2001; Soja 2010) that accumulates in the 
periphery.  
These two main theoretical considerations were important to consider together as energy 
is interlinked within spatialization processes and therefore, there may be connection 
between energy and peripheralization, peripheralization and energy vulnerability and 
finally peripherality, energy vulnerability and low carbon transition. Considering theory 
and pragmatisms, the case study was bound in and around the Brecon Beacons National 
Park (BBNP), Mid-South Wales, which while predominantly rural, in line with Fischer-
Tahir & Nauman (2013) assertion that often peripherality coincides with rurality, the case 
also included some exurban and post-industrial areas. In this way a multitude of 
differently spatially positioned perspectives were exemplified, illuminating the multiple 
interplay between processes of peripheralization, energy vulnerability and energy 
transition in Wales.    
Interviewees experiences of peripherality were varied and numerous, manifesting as 
political marginalisation, as decline in public services, as weak economy and in poor 
transport infrastructures. Such experiences held wide impacts, affecting the effectiveness 
of public service delivery, employment opportunities and incomes (household and 
business), and residual income. Through triangulation with other sources of cultural, 
economic and political data, such as media representations, official statistics, 
parliamentary proceedings and other research, it is apparent that these individual 
experiences are reflective of wider peripherality in Wales. What also became apparent 
was that existing energy infrastructure reflected spatial hierarchies, where older networks 
with a sparser reach were evident in the case study area comparative to core places in 
Wales. This spatial energy configuration was materially visible to interviewees, 
especially those who had no choice but to source alternative energy. Similar to the other 
aspects of peripherality that were discusses, energy-related peripherality was also 
informed by both historic and current economic and spatial development processes. 
Through the exploration of peripheral experience, understanding was gained as to some 
of the ways that spatial injustices and energy injustices interplay within a peripheral 
context and can create energy vulnerabilities that are specific to the periphery.  
Within the periphery, various experiences of energy vulnerability were highlighted. Some 
were discussed by interviewees that could be considered as ‘non-place specific’ for 
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example, vulnerabilities due to housing tenure, however, many of the energy 
vulnerabilities experienced were place-specific or spatially contingent. As outlined in 
Section 8.2, spatial contingency was found within all six energy vulnerability drivers; 
Access, Affordability, Energy Efficiency, Flexibility, Practices and Needs. Indeed, the 
connection between peripherality and energy vulnerability were found to be multiple with 
numerous possible constellations of interconnections (see also Figure 8.1). The 
interconnection means that more than one form of energy vulnerability can be 
experienced at one time, for lack of ‘Access’ to energy, due to peripheral disadvantage 
can impact the ‘Affordability’ of alternative energy sourced, how ‘Efficient’ alternative 
energy system configurations are, whether alternative ‘Practices’ are adopted to facilitate 
such alternatives and how energy ‘Needs’ are met. The research also found that similar 
to peripherality, energy vulnerability can be circular in effect whereby one energy 
vulnerability, very simply, ‘Affordability’ can create ‘Inflexibility’ to alter the current 
energy context, thus leaving a household ‘locked in’ to unaffordable energy and 
feedbacking to ‘Affordability’.   
Seeking to more comprehensively realise the interplay between peripheral disadvantage, 
energy injustice and their consequence, consideration was extended further than at the 
point of end use, or energy vulnerability experienced at a household scale. Exploring 
interplay at all stages of the energy system – at points of energy production, distribution 
as well as consumption – illuminated how energy vulnerabilities at a household scale are 
informed by other interplays between energy processes and spatialization further 
‘upstream’ in the energy system. This consideration does not veer away from the 
empirical findings; indeed, it fits within the expressed experiences and perspectives of 
many of the interviewees who themselves linked together processes of energy production 
and their own consumption. This interplay is discussed in Section 8.2 and exemplified in 
Figure 8.2.  
In this case, a periphery with availability of natural resources for energy production, but 
with low populations and limited social, economic and political capacity experience 
difficulty in accessing the same energy produced. The same weak social, economic and 
political capacity creates problematics for the recognition and inclusion of peripheries in 
energy decisions and other processes. Without recognition of peripheral energy (and 
wider) needs and wants, little influence from the periphery is placed on how, where, at 
what scale and by whom energy production takes place. Likewise, little influence is 
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placed on how and to whom it is the energy itself is distributed and at what cost, in 
addition to any of the other benefits that may arise. Any input into decision making by 
peripheries is skewed by their weak and dependent economic position, making any 
development that offers some economic benefits, especially those which promise 
employment, very attractive - even if employment opportunities are limited and/or low 
paid and other benefits are only short term. This is in line with core-periphery theories 
(c.f. Argent 2013; Hayter et al. 2003) and other research that has demonstrated such 
processes are extractive and foster further dependence on external economic investment 
and energy vulnerable (c.f. Yenneti et al. 2016; Bryn et al. 2017).  
From this, ‘energy periphery’ is conceptualised - providing a means of focusing attention 
on the unique energy injustices experienced throughout an energy system by peripheral 
places – raising attention to the frequent co-constitution of spatial injustice and energy 
injustice. Energy periphery also encapsulates how some peripheral communities 
experience place-specific energy vulnerabilities and disadvantages through the entire 
energy system due to relative spatially asymmetrical distribution of power between 
peripheries and centres. These processes, inherently interconnected and circular maintain 
the self-reinforcing process of peripheralization and its disadvantageous outcomes, 
imbued with energy injustices. Energy periphery derives spatial foundation from 
‘periphery’ as understood in key core-periphery theory (Myrdal 1957; Krugman 1991; 
Copus 2001; Forslid & Ottaviano 2003; Ascani et al. 2012; Hudson 2015), is a relative 
concept and applicable at many scales within many contexts. As such, energy periphery 
is not confined to this research case study and can be applied to other places to exemplify 
similar disadvantageous energo-spatio contexts. There are a number of advantages to 
applying the energy periphery concept to different contexts at global, national and sub-
national scales. First, the energy poverty and transition literature retains a focus on core 
and urban contexts, little focus to date has been placed upon peripheral and rural 
experiences of energy deprivation and energy transition. Second, as energy transition is 
increasingly positioned as a civic and environmental good, economic development and a 
means to reducing energy costs and thus aiding the eradication of fuel poverty (Foxon et 
al. 2010; Hawkey et al. 2013; Pye et al. 2015, p. 673; Jenkins et al. 2016; Benedek et al. 
2019), research is needed to explore how and where this is and is not the case.  
Energy periphery does not intend to apply a broad brush and un-nuanced understanding 
of peripherality-energy vulnerability-transition nexus. In line with other research 
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findings, the various low carbon transitions that became evident during the course of this 
research within the periphery do appear to be creating a more ‘just’ energy system in 
many ways (Foxon 2013; Szulecki 2018; Benedek et al. 2019). First, it is being taken up 
by many individuals and organisations - from individual households, to commercial 
businesses and the public sector – and at varying scales (e.g. micro, meso and macro). In 
terms of energy production, such varied take up is decentralising energy production and 
de-monopolising if not democratising the energy system. Energy production and energy 
conservation interventions singularly or combined did counteract some elements of 
peripheral disadvantage and peripheral-specific energy vulnerabilities. For example, by 
reducing energy consumption and proving savings on energy bills, by providing an 
alternative and secure energy supply (Figure 7.15) and with the most striking results 
visible at micro/meso scale – providing economic subsidisation for small businesses and 
public services (Figures 7.3 and 7.4). This has small but knock-on effects for the local 
economies, leaving households with more surplus income to spend, providing more local 
employment opportunities, or maintaining local services that offer social and community 
benefits, retention of such services reduces the need to travel elsewhere. In addition, as 
some of the interviewees expressed, it offered piece of mind for those on limited incomes 
or ill health, relieving some burden of bill paying and offering increased comfort within 
their homes. 
However, the take-up of low carbon transition opportunities was not universal, as outlined 
in the previous section, some interviewees spoke of ambition to produce their own energy 
or install carbon saving interventions but faced difficulties in doing so. These difficulties 
were traced back to the combination of spatial injustices and energy injustices inherent 
within peripheral disadvantage. For example, elements of peripherality such as sparse and 
declining populations contribute to poor local energy infrastructure, these in combination 
with energy inefficient and inflexible homes, an energy vulnerability driver, means many 
of the households interviewed sourced alternative (non-mains) energy that were often 
more carbon heavy and are higher cost. In addition to meet their energy needs, the same 
households would need to consume more energy than their counterparts in non-peripheral 
places. Such contexts limited the physical adaptability of the existing energy system 
configuration (old, poor energy infrastructure – inflexible building and household energy 
system design) as well as financial ability to participate in transition. This example only 
highlights one limited combination of how peripherality elements and peripheral energy 
vulnerability drivers can align and limit transition uptake. As Figures 8.1 and 8.2 
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demonstrate such combinations can be variable and multiple. Thus, adopting a spatial and 
energy justice lens has provided a means for unpacking the dynamics involved in creating 
situations of energy deprivation and other energy vulnerabilities by expanding 
contributing factors to more than issues of household budgets, building structure and 
energy consumption. Instead contributing factors were expanded to include the socio-
technical, socio-economic and socio-political at multiple scales.  
The lens has also allowed consideration of energy production and distribution in addition 
to consumption. Illuminated by this is that energy vulnerability may manifest most readily 
at a household scale and the socio-geographic and socio-economic structure of different 
places means that these vulnerabilities can be exacerbated depending on location. In 
addition, energy vulnerability is more than an energy injustice at the point of supposed 
consumption. Instead it is impacted on by predecessor energy processes of production 
and distribution (c.f. Figure 8.2). Each process holds spatial implications in how and 
where they materially positioned which is informed by economic and socio-political 
structures and decisions. This research identified that in the periphery, energy injustices 
are present in all three energy processes - production, distribution and consumption - 
capacity to own energy production and distribution and manage consumption levels and 
costs here is limited. This affects multiple actors in addition to households, for example 
affecting community groups, businesses and the public sector. These injustices are likely 
to increase in relevance as decentralisation becomes more common during low-carbon 
energy transition and existing peripheral disadvantages remain, reinforcing some of the 
existing uneven distribution of costs and benefits within the energy system.  
While low carbon transition may be disrupting some aspects of the existing energy 
system, it is still unfolding within it, and is similarly both advanced and constrained by 
liberal energy market logics. For this reason, as with the pre-existing energy system, low 
carbon transition retains preference for energy production via large-scale development, 
and energy distribution to those who can afford it. Energy distribution still predominantly 
take place across existing distribution networks, at lower cost to places closer to central 
points and higher cost to those in remote areas. Thus, with some exceptions, low carbon 
transition does not remediate poor energy access in places where costs cannot be recouped 
quickly. Only at micro scales of energy production and distribution is transition altering 
distribution and cost - where energy producers can consume their own energy. In order 
to benefit from this, in most cases transition requires economic buy-in – thus even at this 
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scale with enhanced distribution and democratisation transition remains subject to 
capitalist logics.  
As transition has progressed so far costs and benefits have not been evenly distributed, 
including how and where transition is taking place, who is taking it forward and how and 
who pays the costs and who gains the benefits. This holds immediate implications for 
energy justice including energy vulnerability. Transition also holds spatial implications, 
most visible at a larger scale where locations for energy production are sought that have 
space, populations and access to natural resource, thus favouring rural peripheries. 
Additionally, energy vulnerability and space also hold implications for transition, where 
those already energy vulnerable are least able to take on transition and, due to the spatial 
contingency of energy vulnerabilities, this will impact more profoundly on some places 
over others. Thus, energy vulnerability, spatialization and transition processes are highly 
interlinked. Energy transition in energy peripheries appears to benefit a small range of 
households, alleviating their end-use energy vulnerability via domestic energy production 
or increased energy efficiency, but most households remain locked-in to outdated, 
inefficient, carbon heavy technologies in the form of carbon heavy vehicles and domestic 
energy systems. Overall, peripherality inhibits abilities to take advantage of the 
opportunities low-carbon transition presents, risking compounding existing 
vulnerabilities. 
Overall, this research has established that the spatial injustice of peripherality holds direct 
and indirect impacts on energy vulnerability and energy transition. For peripheries, 
characterised by various disadvantages and declines, energy vulnerabilities are 
pronounced and place-specific. Place-specific energy vulnerabilities interplay with wider 
energy vulnerabilities throughout the energy system compounding their impacts, creating 
energy peripheries. Therefore, while energy transition is possible and is also able to 
counteract aspects of place-specific disadvantage and energy vulnerabilities, spatial 
differentiation and the relative weaker social, economic and political power held within 
peripheries compared to the core, influences where this can take place. Further solidifying 
differential spatial transition abilities is the economic basis of transition which 
amalgamates with the economic foundations of spatialization. Peripheries are 
subsequently in weak positions to take advantage of transition opportunities and risk 
deeper peripherality as transition progresses without them unless steps are taken now to 
address spatially contingent energy injustices inherent within the transition process. 
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This research has established that processes of spatialization hold direct and indirect 
impacts on energy vulnerability, and combined, spatialization and spatially contingent 
energy vulnerabilities influence low-carbon energy transition. Spatial structures, such as 
core-periphery, and the advantages and disadvantages asymmetrically embedded within 
them, including energy vulnerabilities, are difficult to challenge as they are reinforced 
through a variety of social, political and economic constructions. Each of which, while 
interconnected, are individually multi-scalar and complex.  
 
8.6 Recommendations to harness energy transition and reduce 
peripheral vulnerabilities 
This research has established that processes of spatialization hold direct and indirect 
impacts on energy vulnerability and energy transition. Such spatial structures and the 
disadvantages embedded within them are difficult to challenge as they are reinforced 
through a variety of social, political and economic constructions, each of which, while 
interconnected, are individually multi-scalar and complex. Additionally, while energy 
transition, even in its most democratic and fair form, is unlikely to re-position peripheries 
as cores (or vice versa) it does hold opportunities to redress some of the current spatial 
imbalance and benefit peripheral populations. For energy transition to have such 
influence, its current trajectory and distribution of its costs and benefits must be addressed 
now, as currently it is reinforcing an already uneven and discriminatory energy system.  
Uneven distributions of political power between countries and within regions and sub-
regions of policy powers, funding and autonomy interplays with socio-cultural and 
economic processes to the disadvantage of peripheries at many scales. In addition, the 
drive towards certain modes of low-carbon transition, including those which may or may 
not counteract energy vulnerabilities is heavily influenced by policy. As such, policy 
recommendations are made towards addressing imbalance of power and recognition: 
• Ofgem should recognise and address the disadvantages faced by energy customers in 
Wales regarding energy costs.  
• Existing policy levers in Wales must recognise and accommodate the varying 
endowments and needs of different places, and be utilized in ways where policy 
objectives can be applied in different places but in complementary ways. 
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• Policy commitment for all energy developments ‘to have an element of local 
ownership’ needs to be nuanced and strengthened, this links with a strengthening of 
guidelines for the allocation and management of community benefit funds to ensure 
no community is disadvantaged due to relative peripherality. 
• Welsh low-carbon energy supply chains and R&D must be encouraged to develop 
and grow. This includes the development of energy production and energy efficiency 
technologies. In addition, a greater emphasis is needed on research and 
implementation of new heat technologies to counteract limitations of electricity grid. 
 
A key problematic of low-carbon transition and energy vulnerability at household scale 
was how current assistance programmes can be exclusionary due to how they measure 
the need for assistance. Compounding this is the non-recognition of the extra costs 
associated with living in rural areas. Finally, in order that households are able to 
transition, place-based limitations on transition must be addressed:  
• Housing Regulations should be strengthened to offer better protection in terms of 
building energy efficiencies for privately rented homes. 
• Programmes towards assisting households’ transition should focus more widely on 
energy needs in combination with building structures. In addition, programmes 
should not be limited to benefit claimants, instead actual living costs (including 
energy costs and transport costs) should be considered. 
 
Finally, local governance and policy institutions hold a fundamental role in addressing 
energy vulnerabilities, localised peripheral disadvantages and taking forward low-carbon 
transition. Having excellent knowledge bases of place-based assets and needs, 
recommendations are made as to how these can be capitalised upon: 
• The BBNP to become a ‘niche’ space for transition: enabling communities to 
transition more easily; facilitate partnership working; and further actively 
participating in low-carbon transition as an organisation. 
• Planning procedures should view more favourably energy developments, particularly 
small-scale, which stipulate local reinvestment of profits or which stipulate 





8.7 Research limitations & further research 
This research adopted a qualitative research design and aimed to gain depth of 
understanding currently unfulfilled within the literature. While every effort was made to 
reduces weaknesses in the research process, doubtless there remain areas for 
improvement. The case study area, based in Wales and in and around the Brecon Beacons 
National Park (BBNP) provided an excellent foundation for the exploration of the effects 
of multi-scalar and different interplaying processes of peripheralization, energy 
vulnerability and energy transition. In addition, the effects of alternate governance 
arrangements and priorities on the preservation of such spaces, and possible energy 
vulnerabilities and transition routes were also illuminated. However, in bounding the 
research in such a way, other spaces have not been explored. For example, while 
peripherality within the case area is understood, it may have been beneficial to also 
explore similar or different peripheries within Wales or even within other countries, such 
as Scotland. The development of the energy periphery concept thus at present is applicable 
to Wales, and although likely applicable to other peripheries, further research may be 
required to explore if this is the case. In addition, this research due to its design captures 
perceptions of peripherality and energy vulnerability in Wales strongly. To balance this 
other data had to be sourced, for example, policy documents, official statistics and other 
research to triangulate the perceptions and experiences presented.  
 
Measuring the key concepts of peripherality and energy vulnerability proved challenging 
as both are relative and subjective. To try and bound peripherality required taking a wider 
view of the case study area, where it is positioned physically, and relatively socially and 
spatio-economically in Wales and then the UK. Energy vulnerability while easier to 
bound thanks to the ‘energy vulnerability drivers’ proposed by Simcock and Petrova 
(2017), still remained relatively open to interpretation. In addition, ‘vulnerability’ was not 
a term that could be readily used during interviews with households as despite some living 
in precarious energy contexts, personally they would not identify as vulnerable. Thus, 
alternative ways of asking questions that did not imply their specific vulnerability had to 
be designed. 
 
Illuminating energy vulnerability may have benefitted from alternative methods to those 
used in this research. As energy is largely intangible, except in the services it provides, or 
the heat it produces, taking about it (or lack of) can be hard to articulate. Other research 
has attempted to overcome this by using Narrative or Biographic methods with photo 
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elicitation (c.f. Henwood et al. 2015). Adopting an alternative approach such as these may 
have eased discussions of energy and energy vulnerability for the interviewees and 
perhaps illuminated alternative insights that this research has not. Similarly, low-carbon 
transitions proved to be an abstract concept for some interviewees, other research has used 
Deliberative Focus groups to inform and untangle participant perspectives. Finally, as 
low-carbon transitions are changes to the energy regime in time as well as space, this 
research would have benefited from a longitudinal approach (c.f. Roberts & Henwood 
2019) researching the same groups or communities of people, or phenomena at different 
times, thus gaining an insight into changes through time. Capturing possible changes in 
perceptions and experiences over time in this case-study area would be of great benefit to 
transition research. 
 
Interviewee selection due to the recruitment strategy adopted held some self-selection 
bias. This is evident with regards to domestic and community interviews as opposed to 
the other groups. For example, the majority of owned households and community groups 
interviewed were those that had taken some form of transition forward and who 
volunteered their time after seeing the research advertised. Other tenure types or third 
sector groups without transition had to be purposely recruited and are fewer in sample 
numbers. This provided its own benefits, enhancing understanding of how and who within 
peripheries are able to participate in transition, and in terms of household demographics 
– more closely represented that of the overall study area.  However, further interviews 
with those ‘non-transitioning’ or more ‘passively-transitioning’ would strengthen 
findings around energy vulnerabilities and transition barriers. Additionally, the Brecon 
Beacons National Park Authority (BBNPA) played an informative role during initial 
research design and interviewee recruitment, especially at the early stages. This influence 
is likely to have biased the research towards focusing most readily on areas within the 
BBNP and with interviewees closely connected to the BBNPA. However, this was limited 
in some way during later data collection stages by carrying out interviews with people 
outside of the BBNP and unconnected (at least in a direct sense) to the BBNPA.  
During the research many new energy related research projects were completed in Wales 
and new policies and energy targets were released. This included, the Environment 
(Wales) Act (2016), Wales Act (2017), Planning Policy (version 10) Wales (2019), 
Climate Change Regulations (Wales) (2019) in addition to commitments announced in 
2017 towards 70% of electricity generated in Wales to be from renewables and 1GW of 
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energy to be locally owned by 2030 and by 2020 all renewable energy production to have 
an element of local ownership. Indeed, as this research concludes, the Wales Act (2017) 
will come into force and energy policy will be further devolved placing it more in-line 
with other UK countries. In connection to this, in business rates in Wales increased in 
2016, holding severe ramifications for previously exempt micro-hydro where some saw a 
tax increase of on average 300%72. Additionally, in 2018 Westminster announced its 
decision not to support the Swansea Bay Tidal Lagoon (SBTL). While the announcement 
came after data collection had completed, it was predicted by many long before. These 
two political and policy actions no doubt influenced some of the perceptions of UK and 
Welsh political governance held by interviewees. Thus, further research would be 
beneficial to follow the outcomes of such policies and research agendas on peripheral 
energy vulnerabilities and transition.  
In addition, a major context shift is occurring in Europe and the UK more generally in the 
form of Brexit (the UKs exit from the EU). This is predicted to have severe ramifications 
for the agricultural sector (see Section 8.4) and also economically deprived areas of 
Wales, both of which have been in receipt of substantial EU subsidies (since 2000 
economically deprived areas of Wales have received £53bn) (Dickens 2017). Withdrawal 
of such EU subsidies is to be replaced by a UK Shared Prosperity Fund, however, 
concerns remain as to the share Wales will receive given its peripheral position in the UK 
(National Assembly for Wales 2018b). As such, further research is required to monitor 
and explore this political process and periphery impacts. 
 
There are several new low-carbon developments currently in trial stages in Wales as 
Regulatory Sandboxes (Ofgem 2017b). Further research into their success and the wider 
transition ‘demonstrator projects’ underway in the UK would be beneficial to establish 
which may be best routes for peripheral areas in Wales. Finally, the reduction in FIT has 
already led to new transition business models being adopted by many actors. In particular, 
partnerships between different actors. Further research is needed to establish the extent of 
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Appendix 1. UK Government Fuel Poverty Policy 1991-2018 
 
Government Scheme Dates Detail 








Generally, offers grants and advice to households to improve home energy efficiency. All devolved schemes 
aimed at income benefit claimants and pensioners. 
 
Devolved as of 1999. In England it was replaced with Warm Front; Scotland with Warm Deal; Wales with 
HEES; and N. Ireland with Domestic Energy Efficiency Scheme (DEES). 
 
The Home Energy 
Conservation Act 1995 
& Decent Home Programme 
 
1995 Requirement for each housing authority to identify measures to achieve significant improvements in the 
energy efficiency of dwellings in its areas. Target: 30% improvement from 1996 baseline by 2010. 
 
Cold Weather Payments 1995 The average temperature at a specified weather station must be recorded or forecast as 0°C or below for seven 
consecutive days between November and March. Original payments were £8.50 per week but increased to 
£25 per week in 2008. Eligibility is based on receipt of certain income benefits. 
 
Winter Fuel Payments 1997 Tax-free annual payment for those eligible for state pension. Where the oldest person is under 80 the payment 
is £200, where the oldest person is over 80 the payment is £300. 
 
Warm Homes and Energy 
Conservation Act 
 
2000 Required devolved governments to create strategies for fuel poverty. Also linked to devolved versions of 
HEES. 
Warm Front Scheme 2000-11 Households could get up to £3,500 to improve heating or insulation in their home for example via 
loft/cavity/hot water tank insulation, draught-proofing, gas, electric or oil heating upgrades. Home must be 
owned or privately rented and occupier must qualify for means-tested benefit. (England only). 
 
Fuel Poverty Strategy 2001 Set out UK strategy to alleviate fuel poverty by 2018. Specific plans and targets for each devolved country 
were then made in separate subsequent strategies. 
 
Decent Homes Standard 
 





2004 Introduced a Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) where cold homes are a Category 1 Hazzard 
(most severe category). 
 
















Loans for improvements to domestic energy efficiency improvements paid back via energy bills. Debt stayed 
with property not occupier. 
 
Loans were replaced by grants. 
 
Energy Performance of Buildings 
(Certificates & Inspections) 
(England & Wales) Regulations 
 
2007 Places a legal requirement for buildings that are sold or rented to have an Energy Performance Inspection and 
an Energy Performance Certificate.  
Warm Homes Discount 2011 Rebate of £140 for electricity. Eligibility is split between core group and broader group. The broader group 
rebate is issued on a first come first served basis. 
 
Energy Company Obligation 1 
(ECO1) 
 
Energy Company Obligation 2 
(ECO2) 
 
Energy Company Obligation 2t 
(ECO2t) 
 












Measures are paid for by all energy customers via a levy on bills.  
 
Energy suppliers with more than 250,000 customers are automatically required to deliver ECO. By 2020 all 
suppliers with more than 150,000 customers will be obligated. Energy suppliers must contribute to a certain 
amount of energy-efficient home improvements, based on its share of the energy market. ECO outlined carbon 
savings to be found via; Carbon Emissions Reduction Obligation (CERO); Carbon Saving Community 
Obligation (CSCO) / Rural sub-obligation; and Home Heating Cost Reduction Obligation (HHCRO).  
 
Under ECO2t, which ran from 1 April 2017 to 30 September 2018, suppliers were also required to deliver 
against an additional obligation called the Carbon Emissions Reduction Obligation (CERO). 
 
ECO3 means ECO policy will be entirely formed from one obligation: Home Heating Cost Reduction 
Obligation (HHCRO) or Affordable Warmth. Obligated suppliers must mainly promote measures which 
improve the ability of low income, fuel poor and vulnerable households to heat their homes. This includes 
actions that result in heating savings, such as the replacement of a broken heating system or the upgrade of an 
inefficient heating system. 
 
Current eligibility is for homeowners or private tenants in receipt of income benefit (energy efficiency and 
heating upgrades). Social tenants in house rated EPC E or below. 
 
Energy Efficiency (Private rented 
property) Regulations (England & 
Wales) 
2015 After 2016 landlords cannot unreasonably refuse requests by tenants for energy efficiency.  
From 2016 landlords must ensure their buildings are at least EPC E. 
 
From 2018 if building EPC is below level E it cannot be tenanted. 
 
From 2020 if building EPC is below level E it cannot have existing leases renewed. 
 
Pre-payment Meter Price Cap 2017-20 Implemented following recommendation from the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA). The price cap 
was for customers on pre-payment meters.  
310 
 
Safeguarding Tariff 2018 An extension of the original price cap (above), to protect customers deemed to be vulnerable as they receive 
the Warm Homes Discount. 
 
Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff 
Cap) Act 























Appendix 2. UK Government Climate Change Policy 1994-2019 
 
Government Scheme Date Detail 
Air passenger duty 1994 Air passenger duty (APD) is charged on all passenger flights from UK airports. The rate of duty varies 
according to passenger destination and the class of passenger travel.  
 
Landfill Tax 1996 First UK tax with an explicit environmental purpose. The tax is collected from landfill site operators. It is 
charged at a standard rate per tonne on ‘active waste’ (such as plastic packaging), and at a lower rate on 
inactive waste (such as builder’s rubble). When the tax was first introduced, the standard rate of tax was £7, 
and the lower rate was £2. The standard rate of tax has been increased steadily since 1999, and at present is 
set at £40 per tonne. 
 
Climate Change Levy (CCL),  
Exemption (CCLE), and Carbon Price 
Support (CPS) 
2001  The CCL is a tax on UK business energy use, charged at the time of supply for energy sourced from electricity, 
gas, liquid petroleum gas and solid fuel.  The CCLE is a tax exemption business energy use where electricity 
was sourced from certain renewable sources and combined heat and power (CHP). Energy used by the 
domestic sector and public transport is exempt from the levy. (levy reduced in 2015) 
 
Enhanced Capital Allowance (ECA) 
scheme 
2001-18 Businesses can set 100% of the cost of the low-carbon asset against taxable profits in a single tax year (for the 
1st year). Thus, companies can write off the cost of the new plant or machinery against the business’s taxable 
profits in the financial year the purchase was made. 
 
Aggregates Levy 2002 It was introduced to encourage the recycling of aggregate and is often a consideration in infrastructure and 
other civil engineering projects as well as the quarrying industry. In particular it applies to sand, gravel and 
rock that has been either: Dug from the ground; Dredged from the sea; Imported. Businesses must register 
with HMRC if they exploit aggregate in the UK and must report the quantity of aggregate that has been 
produced or sold each quarter. Tax relief may be available for aggregates that are exported or used in certain 
industrial or agricultural processes, or if the material is not actually used as aggregate. Materials such as soil, 
vegetation and other organic matter are also exempt. 
 
Renewable Obligation and Renewable 
Obligation Certificates 
 
2002-17 Obligation for energy suppliers to source proportion of electricity supply from renewable sources. 
Climate Change Act 2008 Places a legally binding requirement on the Government to set five-yearly carbon budgets, twelve years in 
advance, from 2008 to 2050.  The Government is required to consider the advice of the Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC, also created under the 2008 Act) when setting these budgets.  The aim is to meet the 2008 
Act’s target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. 
 
Since the 2008 Act became law, the UK has ratified the Paris Agreement with more ambitious aims to limit 




Energy Saving Programme 2008 Energy suppliers and new energy generators have to install energy efficiency measures in deprived areas. 
 
Display Energy Certificates (DECs) 
 
2008 Mandatory energy performance report of public buildings. 
UK Low Carbon Transition Plan - 
National Strategy for climate and 
energy 
 
2009 Plan for UK low-carbon transition from 2009-2020.  
Carbon Budget Order  2009 The first three budgets are for the following five-year periods: 2008-12, 2013-17 and 2018-22. 
 
Renewable Energy Strategy 2009 Outlines how the UK will meet 15% of energy from renewables by 2020. 
 
Community Energy Saving 
Programme 
 
2009-12 Placed obligation on large UK energy companies to deliver energy saving measures to low income households. 
The Energy Act 2010 Contains the legislative provisions required to implement elements of the 'UK Low-carbon Transition Plan - 
National Strategy for climate and energy (2009)’.  
 
Carbon Reduction Commitment 
Energy Efficiency Scheme Order 
2010-19 Introduced in the Climate Change Act 2008. The CRC was aimed at increasing energy efficiency and reducing 
carbon emissions from large non-intensive energy users. These emissions are thought to constitute around 
10% of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the UK. The scheme applied to organisations that, over the course of a 
year, used more than 6,000 megawatt-hours (MWh) of certain electricity and had at least one half-hourly 
meter settled on the half-hourly electricity market. Both private and public sector companies were subject to 
the CRC.  
 
Renewables Obligation Order Feed-in 
Tariffs (ROO-FIT) 
2010-19 ROO-FIT is payable for 20 years for electricity generation between 51kw and 5MW. The number of new 
installations that can receive support under the FIT scheme each month has been capped since 2015. Permitted 
technologies: solar photovoltaic; wind; micro combined heat and power (CHP); hydro; and Anaerobic 
digestion (AD). 
 
Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) 2010-19 FIT is payable for 20 years (10 years for CHP) for renewable electricity production of 50kw or below. The 
number of new installations that can receive support under the FIT scheme each month has been capped since 
2015. Permitted technologies: solar photovoltaic; wind; micro combined heat and power (CHP); hydro; and 
Anaerobic digestion (AD). 
 
UK Renewable Energy Roadmap 2011 Outlines renewable energy targets to 2020. 
 




Renewable Heat Incentive (non-
domestic) 
2011 Eligible installations receive quarterly payments over 20 years based on the amount of heat generated. 
Permitted technologies: solid biomass; biogas below 200kWth; ground and water source heat pumps; 
geothermal; solar; energy from waste; and CHP system using biomass (different dates of installation apply to 
each technology). 
 
Carbon Saving Community 
Obligation 
2012-13 Placed obligation on large UK energy companies to provide carbon saving measures to domestic energy users 
living in areas of low income, adjoining areas and rural areas. 
 
The Carbon Price Floor (CPF) 2013 The CPF taxes fossil fuels used to generate electricity via Carbon Price Support rates set under the Climate 
Change Levy. 
 





2013 A steady retainer payment for reliable supply and demand side capacity providers in the UK. 
Contracts for Difference (CfD) 2014 CfDs incentivise investment in renewable energy by providing developers of projects with high upfront costs 
and long lifetimes with direct protection from volatile wholesale prices, and they protect consumers from 
paying increased support costs when electricity prices are high. Successful developers of renewable projects 
enter into a private law contract with the Low-carbon Contracts Company (LCCC), a government-owned 
company. Developers are paid a flat (indexed) rate for the electricity they produce over a 15-year period; the 
difference between the ‘strike price’ (a price for electricity reflecting the cost of investing in a particular low-
carbon technology) and the ‘reference price’ (a measure of the average market price for electricity in the GB 
market). 
 
Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme 
(ESOS) 
 
2014 Mandatory energy assessment scheme and energy saving identification scheme for large undertakings. 
Renewable Heat Incentive (domestic) 2014 Eligible installations receive quarterly payments over 20 years based on the amount of heat generated. 
Permitted technologies: solid biomass; biogas below 200kWth; ground and water source heat pumps; 
geothermal; solar; energy from waste; and CHP system using biomass (different dates of installation apply to 
each technology). 
 
Big Energy Saving Network 2015-16 £1 million for training, support, grants for Third Sector/community groups for outreach to vulnerable 
customers. 
 
Carbon Budget Order 2016 5th Carbon Budget. reducing carbon emissions 57% by 2030 on 1990 level (tougher than the carbon emissions 
target the UK is signed up to as part of the European Union, which requires a 40% cut by 2030 on 1990 levels). 
 
Clean Growth Strategy 
 
2017 Outlined policy plan to meet current and future carbon budgets. 
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Air quality plan for nitrogen dioxide 
(NO2) in UK  
 
2017 End the sale of all new conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040. 
Implementing the end of unabated 
coal by 2025 
 











Appendix 3. Interview Protocols 
 
DRAFT  Interview Protocol, Project: Impacts of energy transitions on 












Position of Interviewee(s): 
 
Breaking the ice 
How long have you lived in the area? If moved into area, why? What do you like 
about area? What don’t you like about area? Is there anything you would 
change? Who do you live with? Have you always lived at same address? 
In terms of local amenities like food shops or doctors surgeries or post offices 
etc, are these things available in your area? How do you get to them? Do you 
need to leave area to access anything?  
What do they do for a living? Is the job local or do you travel? Is that the same 
for other members of the household? How do they travel? Why? Do you have 
own transport?  
If yes, How important is that to you? How often do you have buy petrol? Can 
you buy it locally? Is your vehicle young/old/reliable? Do you mind having to 
travel? 
If public transport, How important is that you? How often do you use the 
service? How regular is the service? What are your feelings about using the 
service? 
Can you describe your typical day?  
 
Further – local area 
If children – is the school close? Are there many local clubs/activities for 
children? Are you personally a part of local clubs/organizations? Why? How did 
they join? 
Free time? Actives? Family and friends in the area? 
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Energy, interventions and other household requirements 
What would you say your highest expenses are every month? Why? Which are 
the essentials or priorities that you have to have? How important is having 
access to energy to you? Why?  
Do you know how much you spend on heating and electric? Which is the most? 
What type of energy do you use in the house? Have you ever considered 
changing your energy supply? Why?  
How do you pay [pay as you go/monthly/quarterly/by delivery]? How easy is it to 
manage these payments? Would you prefer to pay another way? 
What are the main influences over how much energy you need or use? Do you 
think you have enough energy to meet your needs? In what way? Do you feel 
that you have control over how much energy you need? 
Would you say you’re conscious about how much energy you use? Have you 
ever felt you need to reduce how much energy you use? Why? Have you taken 
action to reduce your energy consumption? 
If mentioned energy saving measures above – How did you find out to do 
[change light bulbs, change boiler, install insulation]? Was it easy to do? Have 
you noticed any difference to your bills? Has it had any other impacts to you or 
your family? Why did you take this action? 
Has there ever been a time when you have struggled to pay for your energy? If 
so how did you manage? If you prioritized your energy bill was there something 
else that had to be sacrificed? If you had to choose for some reason between 
[putting fuel in your car/paying for your bus ticket] or paying your energy bill, 
which would you prioritize? 
 
Governance and accessing information 
Do you have any interest in UK national or Welsh government policies and 
strategies? Do you think the decisions made within these institutions have any 
direct impact on your life generally? Or specifically with regards to energy? 
What do you think about that? 
Who do you think are the key players or decision makers when it comes to 
energy in your area? What roles do they play? How do you think this affects 
you? How do you think this may affect other local people? 
Do you think decisions made by national or local authorities reflect your needs? 
What do you think is being missed?  
Do you know where to get information about making your home more energy 
efficient or installing renewable energy sources? Have you ever tried to access 
information? Who do you think can assist you with this in your area? Would you 
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know how to gain information to different grants or subsidies you may be 
entitled to? 
Have you ever accessed assistance to [install energy production/make home 
more energy efficient]? If so, how did you hear about it? What scheme was it? 
Who was it run by? How did it affect you? 
Do you feel you can participate in energy efficiency or renewable energy 
schemes, either for your household or wider community? Why? Do you know if 
there are any community energy schemes in your area? Do you think they have 
impacted the area? 
 
If a Community Project in local area 
What do you know of xxxx community project? 
Have you been involved with the project at all? 
How do you think the project has affected you or your family? 
How do you think the project has affected the community? 
Have you seen any changes in the community, positive or negative, as a result 
of this project? 
Has the project changed your views on energy in any way? 
In terms of your energy use, do you think the project has had an impact? 
In terms of your energy bills, do you think the project has had an impact? 
Given the current political climate and number of cuts being made to welfare 
and community budgets, do you think this project will have an impact in 
lessening these affects? 



























Position of Interviewee(s): 
 
General energy issues 
In your opinion, what are the main issues with regards to energy people within 
your constituency are facing? 
How does this compare/interact with other issues? 
Do you think people within the constituency are able to comfortably manage 
their energy bills? 




Are there mechanisms in place to assist people with energy related issues? i.e. 
bill payment, consumption reduction? 
Do you think these mechanisms could be improved? 
Do you think renewable energy schemes or retrofitting schemes are easily 
accessible by all the community? 
Do you think they make any impacts to people’s day to day lives? 
Are there people within the community who you think may be missing out on the 
benefits from these schemes? Why? 
 
Community project 
Have you been involved with xxxx project? In what way? 




What impact do you think xxxx community project has had on the community as 
a whole? 
Do you think the project would be easily replicated? 
Do you think other projects may have greater positive impacts? Are there 



































Appendix 4. List of events attended for context building, 
observation and potential interview recruitment. 
 
Date Event Organised by 
7.10.15 The Green Valleys Annual Meeting The Green Valleys 
16.05.16 Brecon Beacons National Park Authority Senior 
Management Meeting 
BBNPA 
20.05.16 BBNPA Committee Annual Meeting BBNPA 
16.11.16 Powys Public Service Board consultancy project 
seminar 
Powys County Council 
13.07.17 Energy Policy Seminar National Assembly for Wales 
17.07.17 Low-carbon energy targets - call for evidence Welsh Government & Western 
Power Distribution 
19.07.17 Cross Party Working Group - Sustainable Energy RenewUK (Wales)  
13.09.17 BBNPA and Universities collaboration workshop BBNPA 
26.09.17 Getting on-shore wind back on track  RenewUK (Wales)  
10.10.17 Cross Party Working Group - Fuel Poverty and 
Energy Efficiency 
National Energy Action 
18.10.17 SMARTER Energy Innovation Welsh Government 
18.10.17 NEA Fuel Poverty Forum National Energy Action 
14.02.18 Cross Party Working Group - Sustainable Energy RenewUK (Wales)  
26.02.18 Locally Owned Renewable Energy - call for 
evidence 
Welsh Government 
10.07.18 SMARTER Wales: A Fairer Energy Future Welsh Government 
26.09.18 Cross Party Working Group - Fuel Poverty and 
Energy Efficiency 


















Appendix 6. Ethical Approval 
Cardiff School of Planning and Geography 
 
 
SUBMISSION OF ETHICAL APPROVAL FORMS 
 
 
Staff and MPhil/PhD Projects 
 
ALL FORMS FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL MUST BE 
SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE SCHOOL 
ETHICS COMMITTEE IN GOOD TIME (PREFERABLY 2 
WEEKS) BEFORE THE NEXT SCHEDULED SREC 
MEETING 
An electronic version must to emailed to Ruth Leo, Secretary of 
Ethics Committee LeoR@cardiff.ac.uk / Tel Ext: 74601/ Room 2.54 
Glamorgan Building as a work attachment, bearing relevant staff 
and/or PGR Student signatures. 
Title of Project: Impacts of energy transitions on vulnerable 
peripheral communities  
Name of researcher(s):  
Kate O’Sullivan 
Date:    23 MAY 2016  
Signature of lead researcher: 
                                                                        
Student project 




* Cardiff University’s Child Protection Procedures: 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/govrn/cocom/resources/2010%20November%20Safeguarding%20Children%20&%20VA's.doc 
If you have answered ‘yes’ to any of the above questions please outline (in an 
attached ethics statement) how you intend to deal with the ethical issues involved  
Data Protection: Yes No N/A 
9 Will you tell participants that their participation is 
voluntary? 
x   
10 Will you obtain written consent for participation?  If 
“No” please explain how you will be getting informed 
consent. 
x   
11 If the research is observational, will you ask 
participants for their consent to being observed?  
x   
12 Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from 
the research at any time and for any reasons? 
x   
13 Will you give potential participants a significant 
period of time to consider participation? 
x   
If you have answered ‘no’ to any of these questions please explain (in your ethics 
statement) the reasons for your decision and how you intend to deal with any 
ethical decisions involved 
Recruitment Procedures: Yes No N/A  
1 Does your project include children under 16 years of 
age?  
 x  
2 Have you read the Child Protection Procedures below?   x 
3 Does your project include people with learning or 
communication difficulties? 
 x  
4 Does your project include people in custody?  x  
5 Is your project likely to include people involved in illegal 
activities? 
 x  
6 Does your project involve people belonging to a 
vulnerable group, other than those listed above? 
 x  
7 Does your project include people who are, or are likely to 
become your clients or clients of the department in which 
you work? 
 x  
8 Does your project include people for whom English / 
Welsh is not their first language? 
 x  
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Possible Harm to Participants: Yes No N/A  
14 Is there any realistic risk of any participants 
experiencing either physical or psychological distress 
or discomfort? 
 x  
15 Is there any realistic risk of any participants 
experiencing a detriment to their interests as a result 
of participation? 
 x  
 
Research Governance: Yes No N/A  
16 Does your study include the use of a drug? 
You will need to contact Research Governance 
before submission (resgov@cf.ac.uk) 
 x  
17 Does the study involve the collection or use of 
human tissue? 
You will need to contact the Human Tissue Act team 
before submission (hta@cf.ac.uk) 




If there are any risks to the participants you must explain in your ethics 
statement how you intend to minimise these risks 
Data Protection: Yes No N/A  
18 Will any non-anonymised and/or personalised data 
be generated and/or stored? 
x   
19 Will you have access to documents containing 
sensitive73 data about living individuals? 
If “Yes” will you gain the consent of the individuals 
concerned? 
 x  
  x 
Data protection Act Guidelines 
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/socsi/research/researchethics/ 
If there are any other potential ethical issues that you think the Committee should 
consider please explain them in an ethics statement. It is your obligation to bring 
to the attention of the Committee any ethical issues not covered on this form. 












Please provide following information for the committee: 
Funding Source 
ESRC Student Research Training Support Grant. 
What are the main objectives of this research? 
The current low-carbon energy transition is predicted to impact different households 
and communities within the UK in different ways, influenced largely upon their relative 
geographical location, level of wealth, energy needs and consumption. The impacts of 
transition are also likely to be diverse making some households and communities 
energy vulnerable while others may become more secure. Through adopting qualitative 
data collection methods and energy justice and energy vulnerability perspective, this 
project aims to establish the socio-economic impacts of low-carbon energy transitions 
on vulnerable peripheral communities in the Brecon Beacons National Park, Wales. It 
will largely focus on: what households are energy vulnerable and in what ways; how 
are different households experiencing low-carbon energy transition; how does this 
impacts upon their day to day life and general community life; and how governance 
arrangements affect who experiences the transition in certain ways. 
In order to achieve these aims the project seeks to address the following questions: 
 
1.    How are (low-carbon) energy transitions experienced by different households 
in peripheral places?  
1.1  Why are some households actively involved with low-carbon energy innovations 
while others are not? 
1.2 How are those households involved with low-carbon energy innovations energy 
vulnerable? 
1.3 How does engagement or non-engagement with low-carbon energy practices and 
innovations impact upon energy transition experiences? 
1.4 How does engagement or non-engagement with low-carbon energy practices 
impact upon energy vulnerability? 
 
2.   How do (low-carbon) energy transitions interplay with the socio-economic 
evolution of peripheral places? 
2.1 How do energy transitions affect community and regional economies? 
2.2 How do energy transitions affect how places and community relationships within 
the BBNP are experienced by those who live there? 
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2.3  How do the presence of different social groups and population sizes influence how 
energy transition is enacted in different places within the BBNP? 
 
3.  How do multi-level and multi-actor governance arrangements and inter-
relationships affect where, who and how (low-carbon) energy transitions are 
experienced? 
3.1    How are governance structures arranged in the BBNPA? 
3.2  How do inter-relationships between institutions, authorities, innovators, 
communities and households influence energy transition processes, locations and 
technologies? 
3.3   How do existing governance systems and structures impact upon energy 
vulnerability? 
 
4.     What theoretical and methodological advancement can be made with respect 
to energy vulnerabilities in peripheral places? 
4.1    How can the relationship between energy justice and social justice be further 
understood and advanced through the conceptualisation of energy vulnerability? 
4.2   How far can energy vulnerability, as a concept derived from energy and social 
justice, enhance understandings of energy transitions and possible uneven 
impacts? 
4.3  How can the nature and influence of peripherality be unpacked with respect to 
energy transitions? 
4.3  How can the findings from the research be used to affect a change at a policy or 
community enablement level? 
 
Who are the research participants?  
The project will examine a number of Wales-based case studies, particularly involving 
homeowners and communities that have been involved in some form of low-carbon 
energy production and/or energy efficiency activities. It will also investigate the informal 
and institutional structures surrounding them. As such, it is expected that participants will 
include, individuals who live in the selected areas, individuals working in local and 
national government bodies and the Brecon Beacons National Park Authority. It will also 
involve consultancy and for-profit organisations, charities or not-for profit organisations 
and community groups specialising in low-carbon energy production or energy efficiency 
activities. In order to gain perspectives of households indirectly or passively experiencing 
energy transition, participants will also be sought via non-energy related project groups 
for example, social clubs, food banks or community farms etc. All participants will be 
adults (aged 18 and over), who will be competent to give informed consent.  
 
What methodologies will you be using? 
As the study aims to develop the in-depth understanding of how vulnerable communities 
experience energy transitions, the adopted methodology will employ qualitative methods. 
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This is consistent with the nature of qualitative research, the primary concern of which is 
to develop an understanding of unexplored social phenomena. Specifically, the project 
will use the following methods:  
1. Documentary Analysis – this method include searching, selecting and reading 
written material including socio-demographic-economic details of the areas and 
populations living there in addition to both cultural and geographical characteristics of 
the areas. The purpose of the method is to establish facts about the areas, households 
and geographical communities in general. Geographical characteristics will help provide 
an understanding of the restrictions and opportunities available to those communities 
with regards to low-carbon energy production projects and also their predicted physical 
peripherality in relation to urban centres. This will help with the selection of case sites. 
2. Semi structured Interviews – these will involve asking open-ended questions aiming 
to explore the perception of participants and allowing them to express their point of view.  
4. Group Discussions – this method includes focus groups with shareholders and 
institutional partners. The method will aim to gather the perspective of the group and 
identify points of agreement, potential areas of disagreement, and further actions 
required. The results of discussions may be also used by participants, which makes 
group discussions less extractive method of research.  
5. Participants Observation – this method will aim for researcher to visit the sites and 
attend meetings in order to learn about the activities taking place and process of making 
decisions in the natural setting. 
Ethics Statement 
Obligations to research participants and safety 
I understand that as a social science researcher I have obligation to research participants 
to ensure that they are protected, that risks are not created and existing vulnerabilities 
are not exacerbated. Therefore, Cardiff University’s Code of Practice will guide this 
statement and the research. It will also comply with Cardiff University’s Research Ethics 
Guidance and following ESRC Key Principles for Research Ethics (2015): 
1.) Research participants should take part voluntarily, free from any coercion or undue 
influence, and their rights, dignity and (when possible) autonomy should be respected 
and appropriately protected. 
2.) Researchers should aim to maximise the benefit of the research and minimise 
potential risk of harm to participants and researchers. All potential risk and harm should 
be mitigated by robust precautions 
3.) Research staff and participants should be given appropriate information about the 
purpose, methods and intended uses of the research, what their participation in the 
research entails and what risks and benefits, if any, are involved. 
4.) Individual research participant and group preferences regarding anonymity should be 
respected and participant requirements concerning the confidential nature of information 
and personal data should be respected. 
5.) Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure recognised 
standards of integrity are met, and quality and transparency are assured. 
6.) The independence of research should be clear, and any conflicts of interest or 
partiality should be explicit. 
328 
 
In addition to the above principles, all reasonable measures will be taken to ensure that 
the risks of harm to participants will be minimised. I will adhere to any additional safety 
guidelines in the places and organisations I visited, and I will ensure that someone knows 
my whereabouts when on site.  
 
Recruitment and Consent 
I will ensure that key contacts of the chosen energy related projects or institutional 
partner (e.g. chair, director, project manager, key consultant or lead volunteer) will be 
formally approached to explain the research and to request their cooperation. Subject to 
their agreement, those people regularly involved in the particular scheme or community 
shares projects will be informed about the research and their participation requested.  
The vital recognition of this research process is that although young people, people with 
disabilities and people for whom English is not a first language may be present in a 
community projects this study aims to research, these people are not a target group of 
the research in the present study. Interviews and focus groups will be only conducted 
with adults over the age of 18 years and capable of giving informed consent. 
Nonetheless, acknowledging that it is very difficult for the researcher to have a full 
knowledge of each participants’ vulnerabilities, the researcher will treat any such cases 
with sensitivity. 
All primary data collection, that is semi-structured interviews, focus groups and 
participant observation, are aimed to be taken upon informed written consent of 
individuals involved. Each participant will receive copy of Participant Information 
Sheet. This document describes the purpose of the study, what it entails, what will 
happen with data obtained and the right of each participant to withdraw from the study 
at any time. The Information Sheet contains the contact details of doctoral researcher 
and her supervisors, should any participant wish to contact them to raise any issues.  
I will also discuss the purpose of the study and right to withdraw at any time without 
providing a reason with each participant individually and allow time for reflection before 
asking if he/she agree to participate and asking them to sign up the Participant Consent 
Form. Each participant will be given a copy of consent form.  
I remain open to the possibility of using verbal consent in situations where recording 
equipment is being used, emphasising in advance, but I will use such eventuality only in 
the situations when written consent is not possible or impractical (high number of 
participants at the annual shareholders meetings). In case of such eventuality, I will 
mitigate lack of written consent by being in constant contact with the participants. If a 
participant expresses any concern (directly or indirectly) in any aspect of the research, I 
will acknowledge this and discuss it with them, reminding them of the option to withdraw. 
Confidentiality and data security 
In the context of my study the most significant dimension relating to the privacy of 
participants involved will be with regards to recording of data. Recordings and all other 
electronic data will be stored in on the password protected personal computer and only 
student will have access to the password. The paper data will be kept in a locked drawer 
in a locked office. Data will be used for academic purposes of the student only, and audio 
recordings will be destroyed by permanent deletion after completion of this project.  
All the personal data will be anonymized consistent with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
All care will be taken to ensure that quotations and other data is not individually 
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attributable. For the case studies, should they feel they require anonymity, each scheme 
will be allocated a pseudonym.    
Attachments: 
Participant Information Sheet 
Participant Consent Form 
 
Any changes to the nature of the project that result in the project being 
significantly different to that originally approved by the committee must be 
communicated to the Ethics Committee immediately. 
